


Finabel



The Professionalisation of The Armed Forces

The Citizen Soldier, Warrior Ethos, and the Conscript

AN EXPERTISE FORUM CONTRIBUTING TO EUROPEAN
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DIRECTOR'S EDITORIAL

In the last decades the Western world has grown accustomed to perceiving the partaking in war and active combat as the trade of a select few professionals. Yet it wasn't so long ago that conscription existed for some European countries, and some even have it to this day. This very perception varies across Europe based on differing histories of the respective countries on the matter, yet there are also unifying trends that all or most European armies have undergone. The evolution of who and how many fight the wars waged, as well as how these citizens, mercenaries, professional soldiers or elite troops are mobilised and used is a complex matter.

Studying these fluctuations in the modern and contemporary eras allows for some introspection into how our European civil societies understand their relationship towards the army that shields them as well as some amount of comparison between countries that may have evolved similarly but at a different pace. Starting off briefly as far back as the Thirty Years War and the emergence of the state-commissioned army, and going all the way to today's smaller professional and elite forces, it is worth analysing what these changes have meant socially but also for our defensive and cooperative capabilities. From this overview we may also take note of the lessons to be learnt for tomorrow's armies, their social role and how to manage them. This paper came out of a shared perception at FINABEL that defence as an object of study is worth looking at not only through the prism of events and the strategies or technologies shaping them, but also as a process of constant evolution and self-update. Armies are institutions based on fluctuating notions of why they fight, for what values or interests, but also of who fights and under which material, organisational and ideological circumstances.

This paper can help gain a historical perspective of these military institutions that our European armies are. Though it is worth looking back, reading this piece also allows some insights into the current and potential future dynamics in this field. A lot of what we study in this paper is usually taken for granted, and for good reason. Yet understanding where our current defence mindset comes from and to what extent it was collectively constructed through shared European experiences makes for a useful introspection to any modern military leader.*



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Director PSec

* This Food for Thought paper is a document that gives an initial reflection on the theme. The content is not reflecting the positions of the member states but consists of elements that can initiate and feed the discussions and analyses in the domain of the theme. All our studies are available on www.finabel.org

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INTRODUCTION

“The patriot volunteer, fighting for his country and his rights, makes the most reliable soldier on earth”

American Confederate general Thomas ‘Stonewall’ Jackson

Though this may be argued, historically, it has been far from being the case that men and women in arms serving in their country’s army were doing so voluntarily. At least in the case of Europe, the bulk of the forces deployed for defensive or offensive purposes were levied peasants, oath-bound nobles, hired mercenaries, or conscripted citizens. These examples are a far cry from today’s European armies, which, for the most part, consist of a professional staff made up of volunteers. There have also been substantial changes felt in how military personnel have been utilised, both on and off the battlefield, ranging from a mix of fodder assisting trained professionals, to substantial increases in officer count, to technicians operating in and out of the line of fire, some of them being hired as corporate warriors. This led to shifts being felt throughout the societies those armies defend and continue to evolve to this very day.

These evolutions are both markers of a changing society at home and induce transformation of the social order they defend. Thus, understanding the relationship and organisation between the military and civilian world is necessary to fully grasp the nature of the conflicts they face. The purpose of this paper is to investigate those major changes the common soldier has faced in his role and institution in

terms of operative use and significance within a wider administrative organisation.

In the first part of the paper, a historical perspective on the changes that European armies have undergone will be undertaken. The objective here will be to understand how the conduct of war and who is fighting it has changed and what circumstances have caused this. The second part will assess the relevance of armed forces as a builder of society and how the relationship between the civilian and military spheres influences a nation’s behaviour in general. To grasp this, we will analyse the army’s role in the state-building process and exemplify how military-civilian relations impact a nation by considering the Chinese People Liberation Army, the Bolshevik Red Army, and the U.S Army. The third part will attempt to illustrate the recent changes in the operational environment on the international stage, battlefield, and at home. This final part also offers some predictions on the future relationship between the civil society and the armed forces.



FROM MASS ARMIES TO SPECIALISED ARMIES

1648-2021: The Evolution of Warfare and the Equipment Used

To understand the recent evolution of European land forces and investigate potential upcoming changes, it is worth looking at the road leading to the current configuration. The way that war is waged nowadays is the product of centuries of innovation. Rome wasn't built in a day, and neither were Vauban's fortresses.

We will distinguish between the technical and institutional evolutions that had far-reaching repercussions on the conduct of war. These

two separate processes both contributed, in their ways, to making war what it is today.¹ The conduct of organised violence between political entities has substantially changed from what it once used to be, from pike and shot to strategic bombing. These changes occurred due to technological progress making former arms obsolete, tactical changes implementing more modern armament, and the evolution of the entire administrative and logistical structure supporting the war effort.² In Dubik's words:

"In almost every case, technologies are applied first in an attempt to improve the pre-

1. Ferrero, L'évolution de La Guerre Depuis Trois Siècles. (International Review of the Red Cross 1931),147.179-92
2. Land Warfare - Oxford Handbooks.

vailing method of fighting. Then, once the full capabilities of new technologies are fully grasped, new methods of fighting emerge. Often these new methods then produce new organizations and training requirements as well as new demands on military leaders".³

We will focus on evolutions in land warfare, for brevity and a sense that land forces have been of historical prime importance in the strategic concerns of continental European states, with the United Kingdom as a notable exception⁴. This study ranges from the Thirty Years' War onwards, when many modern warfare staples emerged. Innovations from this period include individual and heavy gunpowder weapons, sovereign command, and control of armed forces by modern state actors, which came to define war itself.⁵

The conflict that opposed most continental European powers to Spain between 1618 and 1648 saw drastic transitioning out of medieval warfare. Though the gunpowder revolution had already come to Europe sometime before, it was only then that the technology was refined to result in mobile, reliable, and relatively simple use of individual guns. This meant the infantry became increasingly potent, especially concerning cavalry, when a battle plan was implemented, allowing both pikes and muskets to operate together. The traditional heavy cavalry in plate armour of Western Europe no longer competed against efficient *Tercio* companies as fielded by the Spanish crown.

Up to the Napoleonic wars, the major changes were not so much ground-breaking tech-

nological changes as regular tactical shifts.⁶ Firearms became more reliable and mobile, but only resulted in adaptations in marching, formations, and specialised light infantry. It was with the Industrial Revolution that technology truly changed the substance of warfare. The ability to produce large amounts of standardised arms allowed for greater use of mobile canons and rifling to increase range. Smokeless powder also helped the advent of light infantry to operate autonomously, added to the fact that firearms were faster to reload, resulting in making users less vulnerable to charges in between volleys.⁷

The increased lethality of firearms over greater distances made for a great shift in the perception of how fighting units should behave towards each other. Exchanging shots before ultimately deciding the fate of a battle in *melee* fighting had been understood as the norm ever since the Ancient Greeks. In light of faster reloads and more accurate guns, now such practises became suicidal. Charging hunkered-down light sharpshooters or organised line units was complicated for Marshall Ney at Waterloo, and the British learned it themselves in Afghanistan. From then on, the increasing industrialisation of production and technological progress made for deadlier weapons produced on massive scales. Breech-loaded muskets gave way to bolt-action rifles, automatic machine guns, and cannonballs to shells of various kinds: incendiary, shrapnel, gas, etc. Warfare also became a strange mix of static standstills and mobile phases thanks to motorization.⁸

3. Dubik, Has Warfare Changed? Sorting Apples from Oranges. (Association of the United States Army 2002)

4. Lynn, The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West. (The International History Review 1996), 800-2000

5. Strachan and Scheipers, The Changing Character of War. (Oxford book of war)

6. Ibid Lynn.

7. Denécé, Forces Spéciales, l'avenir de La Guerre ? De La Guérilla Aux Opérations Clandestines. (Editions du Rocher, 2017)

8. Ibid Lynn.

However, not all armies in the field at each of those periods in time were the same. Though paradigm armies such as the Spanish *Tercio*, the French *Grande Armée*, and the Prussian and then German *Wehrmacht* were imitated by most onlookers, not all of their advantageous technologies or tactics were universally adopted. This is known as the “longbow puzzle” by Allen and Leeson, named after the decision by rivals of England not to implement the superior ranged weapon. Quantitative analysis clarifies they were deadlier and easier to operate than crossbows, yet both Scotland and France refused to implement them. This was due to institutional constraints: France and Scotland were more politically unstable than England during this period. Having large stockpiles of cheaply made weapons in the hands of a trained elite was a threat to the sovereign if there was uncertainty that such weapons could be turned against him or herself. Decisions on implementing new technologies are thus made on a balance of internal and external risks.⁹

Consequent Changes in Army Style in the Modern West: Recruitment, Type, and Organisation

This leads us to try to understand the evolution of warfare through the evolution of armies themselves. As Goya puts it:

“An army is first oriented by missions it must accomplish against current and potential enemies [...] this army is bound to the

*rest of the nation which supplies its resources [that] are fixed by the superior political authority with which the army has a double relationship of expertise and subordination. Military adaptation, therefore, defines the management of the tensions between resources and objectives of the armies in a more or less constrained political environment”*¹⁰

What weapon is being used matters, but so does how and by whom. Bellamy identifies three other key elements of the conduct of war: organisation and size of an armed force, tactics and strategy, and command and control methods. Thus, he concludes that the fighting ability of a nation’s army stems “from balancing better than one’s opponent (...) doctrine, training, leadership, organization, technology, and the fighting character of one’s soldiers”.¹¹ As Van Creveld argues, technology is far from enough to win the day. Otherwise, guerrilla warfare, such as the Peninsular War or Vietnam, would not be a viable strategy.¹² The evolution of warfare is therefore also dependent on the evolution of army structures. Lynn identified seven phases in the evolution of armies from 800 to 2000, from the aggregate-contract army of the Thirty Years’ War to nowadays.¹³ This first phase was a mix of few feudal levies and elite retainers directly loyal to their lord, supplemented with overwhelming numbers of national armies trained and armed by, and loyal to, the central political authority. This was exemplified by the Swed-

9. Allen and Leeson, ‘Institutionally Constrained Technology Adoption Resolving the Longbow Puzzle’. (The Journal of Law and Economics 2015) 58 (3): 683–715

10. Goya, S’adapter pour vaincre. (2019) « une armée est d’abord orientée par les missions qu’elle doit accomplir face à des ennemis actuels et potentiels. Dans le même temps, cette armée est liée aussi au reste de la nation qui lui fournit ses ressources. Missions comme ressources sont fixées par l’autorité politique supérieure avec laquelle l’armée entretient un double rapport d’expertise et de subordination. L’adaptation militaire définit alors d’abord la gestion de la tension entre ressources et missions des armées dans un cadre politique plus ou moins contraint »

11. Avant, The Market for Force - The Consequences of Privatising Security. (Cambridge University Press, 2005)

12. Creveld, Technology and War. (2010)

13. Ibid Lynn.

ish army who, unlike Spain's or Denmark's, didn't pillage to supply itself in Bohemia and Germany, where it operated.

The state-commission army succeeded this model in the late 16th and early 17th century, during which some elements of professionalisation were implemented to improve the quality of select regiments. The complexification in infantry tactics also required qualitative improvements in training. Absolute monarchies could afford to sustain such efforts throughout time better than previous, more personified polities that would purchase the services of mercenaries if bellicose needs arose.¹⁴

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic era saw the emergence of the popular conscript army, wherein the numbers of men in arms were substantially increased through conscription while maintaining some amount of quality through the supplementation of professional soldiers and substantial training. France's army, then Prussia's, was the paradigm army that most took example from. The soldier no longer was a professional, a nobleman, or a subject levied for one season. Every citizen's duty was to protect, but in an organised fashion: having received training and equipment and been assigned to a regiment. As Dubik puts it "*a government or organization with strong popular support wages war differently from one whose support is tenuous. Democracies often wage wars differently from dictatorships. Robust economies or organizations with large financial resources can sustain a war to a scale different from those with more meagre means*".¹⁵

Therefore, substantial evolutions in the modern state apparatus, based not on noble birth or religion, but a sense of belonging and merit, allowed Napoleon to wage war differently than his Bourbon predecessors.

However, keeping many citizen conscripts in arms over extended periods is costly, both politically and economically. Therefore, the next phase is the mass reserve army, which saw a core of professionals supported by conscripts, organised in the long term through generation cohorts. The younger generation was called upon if war broke out, the older in desperate times. Though all citizens may serve, the military effort was based flexibly on the needs of the time. The increased mobility, thanks to railroads, allowed one to move armies from one border to another, thus not requiring operational forces at all times on each front.¹⁶ This model prevailed from the late 19th century to the late 20th century.

Finally, Lynn defines a seventh and last evolution, called the volunteer or technical army.¹⁷ With increasing complexity in armaments, a decrease in 'hot' conflict during the Cold War, a shift in warfare away from Europe and into the periphery, and a population increasingly reticent to conscription, armies were cut down. Armies were now divided between active soldiers, signed up of their own accord and operational, and reserve made of former active soldiers and part-time civilians. This evolution highlights the decrease in numbers, but also the underlying specialisation and professionalisation processes at work. Rank and file soldiers exist, but there has been an

14. Ibid Avant.

15. Ibid Dubik.

16. Bellamy, *The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare*. (Routledge, 2015)

17. Ibid Lynn.

increase in specialist denominations, whom are sometimes hired as private corporate warriors.¹⁸

Commin and Filiol also consider war changed in whom it directly concerns: civilians in the Middle Ages were targets of pillaging, then war was codified and circumscribed to battlefields, at least in principle.¹⁹ With the increase in destructive power, through artillery, air, and missile bombardment, civilians were once again in the fore as collateral damage or targets. Yet war has also changed in what geographical and media space it occupies:

“Traditional warfare often results in several corpses and blood flowing freely in the different battlefields. The new warfare uses civil technologies and the Internet to make the notion of the traditional battlefield virtually obsolete. The world has become a ‘huge battlefield’. Warfare has come out of the domain of the military and has become the story of politicians, scientists, or ecologists. This is demonstrated by a relative reduction in military violence. (...) Apart from unrestricted warfare, we cannot find a more appropriate key for this new warfare.”²⁰

Case Study: Comparison of France with Germany and the UK

“Few historians have to be convinced that military forces are shaped by state infrastructure, but it is worth noting that the converse is also true. Military developments can shape the state. For example, the expansion of armies in the seventeenth century encouraged

the growth of absolutism.”²¹

This typology accounts quite well for the relationship between the nature of polities and their armies, each influencing the other. However, not all of Europe went through these changes at the same pace, extent, or order. Each of these eras saw a paradigm army, imitated thanks to its successes, but just because it worked at that moment does not mean everyone copied it. Some states were either unwilling or unable to change.

One can think of the example of the battle of Rocroi in 1643, where the Spanish realised their outdated Tercio couldn't continue being fielded against modern French state-commission armies of its time.²² In this case, the Spanish did not innovate due to a desire to stick to the previous model. Other innovations are not taken up because an army has developed changes of its own. This was the case of Prussia during the Napoleonic era, wherein a citizen army could not be implemented in the same way as under an absolutist regime. Therefore, improvements were made to train an elite corps of officers to compensate. Austria-Hungary exemplifies the third reason a nation would not implement new changes in warfare in the late nineteenth century. After defeats against Prussia in 1866 and the battle of Königgrätz/Sadowa, the double crown attempted to reform its army based on the Prussian mass reserve army model. Yet the economic cost was simply too great, and their administrative apparatus too meagre, to successfully follow Prussia.²³

It is worth considering different examples of

18. Krahmann, *States, Citizens, and the Privatisation of Security*. (Cambridge University 2010)

19. Commin and Filiol, 'Unrestricted Warfare versus Western Traditional Warfare'. (*Journal of Information Warfare*, 2015) 14.1: 14–23.

20. *Ibid* Commin and Filiol.

21. *Ibid* Lynn

22. Hanson, *Carnage and Culture Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power*. (New York: Anchor, 2002)

23. *Ibid* Lynn.

army modernisation throughout Europe under Lynn's typology. We will focus on France, Germany, and the United Kingdom because of their size and since they have either stood as paradigm armies imitated by their peers or as complete outsiders, depending on the period.

France is often mentioned when presenting this typology because it stood as an example on multiple occasions. It was one of the earliest medieval-stipendiary armies in the twelfth century. In the next period, King Francis prototyped the aggregate-contract army that the Spanish would then perfect. After Sweden and the Netherlands, mid-eighteenth-century France saw the strongest and most efficient implementation of the state-commissioned army. France once again changed the matrix of warfare by forcing wide-ranged conscription on its civilians, a model that persevered decades after Waterloo. Pottier claims that "the celebration of the link between the army and France, under the auspices of war, participates in the affirmation of the 'French exception': it supposedly stands as the archetype of the state, of the nation".²⁴ Though it didn't have the initiative or the means of the German Empire for the latter half of the nineteenth century, it did remain a threat that adapted and learnt from its mistakes in the Franco-Prussian war. It was well able to constitute the bulwark of the Entente's land-based effort on the Western Front in the First World War and maintained the largest active fighting force in Western Europe until the late 1930s and continued long after the war

to maintain a substantial defence effort.²⁵ In 1996, President Jacques Chirac suspended conscription. Since then, France has kept an important active force composed of many types of specialists to try to be operatively independent, and elite expeditionary forces can keep at the ready to serve its interests and values outside of Europe.

Germany is another example of innovation and adaptation in many of the time periods mentioned.²⁶ Prussia and Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, Hannover, and others tried to compete on quality when they could not keep up with the number of forces fielded by France, Austria, or Russia. Prussia was hailed as the state of the art of armies after its victory over the Austrian and French forces at Rossbach in 1757. Though it did not triumph at the Napoleonic wars, it did get back on its feet through impressively fast reforms under the leadership of Stein, Hardenberg, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau.²⁷ It built upon the French model to develop the mass reserve army that served during its wars of unification, defeating larger Austrian and French formations. It also was incredibly effective at mobilising its whole state apparatus behind its military endeavours. The industrialisation of Germany was put to the service of its armies, making for a large but also very well supplied and equipped army. As early as the eighteenth century, Mirabeau said that "Prussia is not a state that owns an army, but an army that owns a state". Since the Second World War, Germany has been bound by treaties allowing only for small forces for purely defensive ends. Thus, Ger-

24. Pottier, 'Armée-Nation: Divorce Ou Réconciliation?' - De La Loi Debré à La Réforme Du Service National, 1970-2004'. La célébration du lien entre l'Armée et la France, sous les auspices de la guerre, du fait d'armes, participe de l'affirmation de « l'exception française » : elle serait l'archétype de l'Etat, de la nation

25. Irondele, La réforme des armées en France. (Presses de Sciences Po, 2011)

26. Ibid Lynn.

27. Ibid Crevel.

many was thrown into the next phase of army innovation and made do with fewer but more professional and specialised military personnel.

The United Kingdom stands as an exception to this typology of Lynn's acceptance: "*Insular states, able to choose when and how far to join in land wars and relying on navies as their first line of defence, can afford smaller armies. Britain (...) maintained modest standing armies into the twentieth century, while armies mushroomed on the continent. Isolation allowed these insular armies to retain other idiosyncrasies besides their meagre regular forces*".²⁸

Because of its different needs, the United Kingdom has maintained smaller, yet permanent and partly elite, standing forces as far back as the Tudor dynasty. There has also been a notable difference between those forces: land-based, but mobile, deployable on theatres of war halfway across the world. This model, which was the United Kingdom's norm for centuries, became a worthy example in the latest phase of army evolution. However, there was an exception to this trend that lasted from 1916 to 1919 and 1939 to 1960, through the implementation of conscription.



28. Ibid Lynn.

An Institution Protecting the Country From Outside Threats

Armed forces played a very specific place in ancient civilizations. The concept of a permanent army as a key part of the social structure originated hand in hand with the social identification process. Emperors decided when and how to make use of their armed forces.²⁹ By doing so, they drew the *cordon sanitaire* around the army's role, guaranteeing that no other position rather than that of 'defender against external threats' and 'keeper of internal order' would be associated with the army. However, to keep an organised and armed group of people under control, a separation between the military forces and political power is crucial.

To effectively divide these two social actors, a clear set of social and internal rules for the military behaviour was settled on to define the purposes, beliefs, and common thought of the soldier as an individual and as a unity.³⁰ Inside the army, there is no place for individual action, as every soldier is part of a solidified social block, whereas, in a civilian hierarchical structure, the social block is built upon individual freedom.³¹ Nonetheless, those two spheres had to establish a functional social exchange so that the armed forces' decisions would represent the social beliefs. This came along with a gradual shift from the

army as a mere defence body to the army as a "smart political power".³² State institutions' rules and legal frameworks have to adapt to the needs expressed in the society they belong to.³³ To effectively represent the social morals, the military had to shift to a defence approach based on diplomacy and compromise with a focus on peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and observer and security missions³⁴.

The Cold War changed national and international security notions, as the threat of a nuclear war between the two world powers was a main security concern. When the Cold War ended, the Berlin Wall fell, and the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, a new wave of political and military insecurity emerged. Ethnic conflict, civil wars, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the proliferation of terrorist organizations are examples of these new security threats.³⁵ These challenges, along with drug and human trafficking, maritime piracy, civil unrest, and the challenges posed by the environmental crisis, are the main security challenges faced by the military forces.³⁶

Therefore, military strategists must respond immediately to a threat within the domestic diplomatic foreign policies framework. This has proven to be a huge challenge in the communication era, where all information can be accessed publicly - including sizeable military deployments, unless they are classified. The

29. Aznar Fernández-Montesinos, F. THE ROLE OF ARMED FORCES IN THE STATE-BUILDING PROCESS. (leec.es. 2014).

30. Gresle François, The "Military Society". Its Future Seen Through Professionalization, (Revue française de sociologie, 2005/5) Vol. 46, p. 37-57.

31. Lutterbeck, Derek. "CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS." (Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance, 2014) 8-19.

32. Alan Chong Smart Power and Military Force: An Introduction. (Journal of Strategic Studies, 2015)

33. Ibib Fernández-Montesinos

34. Ibib Chong

35. Elke Krahmann, 'From State to Non-State Actors: The Emergence of Security Governance' (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) pp.3-19

36. Mallick, Pk.MILITARY LEADERSHIP-THE CHANGING PARADIGM. (2020)

adaptation of armed forces to this new era is known as the revolution in military affairs (RMA).³⁷ The RMA also encompasses the impact of new military technologies on how armed conflict is conducted. As the operational innovation in concept of the army, the organisation adaptation and the army personal training are an important part of the RMA. Despite the changes brought on by the mass production of radios and television and, later, global access to the internet, the core of the military values of patriotism, honesty, loyalty, unity, competence, integrity, moral courage, and strength have endured. These values, and the hierarchical order on which the army operates, are the fundamentals of its existence and therefore immutable. The RMA is a military response to an ever-changing world induced by technological developments and new social morals.³⁷ It is not a formulation of new values, but rather a renovation of old values. After the attacks of 11 September 2001, it became clear that international threats were not only a matter of states. When international threats come from terrorist groups, the potential of mass destruction either by biological, chemical, or conventional weapons are not to be underestimated. The anthrax letters mailed to the U.S Congress in 2001 and the terrorist attacks in Europe over the last two decades are some examples of how non-state attacks driven by group actors pose a substantial hazard to national and international security. Non-state actors are harder to trace and hold accountable for their attacks, as they don't follow the international directives on conflict behaviour.

Another international threat is the development of nuclear armament by North Korea and Iran.³⁸ These countries have chosen not to abide by international nuclear agreements, have a long history of human rights violations, and do not have problems with jeopardising international security when pursuing national interests. Safeguarding sovereignty and territorial integrity also deals with the impacts of urbanization, demographic migrations, population growth, food, financial and economic crisis, natural disasters, climate changes, and pandemic disease.³⁹ These all have a direct influence upon civilian unrest and are potential instigators of civil wars.

A Cornerstone of the Nation and Basis for Consolidating Citizenship

To build the social identity of a state, conflicts are necessary. To solve those, collective sovereign organisation is crucial. Bearing this concept of state-building in mind, it is evident that military institutions are indistinguishably linked with the state.⁴⁰ This role permeates the bureaucratic state boundaries and has the competence of guaranteeing that the government will not surpass its political legitimacy. Maintaining a well-organised body that has the competence of defending national territory and possibly invading a foreign country requires an enormous amount of public funds. Armaments, clothes, salaries, and transportation are just a fraction of army upkeep. Having a taxation model to support such a structure was an efficient way of understanding

37. Sloan, Elinor C. *Revolution in Military Affairs*. (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002).

38. Ibib Krahmann

39. Dandeker, Christopher. *New Times for the Military: Some Sociological Remarks on the Changing Role and Structure of the Armed Forces of the Advanced Societies*. (The British Journal of Sociology, 1994) 45, no. 4

40. Lamb, Guy. *The Role of the Military in State Formation and Nation-Building: An Overview of Historical and Conceptual Issues* André du Pisani and Guy Lamb (2018).

whether a society was developed or not. The symbolism behind the nationalistic drivers of a national armed force, the monopoly on arms, and the highly organized military framework might be a compelling force when structuring a state.⁴¹ Armies are responsible for taming violence within states borders, which requires a high level of bureaucracy and institutionalisation in modern societies, leading to the civilising of the troops, in an era where foreign threats tend to have a diplomatic solution and police officers mostly deal with the internal order. The balance between the power elites and the remaining class structure is a key military function when executing this counterbalance smart power expected of the armed forces in today's society.⁴²

The first effort to understand the role of the soldier in society took shape as "The American Soldier survey" in 1949, which aimed to understand the motivation of ground soldiers in combat.⁴³ The results attested that the moral obligation implied by being part of the armed forces aligned with the heroic culture associated with soldiers as the historical heritage left by the warrior soldier was the munition inside a soldier's gun. This soldier, back then the combatant and not yet the peacekeeper, was well disciplined, aggressive, and physically and mentally strong: the ultimate state protector. Diplomacy did not influence choices made on the battlefield. The only goal was to eliminate the enemy of the state. Much has changed since then. The soldier, now predominantly a peacekeeper, approaches his role as

defender of the state from a different perspective.

The ideal soldier of today seeks viable international relations rather than eliminating the enemy. This means that a balance between diplomatic and tactical decisions is expected from a successful national armed body. Soldiers represent their nation, making them an extension of civilian beliefs that demand their image to be portrayed as accurately as possible. This social supervision started with the mass spread of television, which allowed people to have immediate access to information from all sides of the dispute. This allowed the civilian population to form their own opinions, as was the case for the first time during the Vietnam war. The majority of the United States population disapproved of military decisions, which, along with a lack of financial funds, ultimately led the forces to withdraw from the war. With the military being held accountable for their actions and the rise of human rights awareness, soldiers are expected to fight and die defending human lives and basic human rights for all.⁴⁴

The RMA has also changed the role of the military inside society. There is a clear division between the activities inside and outside the country borders that represents a shift towards specialized personnel within the armed forces.⁴⁵ In addition to their combat skills, future officers are expected to be well-informed citizens, specialist technicians and bureaucrats who analyse a situation before drawing up a military response. The officer should be realistic when it comes to performing military du-

41. Ibid Lamb, Guy.

42. Giustozzi, Antonio. 2011 *Double-edged Swords: Armies, Elite Bargaining and State-building* (London School of Economics and Political Science. Crisis States Research Centre 2011).

43. Stouffer, S. A., Lumsdaine, A. A., Lumsdaine, M. H., Williams, R. M., Jr., Smith, M. B., Janis, I. L., Star, S. A., & Cottrell, L. S., Jr. *The American soldier: Combat and its aftermath*. (Studies in social psychology in World War II). (Princeton University Press, 1949).

44. Ivelin Silja Kaspersen *New societies, new soldiers? A soldier typology* (Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2021)

45. Ibib Fernández-Montesinos

ties and idealistic when formulating responses.⁴⁶ Diplomatic and peaceful interventions in national and international affairs should be pursued as far as possible. If necessary, the use of force is acceptable when establishing or re-establishing peace, and when defending the country from internal or external threats.

To conquer or annihilate enemies is no longer the requested military behaviour and ensuring security is no longer a matter of state stability alone. Security has evolved to include safeguarding civilians' well-being on a global scale.⁴⁷ Hence, the change in the military approach, which now operates to avoid and resolve conflicts, rather than generating new ones. This goal is pursued by compromising with conflicting countries and upholding partner countries with an impartial, non-coercive pattern of behaviour typically associated with UN troops.^{48 49}

A Fluctuating Relationship with Civil Society

History offers numerous examples proving that a division between politics and armed forces is fundamental for a society to thrive. Chinese party leader and Commander-in-Chief Mao Zedong was the pivot behind the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which gave new life to the Chinese Red Army. This case proves how brutal the conflict between armed forces and civilians can be when the realms of armed forces and politics are mixed.⁵⁰

The Cultural Revolution of 1966 sought to renew the spirit of the 1949 Chinese Revolution and to storm away from the Soviet Communist Model. By appealing to peoples' nationalistic sense, the Commander-in-Chief motivated a violent socio-political turmoil that aimed to overturn the Soviet influence on China's communist model. To spread his ideology, Red Army officers that were not combating would engage in civilian duties as farmers, militia organisers, teachers, and even local administrators, hereby creating a direct line to recruit new members. The Red Army grew in numbers as the land reform issued by him and the educational program that gave poor farmers children access to formal education for free and obliged the prole of high classes to perform land work in the countryside after graduation, fuelled the hate-based relationship between the two social classes during the revolutionary spirit.

The first step towards a proper institutionalisation of the People Liberation Army (PLA) was the first regulation drafted in 1930 and still in force at the time of writing. Military troops abided by the Chinese Party and were constitutionally protected to fall under state orders.⁵¹ Former and on-duty military personnel were major actors in Chinese political life throughout the entire PLA revolution and effectively administered the country from 1949-52 and 1967-1973, merging the political and military spheres completely.⁵² During the revolution, untamed violence against the enemies of Chinese communism was used by

46. Ibid Mallick, Pk. (2020).

47. Ibid Giustozzi, Antonio.

48. Ibid Giustozzi, Antonio.

49. Ibid Kaspersen (2021).

50. Bickford, Thomas A. "Regularization and the Chinese People's Liberation Army: An Assessment of Change." (Asian Survey 2020) n° 40.

51. Ibid Bickford, Thomas A.

52. Shambaugh, David. "The Soldier and the State in China: The Political Work System in the People's Liberation Army (The China Quarterly, 1991).

the military as a Party manoeuvre to reassure Chinese communism was never questioned. Both social powers, military and political, were the same.

The importance of a clear division between the military and politics and the social safeguarding that neither side will uphold unlimited social control can also be analysed by the example of Russian military history, which was transformed by the outbreak of the Bolsheviks army or “Red Army” against the anti-Bolsheviks or “White Army” and civilians. Stalin’s purge of the Red Army was an indicator of how mass operations would be handled during his time in power, what became known as the Great Terror. The rumours of espionage were the driving forces of Stalin military attacks against the enemies of the state, resulting in a military-political repression campaign that left a trail of approximately 1.15 million NKVD sentences and 683.000 deaths.⁵³

When Stalin institutionalised the Red Army, the class-revolution pillar was inserted into the doctrine of the armed forces to the point that, in 1939, the vows of the Red Soldier were changed from “fighting for international socialism” to “protect with all his strength the property of the Army and the People and to cherish unto death his People, the Soviet homeland, and the government of Workers and Peasants, also to respond at the first call from the government of Workers and Peasants to defend the homeland, the USSR.”^{54 55}

After this, the armed forces officially became a party instrument for restraining and disciplining civilians to ensure that they would not

betray the party.

The American Republic was forged on political rebellions, uprisings, and fierce military actions born from civil-military conflicts. Perhaps the most well-known example is the ‘America Civil War’, which began with civil-military and socio-political crises that divided the country between the South and North states. Both sides had military power that rose against each other, the civilian population and the government. The casualties from this war remain the highest in U.S history, with approximately 1.5 million U.S soldiers and 50.000 civilians.⁵⁶ This has marked the relationship between the two social groups.

Another turning point was the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, when the tensions between military and civilians gave place to generalised anxiety for the next move and how would Al-Qaeda respond to it. Nonetheless, neither this nor the enthusiastic patriotism disseminated over the US territory were enough to seize the differences between those two social groups. The lack of comprehension from both sides is known as the “civil-military gap”.⁵⁷ Nonetheless, this has not interfered with the indirect control civilians hold upon military personnel as one of the bases of the U.S democracy, which has shaped their relationship and the balance between politics and the military.

53. Whitewood, Peter. “The Purge of the Red Army and the Soviet Mass Operations, 1937–38.” *The Slavonic and East European Review*. 2015)

54. Sella, Amnon. “Red Army Doctrine and Training on the Eve of the Second World War.” *Soviet Studies* 1975) 27, no. 2

55. Stalin. Oath of Allegiance of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army.

56. Drew Gilpin Faust, “Death and Dying—Civil War Era National Cemeteries: Discover Our Shared Heritage Travel Itinerary,” National Parks Service (U.S. Department of the Interior)

57. Rosa Brooks, “Are US Civil-Military Relations in Crisis?” (2021)

THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Contemporary Warfare and Subsequent Usage of the Armed Forces

The evolution of the geopolitical environment since the mid 20th century resulted in missions of increased complexity, requiring professional soldiers. The military's original territorial defence role was supplanted by other roles, namely expeditionary forces, domestic assistance, and internal security.⁵⁸

The process slowly started during the Cold War with the multiplication of expeditionary forces and culminated at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s. Most states that retained a significant fighting force had switched from the conscription method to a professional

army. This phenomenon is typically observed in six major nations in Europe: Poland, Italy, France, Germany, Spain, and the UK.⁵⁹

As a consequence of their professionalisation, the armed forces separated themselves from the role of the citizen-soldier. In effect, the armed forces defined the skills, traits, and required procedures to become managers of violence. At the same time, they created their set of values and norms specific to the institution.

Since the 1960s, however, the professional monopoly the armed forces enjoyed started to decay. This decay is primarily due to the multiplication of actors on the field and the growing complexity of operations. Operations have now switched from a purely defence focus to a



58. Timothy Edmunds, "What Are Armed Forces for? The Changing Nature of Military Roles in Europe," (International Affairs, 2006) 1059-7582, no. 6
59. Countries With Mandatory Military Service 2021.

security focus that encompasses several fields, including some initially linked to the civilian sector.⁶⁰ Moreover, changing preoccupations have induced a different response from states. For example, in 1991, a quarter of all British forces deployed on foreign operation theatres were medical in nature. Moreover, Private Military Companies (PMC) have become standard practice for many states to utilise. A remarkable example of the multiplication of PMC and the growing importance of such organisations is the considerable weight given to Aegis Defence Services, created by Tim Spicer, which, in 2007, was the second-largest military force in Iraq with nearly 20,000 men.⁶¹ Incidentally, the switch from a defensive focus to a security focus is also illustrated in the development of new academic fields in security, which broadened the definitions of what constitutes security to encompass not only matters of state security but also aspects of everyday human security such as food, health, education, and human rights among other things.

The causes which lead to this progressive erosion of the military as the main actor in armed conflicts are numerous. We can at least name two categories of instrumental factors that created such changes: external factors linked to the international environment and internal factors linked to the evolutions of societies in Europe.

As it stands, the new challenges and the evolution of the operational environment have brought forward the need for a more diversified and expert education. Thus, starting from traditional military colleges whose goal was to

train professional managers of violence, the objective shifted to training security experts. This entails switching from a professional education closer to a form of apprenticeship, to a broader and more rigorous education with advanced academic standards that are more open to civilians and non-professionals.

A prime example of such an adaptation of military education is the reforms put in place by the UK National Defence Academy. This military educational institution transformed its structure from being a 'national defence college' to a 'national security university'. This was undertaken by changing the academy's aim from solely providing soldiers' training to a more diversified skill set, including extensive academic education. The university's governance was also reformed from a traditional military hierarchy to internal governance that involves military and civilian personnel. Additionally, civilian experts were added to the faculty and a new student body that includes military personnel, civilians, and international students was created. Moreover, the infrastructure was rebuilt to resemble more closely the type of buildings and equipment one can find in a traditional civilian university. Think of libraries, computing rooms, and additional support facilities other than those usually used for military training.⁶²

The predicted evolutions of the security environment will most likely require further development of new fields of expertise in conflict management, regional understanding of conflicts and peace studies, and new technical fronts in cyber and law enforcement. Thus, it appears that the future evolutions of

60. Ibid Edmunds.

61. Rafik Zenine, "Tim Spicer, le pionnier de la guerre privée," (France Culture, 2020).

62. Tamir Libel, "Chapter 2: New Wine in New Bottles," (Routledge, 2016), European Military Culture and Security Governance, 0 ed

the education and roles of the armed forces will continue to move away from that of the professional education of the soldier towards 'security experts' **integrated with** a broader national security agenda, where civilian institutions will continue to play a more significant role.

Implications for Modern Armies' Recruitment, Training, and Organisation

To properly assess how the role of the armed forces might evolve in the next few decades, it is vital to understand the structural forces that will shape conflicts in the twenty-first century. To do this, the authors compiled global trends reports published by the intelligence agencies and administrative services from France, the UK, and the USA. Those three countries were selected because they are the three major western nations currently equipped with nuclear weapons, whilst also being permanent members of the UN security council.

One of the key trends detected in those countries that will continue in the coming years is the increase in hybrid warfare and asymmetric warfare. Hybrid warfare is a loosely defined type of conflict that mixes both military (including regular and irregular operations) and civilian means by combining military manoeuvres, political manoeuvres, and cyber-attacks.⁶³ Similarly, it also seems very likely that asymmetric warfare will continue to be one of the predominant types of conflict in the world, mostly in the form of counterinsurgency operations.

Typical examples of such conflicts are the

Syrian civil war and the conflicts around the Donbas region in Ukraine. The latter involves several means employed by both parties in warfare qualified by Russian strategists as 'non-linear' warfare. In essence, the goal is to confuse the enemy by using a variety of operational means. Similarly, in Syria, the 10-year civil war illustrates what one could expect from a counterinsurgency operation complete with foreign actors' involvement and a plethora of insurgent groups.

Those types of conflict will most likely continue to be the predominant form of active combat in the coming decades, in large part because they allow for operations to be performed while remaining underneath the threshold of a full-blown war. As such, weaker states and insurgent groups can operate while making sure to avoid what Clausewitz would have qualified as the 'ascension of the extremes'. In other words, they allow for actors to keep operating without triggering the political and international responses usually associated with war.⁶⁴

The trend reports also point out newer challenges. These are potential issues and fights that might become more important as time goes by, due to various structural forces that will increase in importance. Those structural forces will most likely produce domestic uncertainty and polarisation, economic uncertainty, and the multiplication of operational field of conflicts. The causes behind those forces are varied. Nonetheless, a few should be mentioned.

Some of the leading causes behind those structural phenomena are the continuation and acceleration of globalisation with the

63. Joshua Ball, "What Is Hybrid Warfare? Non-Linear Combat in the 21st Century," (Global Security Review, 2018)

64. Raymond Aron and Raymond Aron, *L'âge planétaire*, Nachdr., *Penser la guerre*, Clausewitz / Raymond Aron 2 (Paris: Gallimard, 2009).

increased use of cyber tools, along with climate change and resource scarcity. These institutional and environmental challenges will continue to generate uncertainty in economic policy, even for the more developed nations on the planet. Similarly, the future climate and resource challenges will most likely destabilise governments worldwide and create vast migration movements in the coming decades. Finally, trends identified by the three countries also point out that there will most likely be a further blurring of lines between international criminal groups and terrorist groups. Those factors seem to indicate that it is increasingly likely that forms of armed forces other than the military will play a greater role in the coming decades. Specifically, civilian forces such as the police force will become more important to ensure the state's security. Similarly, we might observe a rise in 'intermediate forces' which are in between the police and the army, such as the *gendarmierie* in France or the *carabinieri* in Italy, who can accomplish a wide range of missions from both law enforcement to military operation as was demonstrated by the French personnel during the Yugoslav crisis.⁶⁵

The armed forces will continue to play an important role in diplomatic affairs both in terms of power projection and as a show of commitment to allies. The diplomatic role of the armed forces as an illustration of the commitment towards an international organisation or a foreign power seems to be one that will remain insurmountable and will most likely grow in importance as time goes by.⁶⁶

This is particularly illustrated by the presence of forces in the Pacific. The goal of such presence in highly contested areas, particularly in the South China Sea, is not as much to prepare for war as it is a show of strength to promote deterrence and ensure a balance of power in the area. Similarly, while EU presence in sub-Saharan Africa does have an operational objective, it appears that this objective is almost as important as their simple presence to illustrate their commitment to allies in the region.

It seems likely that certain historical roles of the armed forces will remain intact. This is particularly the case for the functions which serve as a reminder of power and allow for increased presence on the diplomatic stage. It seems that projecting power might become more important than the actual power an army has. Historically, this is also something we can find examples of, most notably through the USSR. Despite their actual effectiveness being light-years detached from what they could realistically achieve, the mass and size of the Soviet army still contributed vastly to their presence on the international stage

Today's Army-Population Perceptions, Interactions, and Overall Image

The armed forces are an essential repository of traditional ideas of society and were in many cases instrumental in building nation-states in Europe. One of the standard trends in most Western nations is that the military was at one point in time a unifying experience for many citizens of the nation. The obligatory

65. Anthony Forster, "Chapter 8: The Domestic Roles of Armed Forces," in *Armed Forces and Society in Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2006).

66. Christopher Dandeker, "New Times for the Military: Some Sociological Remarks on the Changing Role and Structure of the Armed Forces of the Advanced Societies," (*The British Journal of Sociology* 4 1994) 45, no.637.

nature of conscription ensured a sharing of values among citizens and mixed many citizens and members of different regions, who otherwise would have never met. It also was an important defender of traditional and military values.⁶⁷

France is a notable example of the socialisation role the military has sometimes occupied. If conscription initially served an obvious role for territorial defence, the operational use of conscription for the armed forces became less apparent. Despite the suspension of obligatory military service in 1997, advocates for its reintroduction point that military service was a truly unifying experience for many young men in the nation and communicated traditional French values.

This role as both educators of the masses, defender of traditional values, and guardian of the nation were instrumental in providing legitimacy to the armed forces in the modern era. The armed forces went from becoming something reserved for elites and separated from the nation's population to an institution with a very high symbolic capital that it still has in part today, though not in the same proportions as it did in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Nonetheless, the values and norms of what is deemed

acceptable have considerably changed in the last few decades. In effect, there has been a considerable push from civil society to adapt and reform the armed forces to reflect better society's changing values. Moreover, the considerable changes in the operational environment have created the necessity for a diversified skill set among recruits.⁶⁸

Some of the values that have undergone a considerable shift from the previous centuries are in terms of what is expected from the conduct of war and operations and the expected norms that apply to the armed forces. A significant shift occurred during the second half of the twentieth century with the development of electronic media. These new media allowed for the instant transmission of news from the front lines, first by sound with the radio, and later, with images as television, started to democratise. The consequence was that



67. Anthony Forster, "Chapter 3: Armed Forces and Societies: Changing Roles and Legitimacy," *Armed Forces and Society in Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2006), 3.

68. Anthony Forster, "Chapter 4: Armed Forces and Societies: Differences and Similarities," in *Armed Forces and Society in Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2006), 4.

the news of casualties, both civilian and military, became more present in people's homes. Thus, violence and war became something far less acceptable than they had been. The civilian world started to demand zero-casualty conflicts, leading to a considerable change in the symbolic value traditionally associated with those deemed to be managers of violence. Incidentally, the progressive need for a more diversified skill set meant that the armed forces were no longer the sole judge of what could be considered operational effectiveness. This change incentivised the armed forces to relax recruitment restrictions on minorities and embrace a gender equality agenda. The societal evolutions of the last decades have forced the armed forces to reconsider their place in society. The exceptional role the armed forces once occupied has been replaced by one more closely resembling that of any other employer. Yet, there are some elements of the functions of a soldier which cannot be ignored. It is one of the rare functions in a society where one can be expected to sacrifice himself and potentially take a life, which will impose a distinctive institutional culture. Nonetheless, the extraordinary social role traditionally associated with the military is now less apparent among the public.⁶⁹

With the multiplication of actors in the field of security and the considerable changes in the battlespace that occurred in the last few decades, it is relevant to ask how the use of force and the military will be governed in the next few years. A few predictions we can infer from the current international climate is first that operations will become more and more internationalised. In essence, military

forces will probably be increasingly employed in joint international environments. This is due to multiple factors. First, because of the changes of what is socially acceptable in terms of interventions, second, because of the reductions in defence spending in western Europe, and third, because the new types of conflicts will probably remain below the threshold of conflicts and the public perceptions radar. Another critical factor is the multiplication of non-state actors in both the conventional and non-conventional battlespace.

Due to the over-specialisation of certain branches of the armed forces who are still combat-oriented, such as special forces and other covert means of conflict in the non-conventional battlespace, it seems likely that the civilian control and approval of the use of force will become less and less relevant. Due to the evolution of warfare and the use of the armed forces, states might be more incentivised to use non-conventional means to achieve a strategic objective because of the comparatively low political cost of deploying such means instead of regular forces. Moreover, since they act below the legal threshold of what constitutes an open war, the legal requirements for such an intervention are easier to meet.

Similarly, when it appears necessary to deploy regular forces in conflict areas, it will most likely be under the jurisdiction of international organisations such as the UN, NATO, or the EU. This dual phenomenon has been illustrated in recent years with the multiplication of coalitions to fight terrorism in the Middle East – North Africa region. Most notably in Iraq with the coalition against ISIS, and in Mali with the end of the French Op-

69. *Ibid* Dandeker.

eration Barkhane in early June 2021, which has now been handed over to an international coalition against terrorism lead by the EU. Judging by the observed trends in the international environment, battlespace and domestic

environment are expected to continue, civilian control over the use of force will continue to be less prevalent.

CONCLUSION

In the end, we can see just how far our European armies have come in the last few centuries. Technology has substantially evolved, with the advent of gunpowder and industrialisation changing the name of the game forever. Yet technical innovations are far from being alone in altering the matrix of warfare, and the societal changes happening around the same time have taken the importance of their own. The emergence of the modern state apparatus, demographic changes, and the notion of the nation-state and related ideologies have changed not only how, but why we fight wars, and by whom they are fought. From this, a typology can be drawn, which can be useful in understanding the various steps that have been taken in evolving from feudal to state warfare to citizens voluntarily defending their democratic values. Changes have not been uniform in adopting new technology, nor in the implementation of administrative and societal reforms required on the sidelines. The longbow puzzle and Napoleonic military revolutions are indicative of such variance in civil-military innovation. As a result, the way that the French, German, and British militaries have themselves changed has differed. France has stood as a reference in a few of

the steps in Lynn's classification, most of the time creating or perfecting the predominant army structure of the time. Under its various forms, Germany has also kept up quite well until it became the main paradigm army for almost a century from the mid-19th until the end of the Second World War. Then it was coerced through treaties into an early professionalisation. The United Kingdom has stood as an exception due to its exceptional strategic situation: out of choice, a smaller but more efficient standing army was institutionalised. However long it stood alone in this approach, it became the example to follow in the last step of this evolution.

Military institutionalisation happens while state-building takes place, which makes the military one of the national identity pillars. The division between political and military powers is crucial to assure that neither of them will exploit the power position they hold in society to oppress citizens. Armies must balance on assuring that politicians and civilians will keep social order, and to do so, they rely on police support nowadays. The role of the soldier has changed over the years from the ruthless warrior that defended the nation or conquered new territories at all

costs, to a peacekeeper that seeks a diplomatic, military-strategic response and that lives and dies defending human rights on a global scale. The civilian-military relationship is crucial to maintain a secure national environment, and when this balance fails, social order is disrupted, fomenting violent attacks from both sides. As was the case in the Commander-in-Chief Mao Zedong Red-army uprising in defence of a Chinese communist model, standardised military persecution of civilians and party members was considered a threat to the system. The Bolshevik attacks on civilian society and enemies of the state under Stalin that culminated in the “great terror” are another example of how far harmful a state can be without a clear separation of political and military power. The soft civilian control upon the U.S troops is an attempt to assure that tactical decisions will be a representative statement of their social expectation.

The operational environment has changed considerably in the last few decades. Switching from territorial defence to expeditionary warfare and new types of conflicts, such as hybrid warfare, the military had to adapt by changing how they train their officers. Officers are no longer professional managers of violence, but security experts who specialise in various fields. Moreover, the number of actors in the field has expanded significantly since the 1990s. Suppose the current trend reports for the next 20 years are to be believed. In that case, the observed evolution since the end of the Cold War will most likely continue with an increased focus on domestic instability and new forms of conflicts which will remain below the threshold of a full-blown conflict. Nonetheless, this will also mean that civil society will probably have decreasing influence on whether to join a conflict or not.

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