



FINABEL
THE EUROPEAN LAND FORCE
COMMANDERS ORGANISATION

MARCH 2026

From Arms Control to Uncertainty: Europe in a Post-New START World

Leen Leclercq

Defence & Security Research Department



RESEARCH REPORT



FINABEL
THE EUROPEAN LAND FORCE
COMMANDERS ORGANISATION

Defence & Security Research Department

Written by: **Leen Leclercq**

Supervised by: **Finn Seiffert, Élea Huguet**

Edited by: **Alexandra Huggins**

FINABEL's Research Reports are concise, research-driven publications designed to keep Europe's defence community informed about the latest strategic, military, and geopolitical developments. Released three times per week, these short-form papers offer timely analysis on emerging trends affecting European land forces. Each Research Report is produced by the researchers of FINABEL's Permanent Secretariat, in the goal of supporting decision-making across the European defence landscape.



RESEARCH REPORT

Introduction

For decades, bilateral treaties between the U.S. and Russia, together with international instruments, formed the backbone of the international nuclear security regime. This architecture was a mix of legally binding limits on their nuclear weaponry and multilateral agreements on non-proliferation and disarmament, especially under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Through the imposition of limits, verification mechanisms and institutional dialogue, this system increased strategic predictability and reduced the risk of unrestrained nuclear escalation between major powers. During the last two decades, however, this framework has largely disappeared, with the most recent landmark being the expiry of the New START Treaty on 5 February 2026. This means that, for the first time since the early 1970s, there are no longer any binding restrictions on the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two largest nuclear-weapon states. Rather than an isolated development, this marks a broader erosion of the post-Cold War arms control framework (Woolf, 2023). At the same time, the non-proliferation regime is also under pressure, partly due to frustration over the lack of progress on disarmament and the establishment of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which has highlighted normative tensions within Europe (Meyer & Sauer, 2023).

This paper argues that these developments reflect a structural shift toward uncertainty in the international nuclear order rather than a temporary treaty crisis. These developments are of direct significance to Europe. Geographically and politically, the continent is located in close proximity to nuclear superpowers and for decades, it was one of the primary beneficiaries of the relative stability that nuclear arms control brought. The erosion of these mechanisms raises some fundamental questions about strategic stability, crisis management and Europe's position in an increasingly competitive and multipolar nuclear environment. This paper, therefore, analyses the erosion of the nuclear arms control framework in recent years and assesses its implications for Europe's strategic environment in an increasingly multipolar nuclear order.

The Post - Cold War framework

Towards the end of the 1940s and early 1950s, concerns grew about uncontrolled proliferation and the risk of nuclear escalation. The first attempts to manage these risks took the form of multilateral treaties. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, a modest de-escalation in U.S.-USSR relations created political space for renewed diplomatic efforts, which resulted in the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (Bunn & Rhineland, 2008, p. 2). The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was adopted in 1968 after extensive diplomatic discussions. The five recognised nuclear-weapon states agreed not to transfer or assist in the development of nuclear weapons, while non-nuclear states committed to abstain from acquiring or producing such weapons and to accept IAEA inspections (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT], 1968, arts. I–III). Additionally, all signatories pledged to “pursue negotiations in good faith on measures to end the nuclear arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament, as well as on a treaty for general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” (NPT, 1968, art. VI). By legally codifying the distinction between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, the treaty established a limited ‘nuclear club’, increasing the element of prestige and exclusivity associated with nuclear weapons (Sauer, 2020, p. 44).

From the early 1970s onwards, bilateral nuclear arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union became more structured and binding. With the signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreement (SALT I) in 1972, formal restrictions were, for the first time, placed on the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons (Woolf, 2023, pp. 9-12). In the following decades, as shown in *Table 1*, a network of bilateral arms control treaties developed, changing the size and composition of the American and Soviet, later Russian, nuclear arsenals. Between 1972 and 2010, several agreements limited both offensive nuclear delivery systems and, in one case, ballistic missile defence systems (Russell, 2021, pp. 3-4). Efforts like the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of the 1990s and the New START Treaty of 2011 helped this process, by, for example, setting limits on active warheads and launch vehicles and adding verification procedures. For non-nuclear-weapon states in Europe, particularly NATO members, these treaties enhanced stability and increased the credibility of American extended deterrence (Portela, 2020). From a deterrence perspective, the agreements created a credible threat that discouraged potential aggression while reducing the likelihood of confrontation between major powers on European territory. This contributed to Europe’s security strategy of the past decades, increasingly pursued through transformative engagement, with lower defence spending, smaller modern armies and greater dependence on the presence and protection of the U.S. (Brustlein, 2018, p. 26; Bollfrass & Budjeryn, 2020, p. 1).

From Stability to Uncertainty

Bilateral Arms Control Under Strain

Although this framework facilitated a relatively stable strategic environment in the post-Cold War era, it gradually eroded in the twenty-first century. The United States' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002 marked the first structural shift, enabling new deployments of missile defences (Portela, 2020, p. 8). This decision reflected growing scepticism within parts of the U.S. political system toward legally binding limits on missile defence (Kühn, 2022, pp. 332-334). More broadly, it demonstrated how difficult it had become to maintain bipartisan support for nuclear arms control agreements in the long term. In fact, no new nuclear arms control treaty with Russia has been concluded under Republican administrations since 1991 (Kühn, 2022, p. 336). In the years that followed, mutual accusations of treaty violations increased. By 2019, only two bilateral treaties remained in force due to withdrawals and expirations (see *tables 1* and *2*). This culminated in the Trump administration's withdrawal from the INF Treaty in August 2019, which collapsed the following day when Russia also withdrew (Portela, 2020, p. 9). The Treaty's demise reintroduced the possibility of deploying land-based missiles with a range of 500-5,500 kilometres on the European continent, thereby increasing regional uncertainty (Neuneck, 2019, p. 437).

In addition, under both Trump administrations, U.S. policy increasingly prioritized China, officially identifying it as a "strategic competitor" engaged in a "historic military buildup" (U.S. Department of Defense, 2026, pp. 3-4). Consequently, purely bilateral arms control agreements with Russia were viewed as insufficient unless China was also incorporated into the framework. As a result, renewing or expanding arms control with Moscow became a lower strategic priority. Beyond this geopolitical shift, technological developments have also played a significant role, particularly the emergence of offensive cyber capabilities and new weapon categories not covered by the existing treaties. The main problem lies in the uncertainty surrounding their potential military nuclear applications, which calls into question the relevance of treaties that don't account for these emerging technologies (Portela, 2020, p.10). With the loss of earlier treaties, New START remained the only binding instrument limiting the strategic nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, until it expired, after a 5-year extension in 2021, on February 5, 2026. Without a follow-up treaty, for the first time since the early 1970s, there is no longer a legally binding framework limiting the size of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two largest nuclear-weapon states (Woolf, 2023).

Whereas treaties previously offered quantitative limits, verification and institutional dialogue, we are now seeing a situation in which uncertainty and worst-case planning may once again take centre stage.

Strains on the Nuclear Bargain

Parallel to the erosion of bilateral arms control, the non-proliferation regime is also under increasing pressure. Many non-nuclear-weapon states are frustrated by the limited progress on nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT (Abe, 2020, p. 225). Additionally, although the NPT has limited proliferation, it has not prevented the acquisition of nuclear weapons by all states. Currently, apart from the five nuclear powers of the treaty, North Korea, India, Pakistan, and, most likely, Israel also possess nuclear arms (Abe, 2020, p. 229; Kristensen & Korda, 2022, pp. 39-41; Kristensen & Korda, 2025, pp. 178-183). North Korea is unique in that it joined the NPT and later acquired nuclear weapons, unlike other nuclear-armed states that never acceded to the treaty (Abe, 2020, p. 229).¹ All nine nuclear-weapon states continued to modernise or strengthen their arsenals in 2024, raising concerns about a renewed arms race (Kristensen & Korda, 2025, p. 178; Immenkamp, 2021, p. 3). The crisis surrounding Iran and its suspected activities related to a nuclear weapons programme also raised new questions about how quickly a country could actually develop nuclear weapons once it decided to take that step (Abe, 2020, pp. 229-230).

Frustration with the disarmament process manifested in a new treaty, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which was adopted in 2017 and entered into force in 2021 (Meyer & Sauer, 2023; United Nations, 2017). Although no nuclear-weapon states are party to the treaty (nor are NATO Member States), the TPNW poses a challenge to the existing nuclear order, as it creates a legal framework that categorically delegitimises the possession of nuclear weapons. Among other things, it prohibits the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which makes the doctrine of nuclear deterrence illicit for the signatory states (Meyer & Sauer, 2023, p. 62). The EU Member States' positions on the TPNW vary (see figure 1). Even though the only countries to vote in favour of the TPNW were Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta and Sweden, and only Austria, Ireland and Malta have ratified it, public opinion in some NATO nuclear-sharing states favours joining the treaty and removing U.S. nuclear weapons. This highlights a tension between domestic political pressures and NATO's official stance against the TPNW (ICAN, 2019; Immenkamp, 2021, p. 5). This tension is heightened by the presence of France as a nuclear-weapon state within the EU, which rejects the treaty and insists that nuclear deterrence remains essential for its national and European security. Taken together, these elements indicate that the issue extends beyond isolated treaty failures and instead points to a broader structural transformation toward increasing uncertainty in the international nuclear order.

¹ North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985, withdrew in 2003, and was reported to have conducted a nuclear test in 2006. IAEA inspectors departed the country in 2009 following the DPRK's decision to cease all cooperation with the IAEA. (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2026).

Implications for Europe and Possible Options

As key bilateral treaties collapse and multilateral agreements come under pressure, Europe is losing important frameworks that long provided stability, transparency and predictability in the nuclear order. Against the backdrop of worsening NATO-Russia relations and growing mistrust among nuclear-weapon states, Europe must navigate a more volatile strategic environment. The expiration of New START can carry serious consequences for Europe, as it was the main beneficiary of the treaty's protections. Without binding constraints on the American and Russian strategic arsenals, there is once again scope for an uncontrolled arms race, the impact of which is likely to be felt primarily on European territory (Portela, 2020, p. 11). The treaty did not require the destruction of nuclear warheads, allowing both parties to expand their arsenals relatively quickly after expiry. In addition, the comprehensive verification system, which included inspections, data exchange and military communication channels, was an important source of transparency and mutual trust, offering insight into the "size, capabilities, and operations" of the Russian nuclear arsenal (Portela, 2020; Klotz, 2020, p. 11). The disappearance of this verification system increases the risk of misperception and crisis instability in moments of heightened tension. It is more reasonable to assume that, rather than a rapid quantitative rebuild, the process will be qualitative in nature, for example, through the integration of emerging disruptive technologies into nuclear doctrine or the incorporation of hypersonic systems in nuclear missions (Portela, 2020, p. 11; Sauer, 2024, p. 4). In such a scenario, EU Member States, especially those that are also NATO allies, risk being drawn into an intensified strategic confrontation between the U.S. and Russia, while their influence on the U.S. nuclear buildup remains limited (Portela, 2020, p. 11). In addition, there is also the question of whether the doctrines of minimum or sufficient deterrence pursued by European nuclear powers (France and the United Kingdom, the latter no longer a member of the Union) remain credible if other major powers significantly expand their arsenals or modernise them even more intensively (Kamp, 2025, p. 4).

The weakening of the nuclear arms control framework coincides with a gradual deterioration in transatlantic relations and, as mentioned before, a shift in American strategic priorities towards China. Although the United States remains formally committed to NATO and European security, Europe is no longer the central focus of its strategic planning (U.S. Department of Defense, 2026). This increases uncertainty, feeding into the debate about European strategic autonomy and raises questions about the future nature and credibility of the American nuclear umbrella, which has always served as a nuclear non-proliferation instrument (Kamp, 2025, p. 2). Whether the 'closing' of the umbrella is likely to occur or not, this context has reignited debate over a potential European nuclear deterrent. In general terms, consideration is being given to a possible strengthening of the European dimension within existing nuclear structures, such as the Europeanisation of the French nuclear deterrent, or to alternative forms of cooperation between European nuclear powers and other Member States.²

² For a more detailed discussion on this topic, see: Sauer, T. (2022). The nuclear umbrella in Europe. *Arms Control and Europe: New Challenges and Prospects for Strategic Stability*, 57-68. ; Kamp, K. H. (2025). What If the USA Closes Its Nuclear Umbrella Over Europe? ; Lambert-Deslandes, É., & von Hlatky, S. (2025). NATO, nuclear deterrence and disarmament in an age of US ambivalence. *Defence Studies*, 25(3), 682-689.

Nevertheless, such proposals remain politically sensitive and strategically complex for several reasons, including that U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is closely intertwined with NATO structures and transatlantic ties (Kamp, 2025). These discussions risk further deepening divisions within the EU on non-proliferation and disarmament, potentially weakening the Union's internal cohesion at a time when strategic unity is increasingly necessary. Although the EU Member States that are parties to the TPNW currently remain committed within the NPT framework, a further deterioration in the international disarmament dynamic could harden their position. In this case, the EU may find it difficult to maintain a coherent and credible common line in its support for the NPT, of which it has long been a firm supporter. In that case, Europe not only risks being confronted with a deteriorating nuclear security environment but also being left behind in the task of helping to rebuild a further fragmented global non-proliferation and disarmament regime (Portela, 2020, p. 16).

Taken together, this forces the EU to redefine its strategic position. Instead of choosing between deterrence and disarmament, it can focus on a renewed risk-reduction agenda (Woolf, 2023). In the current security context, and as long as the war in Ukraine continues, a trend towards ambitious disarmament seems unlikely (Lambert-Deslandes & von Hlatky, 2025, p. 685). A pragmatic focus on transparency, crisis communication and limiting the risk of escalation along the NATO-Russia border regions, on the other hand, can make a meaningful contribution to stability. Such measures, if applied more broadly, could also reduce security risks for Europe and promote sustainable security, which requires more than just enhanced deterrence (Haggag, K, 2026; Woolf, 2023, p. 28). At the same time, the importance of China as a nuclear power and the explicit involvement of France and the United Kingdom in the strategic debate make it clear that bilateral agreements between the United States and Russia are becoming insufficient (Woolf, 2023, p. 23). Although the EU itself is not a nuclear power, it can encourage France and, possibly, the UK to show a willingness to engage in future talks, thereby positioning itself as an active advocate of inclusive and adaptive arms control (Haggag, K, 2026).

In addition, an emphasis on risk reduction could help to mitigate internal divisions. By approaching arms control as a tool to prevent escalation, the EU may be able to find common ground between Member States that are strongly committed to nuclear deterrence and those that support the TPNW. Given the continuing public support for new arms control negotiations in several European countries, such an approach also has the potential to gain public support (Smetana et al., 2025, pp. 47-51). This could then contribute to limiting the risks of escalation while maintaining a minimum of multilateral momentum. In an increasingly multipolar world order, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation will have to be achieved through multilateral initiatives. Europe does not need to take a passive stance on this; the end of the New START era could be an opportunity for the Union to take a proactive role and support dialogue to confirm its position as a champion of nuclear non-proliferation (Kane & Fayet, 2026).

Conclusion

The erosion of the nuclear arms control framework marks more than the expiration of individual treaties. It reflects a broader structural transformation in the international nuclear order. The combination of weakened bilateral constraints, growing multipolarity and increasing pressure on the non-proliferation regime creates a security environment with reduced predictability and increasing strategic competition. This transformation is driven, among other things, by rising geopolitical tensions, shifting strategic priorities, domestic political constraints, and rapid technological developments that existing agreements are not designed to address. Growing frustration with the effectiveness of the NPT and with the nuclear bargain has also created a new dynamic in which non-nuclear states are pursuing their own initiatives. Together, these dynamics have gradually eroded both the political support and perceived relevance of traditional arms control arrangements. This poses considerable challenges for Europe. For decades, European security benefited from legally binding limits, transparency and institutional dialogue. The erosion of these instruments does not automatically imply immediate arms racing, but it does increase uncertainty and the potential for misperception in times of crisis. At the same time, internal differences within the European Union on deterrence and disarmament complicate the formulation of a unified response. In this context, the EU's room for manoeuvre remains confined but not insignificant. While a new trend towards arms control seems unrealistic in the short term, a targeted focus on transparency, dialogue and nuclear risk-reduction measures may offer a realistic approach to maintaining a degree of stability. Such an approach does not resolve the underlying structural tensions, but it might help to limit the risks of escalation and preserve the EU's role as a promoter of multilateral stability. Ultimately, the expiry of New START makes it clear that Europe can no longer rely on the stability mechanisms of the past. Navigating this more uncertain nuclear landscape will require careful balancing between deterrence commitments, internal cohesion and continued engagement in international non-proliferation efforts.

Annex

Table 1: US - Soviet Union/ Russia nuclear arms control agreements

Name of treaty	Duration	Limits on launchers: ballistic missiles (ICBMs, SLBMs); strategic bombers	Limits on nuclear warheads	Limits do not apply to	Current status
SALT I	1972 –1977	Each side commits to not adding to the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers tubes, estimated at: ICBM silos: 1054 US; 1 607 USSR SLBM launch tubes: 656 US, 740 USSR	No limits	Strategic bombers	Expired
SALT II	Signed in 1979, but never entered into force	Maximum total of 2 400 ICBM/SLBM launchers + strategic bombers on each side, with sub-limits for MIRV-carrying missiles	No limits		Never in force
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)	Signed in 1991, in force from 1994-2009	Maximum total 1 600 ICBM/SLBM launchers + strategic bombers on each side	6 000 'attributed' deployed strategic warheads for each side		Expired
START II	Signed in 1993, but never entered into force	Same as START I, plus ban on MIRV-carrying ICBMs and 'heavy' ICBM launchers, and requirement to eliminate all 'heavy' ICBMs	3 000-3 500 'attributed' deployed strategic warheads for each side	Non-deployed and non-strategic warheads	Russia withdrew its support for the treaty in 2002 after the US pulled out of the ABM Treaty
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)	2002-2012	No limits (though START I limits on missile launchers and bombers remained in force until 2009)	1 700-2 200 deployed strategic warheads for each side	Non-deployed and non-strategic warheads	Superseded by New START in 2011
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)	2011-2026	Maximum 800 deployed or non-deployed ICBM/SLBM launchers + strategic bombers; maximum 700 deployed ICBMs + SLBMs + strategic bombers	1 550 deployed strategic warheads for each side	Non-deployed and non-strategic warheads; non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs	Extended in January 2021, in force until February 2026


Note. Reproduced from Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons - The 'Ban Treaty' (EPRS Briefing No. PE 614.664, p. 6), by B. Immenkamp, 2021, European Parliamentary Research

Table 2: Other bilateral arms control agreements

Name of treaty	Duration	Scope and purpose	Current status
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty	1988-2019	Ban on all nuclear- and conventionally-armed ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500-5 500 km. Does not include: submarine and air-launched missiles; ground-launched missiles with ranges of less than 500 km/more than 5 500 km	The US ended the treaty in 2019 after repeatedly accusing Russia of developing and deploying a banned missile type
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty	1972-2002	Ban on missile systems defending the whole of Soviet/US territory from attacks by strategic ballistic missiles, missile interceptor launchers limited to 100 each	The US withdrew from the treaty in 2002

Note. Reproduced from The New START Treaty between the US and Russia: The last surviving pillar of nuclear arms control (EPRS Briefing No. 690. 523, p. 4), by M. Russell, 2021, European Parliamentary Research Services.

Figure 1: EU Member States' views on the TPNW



Note. Reproduced from Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons - The 'Ban Treaty' (EPRS Briefing No. PE 614.664, p. 6), by B. Immenkamp, 2021, European Parliamentary Research

Bibliography

- Abe, N. (2020). The NPT at fifty: Successes and failures. *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, 3(2), 224-233.
- Bollfrass, A., & Budjeryn, M. (2020). Arms Control: For and By Europe. *CSS Policy Perspectives*, 8(10).
- Brustlein, C. (2018). The Erosion of Strategic Stability and the Future of Arms Control in Europe. *Institut français des relations internationales, IFRI Proliferation Papers*, 60.
- Bunn, G., & Rhinelander, J. B. (2008). Looking Back: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Then and Now. *Arms Control Today*, 38(6), 56.
- Haggag, K. (2026). *After New START expires, Europe needs to step up on arms control*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2026/after-new-start-expires-europe-needs-step-arms-control>.
- Immenkamp, B. (2021). *Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons – The ‘Ban Treaty’* (European Parliamentary Research Service Briefing PE 614.664). European Parliamentary Research Service.
- International Atomic Energy Agency. (2026). *Fact sheet on DPRK nuclear safeguards*. <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards>.
- International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. (2019, April 24). *Polls: Public opinion in EU host states firmly opposes nuclear weapons*. https://www.icanw.org/polls_public_opinion_in_eu_host_states_firmly_opposes_nuclear_weapons
- Kamp, K. H. (2025). What If the USA Closes Its Nuclear Umbrella Over Europe?.
- Kane, A., & Fayet, H. (2026). *What the end of New START means for Europe: Two views*. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. <https://thebulletin.org/2026/02/what-the-end-of-new-start-means-for-europe-two-views/>.
- Klotz, F. G. (2020). *The military case for extending the New START agreement* (PE-350-AF). RAND Corporation.
- Kristensen, H. M., & Korda, M. (2022). Israeli nuclear weapons, 2021. *Bulletin of the atomic scientists*, 78(1), 38-50.
- Kristensen, H. M., & Korda, M. (2025). World nuclear forces. In SIPRI Yearbook 2025: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (pp. 177–214). Oxford University Press.

-
- Lambert-Deslandes, É., & von Hlatky, S. (2025). NATO, nuclear deterrence and disarmament in an age of US ambivalence. *Defence Studies*, 25(3), 682-689.
- Meyer, P., & Sauer, T. (2023). The nuclear ban treaty: A sign of global impatience. In *Survival 60.2* (pp. 61-72). Routledge.
- Neuneck, G. (2019). The deep crisis of nuclear arms control and disarmament: The state of play and the challenges. *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, 2(2), 431-452.
- Portela, C. (2020). Nuclear Arms Control Regimes: State of Play and Perspectives. *European Parliament: Policy Department for External Relations*, 41.
- Russell, M. (2021). *The New START Treaty between the US and Russia: The last surviving pillar of nuclear arms control* (EPRS Briefing No. 690.523). European Parliamentary Research Service.
- Sauer, T. (2020). Power and nuclear weapons: the case of the European Union. *Journal for peace and nuclear disarmament*, 3(1), 41-59.
- Sauer, T. (2024). The potentially revolutionary impact of emerging and disruptive technologies and strategic conventional weapons on the nuclear deterrence debate. *Eu non-proliferation and disarmament papers*, (91).
- Schenck, L. M., & Youmans, R. A. (2011). From Start to Finish: A Historical Review of Nuclear Arms Controls Treaties and Starting over with the New Start. *Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L.*, 20, 399.
- Smetana, M., Vranka, M., & Rosendorf, O. (2025). Public support for arms control in the third nuclear age: cross-national survey and elite cues experiment in NATO countries. *European Journal of International Relations*, 13540661251353107.
- U.S. Department of Defense. (2026). *2026 National Defense Strategy*.
- United Nations. (1968). *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*.
- United Nations. (2017). *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons*.
- Ünlü, A. D. (2021). European Union and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi*, 16(1), 229-245.
- Woolf, A. F. (2023). Past and Future of Bilateral Nuclear Arms Control.



FINABEL

THE EUROPEAN LAND FORCE
COMMANDERS ORGANISATION