

Finabel



EU-UK Defence Cooperation After Brexit

AN EXPERTISE FORUM CONTRIBUTING TO EUROPEAN
ARMIES INTEROPERABILITY SINCE 1953



This paper was drawn up by Paolo d'Alesio under the supervision and guidance of Mr Mario Blokken, Director of the Permanent Secretariat.

This Food for Thought paper is a document that gives an initial reflection on the theme. The content is not reflecting the positions of the member states but consists of elements that can initiate and feed the discussions and analyses in the domain of the theme. All our studies are available on www.finabel.org

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	3
Historical overview: UK's role in shaping EU defence cooperation	3
2.1 The creation of the CSDP	4
2.2 London's obstruction to further integration in EU-driven defence	6
Consequences of the Brexit referendum	7
3.1 UK's relevance for EU security and defence	8
3.2 Post-Brexit momentum	8
Conditions for third countries' involvement in EU defence initiatives	10
4.1 CSDP and EDA	12
4.2 PESCO, EDF and other initiatives	13
Rethinking the UK defence strategy	14
5.1 The trans-Atlantic bond	14
5.2 Multilateral and bilateral partnerships across Europe	15
The way ahead: a mutually beneficial engagement	17
Concluding remarks	19
Bibliography	20

INTRODUCTION

Master of its own fate, the British nation, in the exercise of its exclusive sovereign powers, decided through the vote of its people, to withdraw from the European Union. Therefore, the United Kingdom willingly embarked on the tortuous path of Brexit and, after years of negotiations and controversies, achieved its target: to quit its EU membership and all that comes with it. While the British Government's compliance with its people's will is not under scrutiny, concerns arise over the terms and conditions of the withdrawal arrangements and the eventual costs (not merely economic) Britain will now have to bear.

Brexit entails a halt in the European integration process, that heretofore had never experienced disintegration. However, the relationship between the UK and the EU has never been that idyllic, to put it mildly. It suffices to consider the British opting out from landmark policies of the EU such as the Schengen Area, the Eurozone and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Moreover, since 1985, the UK secured a "rebate" over its financial contribution to the EU budget, obtaining 66% of the country's budgetary imbalance back¹.

This paper will deal with the implications of Brexit on the security and defence policies of both the UK and the EU, eventually providing an outlook regarding their future pragmatic engagement. By leaving the EU, the UK renounced its prerogatives in EU defence cooperation, including the possibility of exerting influence over new developments. It can now only be involved as a third country without any decision-making authority. This might generate issues for its defence posture, particularly its industrial base and bilateral relationships with the United States and France. This study will first outline the UK's role in creating a common European security and defence policy, also considering its obstructive stances over further integration. After that, an analysis of the post-Brexit EU defence cooperation initiatives will be conducted as well as the conditions for involvement therein as a third country. Thereby, there will be an assessment of the UK defence strategy outside of the EU, followed by an overview of a practical way ahead for an EU-UK mutually beneficial engagement.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: UK'S ROLE IN SHAPING EU DEFENCE COOPERATION

With the end of the Cold War, the member states of the European Economic Community (EEC) signed the Maastricht Treaty of 1992,

setting the foundation for a stronger and more integrated Europe. Among other things, they introduced the Common Foreign and Secu-

¹. Alessandro D'Alfonso, 'The UK 'rebate' on the EU budget', Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service (February 2016), 1.

Policy (CFSP) as the second pillar of the newly instituted EU. This policy was meant to enhance cooperation in foreign affairs to establish the EU as an influential actor on the global stage, capable of handling the power adjustments resulting from the new world order. However, it was not until the independence wars in the Balkans, following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, that the EU realised the need for autonomous military action to intervene in its neighbourhood, mainly for crisis management operations². Remarkably, the UK, usually quite hesitant in furthering a closer European integration, played a crucial role in fostering EU cooperation in the security and defence domain.

2.1 The creation of the CSDP

In 1997, the Labour Party won the general elections in Britain, leading to the appointment of Tony Blair as Prime Minister (PM) of the UK. He put forward a strong and modernising agenda and, unlike his predecessors, emerged as distinctively pro-European³. One of his first foreign policy acts was the high-level summit with his French counterpart, Jacques Chirac, that resulted in the Saint Malo Joint Declaration of 1998. The latter represented a clear statement of purpose by the two major EU powers in military capabilities to create a framework within the EU for the deployment of forces. This meant that the Europeans would take more responsibilities regarding the security challenges related to the EU's external projection, notwithstanding a still robust trans-atlantic alliance. It was agreed that "the Union must have the capacity for auton-



PM Blair and French President Chirac, February 1, 2000

2. Christine Nissen, *Forged in Crisis: The EU Common Security and Defence Policy after Brexit* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2017), 14-15.

3. Irina Tsertsvadze, "Britain and the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union", *Connections* 16, no. 3 (Summer 2017): 77.

omous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, to respond to international crises⁴.

This outcome was largely spurred by US pressure on London to become more active in EU affairs⁵, especially regarding defence and security policy, whereby Europeans could take on stronger commitments to deliver their security. Washington was advocating for closer British integration in a wide variety of EU policy areas. Still, Blair was fully aware that the British public, generally proud of its nation's uniqueness and typically opposed to far-reaching European projects, would have never accepted common policies like the abolition of border controls or replacing the pound with a new European currency. On the other hand, the British PM has been a great champion of a cooperative approach in security and defence, not only due to the US partial retreat or the weakness shown in dealing with conflicts in the Balkans but also because he aimed at leading the Union's developments in this area⁶, rather than merely taking part to them. This comes as no surprise given the UK's tradition of imperial power and its constant scepticism concerning European initiatives.

The bilateral St. Malo Joint Declaration paved the way for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), laid out at the European Council of Cologne in 1999. Shortly after, the Helsinki Headline Goal to set up a joint military force was implemented, along with

the establishment of permanent structures for military and defence coordination such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC), the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and, later in 2004, the European Defence Agency (EDA).

In the same vein, to operationalise the EU crisis management capacity, it was reached a comprehensive package of arrangements with NATO, the so-called Berlin Plus Agreement, that granted the EU access to NATO military assets to conduct its missions. The agreement mainly served as a legitimisation of EU missions, as they needed to be organised in coordination with NATO's purview. In this phase, the UK, due to its special relationship with Washington and its essential role in the CSDP, helped the two organisations in bringing together their respective interests and in harmonising their responsibilities for the security of Europe. Moreover, it was established that the EU should avoid the following three practices (the three "Ds"): decoupling NATO and EU decision-making, duplicating capabilities, and discriminating against non-EU Member States⁷.

In 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon eliminated the three pillars' system and introduced the designation of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)⁸, as a component of the CSFP, for the EU actions in the fields of defence and crisis management. The overall scope of the CSDP was framed according to UK's perspectives, as it predominantly carried out conflict prevention, crisis management, and

4. Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe. 'Franco-British St. Malo Declaration (4 December 1998)'. [online] Available at: https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/franco_british_st_malo_declaration_4_december_1998-en-f3cd16fb-c37-4d52-936f-c8-9bc80f24f.html

5. Jolyon Howorth, "The CSDP without the UK: bad for Europe but even worse for Britain", in *The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives*, ed. Daniel Fiott (Brussels: The Royal Institute for International Relations, 2015), 19.

6. Tseretvadze, "Britain and the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union", 78.

7. Nissen, *Forged in Crisis*, 15.

8. This replaced the former ESDP denomination.

peace-building missions in the EU neighbourhood. The creation and development of this kind of security and defence policy has always been in the best interest of London. Aside from prompting EU member states to develop their capabilities, it provided a valuable complement to NATO.

Indeed, the CSDP was a vital element of the comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and crisis management that the UK has frequently sought and advocated for⁹, combining soft and hard power tools to tackle security challenges in conflict-torn areas. NATO's mainly military focus could not be shifted for this sort of engagement. In contrast, the EU constituted the ideal sweeping framework to engineer and forge a broader strategy for crisis management. The division of tasks with NATO was evident from the outset: while Brussels was better equipped to perform "soft power" operations, the Alliance was still entrusted with the territorial defence of the European continent and "hard" security tasks in overseas missions¹⁰.

2.2 London's obstruction to further integration in EU-driven defence

Despite being one of the most fervent promoters of a common security and defence policy in the context of the EU, the UK fiercely hampered certain cooperative advances therein that were not compliant with its narrow perspectives on European defence. While initially London was among the major contributors to

EU CSDP operations, its deployment gradually decreased¹¹, preventing the EU from playing an enhanced strategic role in its immediate neighbourhood. It only emphasised the civilian/humanitarian character of its missions through the dispatch of its world-renowned British diplomatic corps. Thereby, it is accounted that the UK only contributed to 4.19% of the total personnel deployed in EU CSDP missions¹².

This dramatic change of attitude towards the CSDP was largely due to the end of the "New Labour" Government, represented by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, and the election of the Conservative David Cameron as PM in 2010. Although there was a small fraction of pro-Europeans in his coalition, he perfectly embodied the Eurosceptic majority of his party¹³. Indeed, early in his tenure, he consistently reduced forces deployed in CSDP operations and adopted an obstructive position on creating an Operational Headquarters for the EU. The latter had been strongly endorsed, in 2010, by the first High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Albright, a British Labour politician. She considered the installation of an Operational Headquarters in Brussels as a natural outcome of the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon¹⁴, which just recently entered into force. In her view, she was supported by France and Germany. However, the British Conservative Government asserted that it would veto a proposal for the creation of the EU Operational Headquarters citing

9. Nissen, *Forged in Crisis*, 16.

10. *Ibid.*

11. Azizam Yussupova, *Brexit: Its Implications on European Union's Defense Policy* (Brussels: Finabel, 2016), 4.

12. Giovanni Faleg, (2016), "The Implications of Brexit for the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy", CEPS. [online] Available at: https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/implications-brexit-eus-common-security-and-defence-policy/#_ftn2

13. Tsertsvadze, "Britain and the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union", 80.

14. *Ibid.*

concerns of duplication with NATO and unnecessary financial burdens¹⁵.

Another policy obstruction in the field of EU security and defence coming from the British cabinet has been the yearly veto (from 2010 to 2015) on any attempt of increasing the budget of the EDA¹⁶. The Agency, which originally had London's full support, was forced into a freeze of the resources at its disposal despite expanding its tasks in coordinating national capability planning.

Moreover, beyond crisis management mis-

sions, EU member states became increasingly vocal about the capabilities development dimension of the CSDP¹⁷ as the first operations in the EU neighbourhood exposed the need to address various shortcomings in this area. A comprehensive approach to industrial cooperation was necessary to fill the capability gap that undermined the EU's capacity to thrive in its missions overseas. However, only after the Brexit referendum, this became a concrete possibility.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE BREXIT REFERENDUM

On 23 June 2016, the majority of the British citizens voted for their country to leave the EU in a historic referendum. Although the result of the popular consultation was non-binding for the Government, the Conservative leadership, which previously advocated for the occurrence of the referendum, decided to comply with the British people's will and activate the withdrawal procedure.

The latter had been introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon at Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), requiring the Union



PM Blair and French President Chirac, February 1, 2020

and the withdrawing state to negotiate and stipulate an agreement concerning the withdrawal arrangements and the future relation-

¹⁵. Ibid, 81.

¹⁶. Ryan Maas, (2016), 'EU approves budget increase for European Defence Agency', UPI. [online] Available at: <https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2016/11/16/EU-approves-budget-increase-for-European-Defence-Agency/1391479527856/>

¹⁷. Nissen, Forged in Crisis, 18.

ship between them¹⁸. It is important to note that such a process had never been triggered before as the EU, until then, only proceeded in the direction of further integration between its member states, not the opposite. Therefore, the fact that the UK was going to lose its EU membership constituted something unprecedented.

As could be expected, given the nature of the EU, Brexit negotiations and the ensuing withdrawal agreement focused mainly on regulations regarding trade practices, customs, immigration and fishing rights. Security and defence matters have not occupied a prominent stage during the talks, but their relevance is soon demonstrated.

3.1 UK's relevance for EU security and defence

With the departure of the UK, the CSDP has to carry on without one of its two major shareholders, along with France. London has the highest defence spending across Europe, accounting for nearly a quarter of the total EU defence budget¹⁹. Indeed, it was among the five EU member states being able to reach and overcome the 2% threshold of their GDP spending towards defence²⁰. Moreover, the UK provided huge political weight to the EU external action, being a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), a nuclear power and a crucial bridge between Brussels and Washington.

British technical expertise was also of great relevance for EU military/defence institutions such as the EDA, the EUMC and the EUMS²¹; additionally, its diplomatic personnel, bearing UK international influence, has been of paramount significance for the civilian side of CSDP missions.

Most importantly, the UK owned 20% of the EU's overall military capabilities²², as included in the EU Force Catalogue of available units and assets. These encompass a large share of strategic capabilities such as aircraft carriers, radar systems, nuclear submarines, multipurpose frigates, and even Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) systems²³. Nevertheless, there has never been a solid guarantee that the UK would commit its arsenal to CSDP missions²⁴, particularly given its traditional scepticism towards EU defence cooperation and the predilection of the NATO framework. The political and military weight brought by the UK has never been matched by activism in the defence field. Rather, it has frequently prevented the CSDP to move forward, vetoing essential advancements. Coming from a major military and political power, this posture did not let more ambitious proposals be even tabled for discussion, implicitly assuming a British objection.

3.2 Post-Brexit momentum

The outcome of the Brexit referendum represented a game-changer, giving momentum to those EU defence initiatives that were latent,

18. If no agreement is reached between the Parties after 2 years from the withdrawal notification, the Treaties shall cease to apply to the withdrawing State, unless an extension of the negotiating period is agreed unanimously. However, this scenario no longer applies to the withdrawal of the UK.

19. Jamie Shea, "European Defence After Brexit: A Plus or a Minus?", *European View* 19, no. 1 (April 2020): 88.

20. Giovanni Faleg, (2016), "The Implications of Brexit" [online].

21. Anne Bakker, Margriet Drent, and Dick Zandee, *European defence: how to engage the UK after Brexit?* (The Hague: The Clingendael Institute, 2017), 3.

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*

24. Shea, "European Defence After Brexit: A Plus or a Minus?", 89.

in fear of British opposition. The potential withdrawal of a powerful veto player suddenly enabled the CSDP to achieve more in the year after Brexit than in ten years of defence cooperation, according to the former High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini²⁵.

The attitude shift has been evident from the outset: just five days after the British vote on the EU membership, the Council agreed on the EU Global Strategy (EUGS). This document, along with the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, was a turning point for EU defence cooperation. It considerably raised the EU level of ambition by expanding its responsibilities beyond the crisis management area to include the protection of the European territory and its citizens²⁶. On that basis, the EU aims at obtaining strategic autonomy in security and defence affairs, aiming to become an increasingly influential actor on the global stage. Accordingly, since the release of the EUGS, the EU designed several defence tools to reach better and more comprehensive coordination in its efforts.

The EUGS led to the revival of certain initiatives whose realisation was hampered by a British veto. Indeed, in 2017, the Council agreed on the establishment of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) as a permanent EU operational headquarters located in Brussels. It serves as a coordination instrument at the military and strategic level

for CSDP missions.

Moreover, after the Brexit referendum, the EDA budget could eventually be increased. This resulted in an enhanced role for the Agency, which involved the assignment of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). The latter consists of a mechanism to monitor and align EU member states' national defence planning to identify potential cooperative projects. The EDA acts as the CARD Secretariat, together with the EUMS²⁷.

Other key EU defence initiatives arose right after Brexit, presumably incentivised by the British inability/unwillingness to block them²⁸. It is equally remarkable that such developments have largely been prompted by either the Franco-German couple²⁹ or the European Commission³⁰, both unusually involved in the defence domain hitherto.

It is exactly from the Paris-Berlin axis (thus replacing the Paris-London one) that the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) took shape. While the PESCO framework was already envisaged by Article 46 TEU, introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, it was not until 2017 that it could become reality. According to Germany's will³¹, this initiative kick-started with major inclusiveness³² as a compromise was reached on the fulfilment of its binding commitments³³, which are to be met at a later stage (following the phased approach suggested by Berlin). PESCO provides

25. Alexandra De Hoop Scheffer and Martin Quencez, *Will Europe Defense Momentum Lead to Anything?*, Policy Paper no. 22, The German Marshall Fund of the United States (June 2017): 3.

26. European External Action Service, 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy'. [online] Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf

27. European Defence Agency, 'Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)'. [online] Available at: <https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defence-initiatives/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence/card/>

28. By that time, the UK was still a member of the EU. Nonetheless, it did not wield its veto power, having already initiated the withdrawal procedure established by the art. 50 TUE.

29. Yussupova, *Brexit*, 6.

30. Nissen, *Forged in Crisis*, 31-32.

31. *Ibid.*, 39.

32. 25 EU member states participate in PESCO, with the exclusion of Malta and Denmark and the then "departing" UK.

33. PESCO is characterised by 20 individual binding commitments set out by the Protocol no. 10 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon.

its member states with a flexible framework to jointly plan, invest and develop shared military capabilities. Currently, there are 47 PESCO projects underway, aimed at enhancing EU operational readiness for national and multinational missions³⁴.

Furthermore, the European Commission took advantage of the unprecedented impulse in EU defence cooperation by bringing forward the proposal of a European Defence Fund (EDF). This is a financial tool that “aims to boost joint research and innovation in the defence and stimulate Member States industrial bases to develop common military capabilities”³⁵. It also addresses the issues of national protection over the defence industry, equipment duplication, and high procurement costs. The EDF, officially launched in 2021 (with the new Multi-Annual Financial

Framework 2021-2027), was preceded by two successful pilot programmes: the Preparatory Action for Defence Research (PADR) in the period 2017-2019 and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) for the years 2019-2020.

This series of defence initiatives risk expanding the complexity and fragmentation of the EU defence landscape. However, the EU, guided by the EDA, strives for a coherent approach between the spectrum of these newly created tools. Each mechanism, along with the overarching Capability Development Plan (CDP), has its own separate and well-defined purpose that, if properly accomplished, would serve as an enabler for the next one and, in turn, contribute to the enhancement of EU-wide integration in defence³⁶.

CONDITIONS FOR THIRD COUNTRIES’ INVOLVEMENT IN EU DEFENCE INITIATIVES

As of today, the withdrawal process designed by art. 50 TUE has been finalised. A Withdrawal Agreement was signed in October 2019: it entered into force on 1 February 2020 and provided for the terms and conditions of the withdrawal of the UK from the EU³⁷. This unfolded a transition period, set to expire on 31 December 2020, in which

the Treaties (and all the EU policies thereof) kept being applied across the English Channel. London and Brussels still had to strike an agreement on the issues regarding their future relationship³⁸, whereby the UK would no longer be treated as a member state. Therefore, in late December 2020 (few days before the established deadline), the EU and the UK

34. PESCO, ‘PESCO | Member States Driven’. [online] Available at: <https://pesco.europa.eu/>

35. Paolo D’Alesio, (2021), ‘European Defence Fund: Time to Shine’, Finabel. [online] Available at: <https://finabel.org/european-defence-fund-time-to-shine/>

36. European Defence Agency, ‘Ensuring coherence among EU defence tools’. [online] Available at: <https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2019-10-25-factsheet-coherence2f6bb73fa41264ca776ff000087e10f.pdf>

37. Official Journal of the European Union, ‘Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community 2019/C 384 I/01’. [online] Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A2019W%2FEX%2B280%29>

38. In case no agreement had been found before the end of 2020, the Treaties would have ceased to apply altogether (no-deal scenario). This meant that the UK would have been treated as a third country by default, without any peculiar arrangement. Such a circumstance would have endangered the relationship between the two, especially in trade-related matters. Although Brexit has been at considerable risk of getting into this scenario, an agreement in the last days of December prevented this appalling situation.



Source: <https://twitter.com/ymdelbecq/status/134420154365814785> (photo)

Trade and Cooperation Agreement, Ursula von der Leyen, December 30, 2020

signed the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), to come into effect from 1 January 2021.

Despite having been inserted in the Political Declaration³⁹, enacted in pursuance of the 2019 Withdrawal Agreement, the themes of security and defence were not part of the TCA. This is the result of the dispositions of the UK Government, which favoured a flexible, ad-hoc approach to defence cooperation⁴⁰. Thereby, since 1 January 2021, the UK is no longer bound to comply with any CSDP norm or arrangement, nor can it participate in any defence initiative as a member state. The only provisions of the TCA that might vaguely touch upon security and defence are

the Standard Security of Information Agreement and the Framework for Collaboration on Cybersecurity. For everything else, we should refer to the conditions in place for third countries' participation.

Currently, the EU has a variety of defence policies underway, but it lacks a comprehensive framework for third countries' involvement⁴¹; rather, each initiative has its approach or process concerning third countries' participation, without substantial coordination between them. Therefore, if the UK, being now the third country, decides to participate in any EU defence initiative, it must comply with a specific procedure that will be unique to that policy and thus only valid for that one. Here-

39. UK Government. 'Political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom'. [online] Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/840656/Political_Declaration_setting_out_the_framework_for_the_future_relationship_between_the_European_Union_and_the_United_Kingdom.pdf

40. Claire Mills and Ben Smith, End of Brexit transition: implications for defence and foreign policy cooperation, Briefing Paper no. 9117, The House of Commons Library, (January 2021), 1.

41. Thierry Tardy, Revisiting the EU's Security Partnerships, Brief Issue, no.1, EUISS (January 2018).

after, the conditions for third countries' access to EU defence initiatives will be dealt with.

4.1 CSDP and EDA

The most compelling issue during Brexit negotiations has been that of the UK participation in CSDP missions. The British Government argued for a separate agreement in security and defence matters that would reflect the UK-EU deep and special relationship⁴². Most importantly, the UK claimed an involvement in the decision-making and operational planning over CSDP missions commensurate to its contribution. However, the EU drew a clear red line about preserving its decision-making autonomy and operational independence: no third country could be enabled to receive the same benefits as a member state, and no discrimination against other third countries should be devised⁴³.

As a result, after the enactment of the TCA, the UK no longer has a legal basis to participate in CSDP missions. Under no circumstance can British officials hold command posts in CSDP missions or EU military institutions.

The general format in place for third countries' participation in CSDP operations is that of the Framework Participation Agreement (FPA), which allows the signatory third country to participate in any of the EU missions, following an invitation by Brussels⁴⁴. Predictably, although FPAs differ from each other depending on the third country involved, these

types of agreements always proclaim the autonomy of the EU in political decision-making and strategic direction of operations. So far, four countries have signed an FPA with the EU to take part in CSDP missions: Canada, Norway, Australia, and the United States. Nevertheless, FPAs are not an essential means to participate in CSDP missions. The most common practice is that third countries conclude an agreement with the EU for participation in a specific CSDP mission or operation on a case-by-case basis. This flexible approach seems to suit better the UK position on defence cooperation with the EU. However, the commitment of UK troops and capabilities to EU-led military operations without any formal say, seems hard to be accepted by London⁴⁵. For this very reason, some authors⁴⁶, as well as third countries themselves⁴⁷, have argued for a revision of the framework for third country participation in CSDP operations. Still, no adjustments have been made by the EU so far.

Similarly, the EDA enables third countries' involvement in its projects. This is done exclusively employing an Administrative Arrangement (AA) setting out the principles of engagement, the forms of cooperation on specified programmes, and the amount of voluntary personnel contribution. However, AAs do not confer any decision-making prerogatives over the Agency's steering board or an automatic presence at its meetings. Third countries can only attend meetings of common interest upon invitation.

42. Federico Santopinto and Lou Villafranca Izquierdo, *CSDP after Brexit: The Way Forward*, Directorate-General for External Policies, European Parliament (May 2018), 13.

43. *Ibid.*, 14-16.

44. Bakker, et al., *European Defence*, 11.

45. Mills and Smith, *End of Brexit transition*, 5.

46. Bakker, et al., *European Defence*, 14; Bastian Giegerich and Christian Mölling, *The United Kingdom's contribution to European security and defence*, Military Balance Blog, IISS, DGAP (February 2018), 13.

47. Santopinto and Villafranca Izquierdo, *CSDP after Brexit*, 19.

Currently, four countries have signed an AA with the EDA (Norway, Switzerland, Serbia, and Ukraine) while the United States has entered the negotiations phase⁴⁸. For the UK, upon the loss of its seat at the EDA Steering Board, no agreement has been struck for future participation in EDA projects. London, once again, would likely seek more inclusiveness in the Agency's activities than that provided by the current form of AAs⁴⁹.

4.2 PESCO, EDF and other initiatives

For PESCO projects, the EU has recently laid out rules and conditions for third countries' access⁵⁰. These will now apply to the UK if it wishes to be involved therein. Firstly, to be invited to participate in a PESCO project, third countries must comply with certain general conditions that, among others, include: sharing the values of the EU, contributing to the strengthening of the CSDP, proving substantial added value to the particular project, reaching an agreement on the sharing of the capabilities developed, adhering to the 20 PESCO binding commitments, and having signed an AA with the EDA⁵¹.

A third country fulfilling all the general conditions and seeking to participate in a PESCO project must be unanimously invited (upon acceptance of a detailed request by the states that take part in the project), and the whole procedure must be approved by the Council. Once completed the process, the members of

the project and the third country must negotiate an administrative agreement setting out the rights and obligations of the non-EU state. This will likely cover the scope of the third country's decision-making power over the specific project proportionate to its contribution, still preserving EU autonomy. However, "regardless of the extent of decision-making powers conferred on a third state within a specific PESCO project, third states will have no decision-making powers with the overall governance of PESCO, including the future direction of the initiative"⁵².

The UK, that refused to take part in the overall PESCO framework at the time of its launch in 2017 when it was still an EU member state, will most likely frown upon these strict conditions for third countries' involvement in PESCO projects, particularly in the area of intellectual property rights and export controls⁵³.

On the industrial side, only non-EU members of the European Economic Area (EEA)⁵⁴ can be involved in the EDF by means of an associated status. However, subsidiaries of third countries' companies located in the EU can participate in projects funded by the EDF, but they cannot take any direct funding. Moreover, an agreement regarding the retention of intellectual property rights within the EU and the security of supply shall be reached⁵⁵.

Likewise, to have access to the Horizon 2020 EU-funded research programmes, including those concerning security and defence tech-

48. Bakker, et al., *European Defence*, 15.

49. Giegerich and Mölling, *The United Kingdom's contribution*, 14.

50. Council of the European Union, *Decision, 5 November 2020, 2020/1639: Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 of 5 November 2020 establishing the general conditions under which third States could exceptionally be invited to participate in individual PESCO projects*.

51. As of now, the UK lacks this form of arrangement. Thereby, it would be excluded a priori from PESCO projects.

52. Claire Mills, *EU Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO): a future role for UK defence?*, Briefing Paper no. 9058, The House of Commons Library, (January 2021), 4.

53. *Ibid.*, 5.

54. These are only Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein.

55. Mills and Smith, *End of Brexit transition*, 6.

nology, third countries must apply for the Associated Country Status (ACS), whereby they would have to negotiate their contribution to the research budget based on their GDP⁵⁶. In any case, “associated” non-EU states would not be granted any decision-making power. Given the interdependence of the European defence industry and the British reliance on EU funds for R&D/R&T⁵⁷, the potential failure to take part in those initiatives could

prompt the UK defence sector to fall behind its continental counterparts, particularly in terms of cross-border integration. The dire consequences of this side-lining have already been shown by the UK loss of access to the encrypted Public Regulated Service (PRS) of the Galileo satellite navigation programme, leading British companies to be compelled to drop off their sensitive work on the project⁵⁸.

RETHINKING THE UK DEFENCE STRATEGY

In the context of Brexit, the UK must cope with an inevitable shift in its international posture, particularly for defence and security cooperation. Indeed, the loss of its EU membership and the lack of agreement on these policies may lead the UK to be excluded from EU defence cooperation, at least in this initial phase. Although some EU defence initiatives are tantalising for the British defence sector, so far, the rigid conditions for participation as a third country do not seem agreeable by London. On that basis, the UK might have to refine and rethink its defence strategy without a solid bond with the EU.

5.1 The trans-Atlantic bond

From the very beginning to this day, the cornerstone of the British security and defence posture in Europe has been NATO⁵⁹. The

trans-Atlantic Alliance certainly matches the British geopolitical orientation far better than the EU, as its sovereignty will never be at stake. Indeed, the UK has always been a key player in NATO, and Brexit is not likely to affect this, nor its sheer military power, at least in the short term. It is also claimed that London would have increased its NATO commitment regardless of Brexit, due to the worsening security environment in Eastern Europe⁶⁰.

Therefore, the UK is likely to double down on NATO as the primary mechanism for defence cooperation in Europe. It is not only a champion in defence spending (well above the 2% of its GDP, being the largest spender in Europe) and a major contributor to NATO military exercises, but it also actively leads a NATO battalion in the Baltic region and a long-time advocate of an expansion of NATO competences to areas like cyber threats, ter-

56. Bakker, et al., European Defence, 17.

57. Giegerich and Mölling, The United Kingdom's Contribution, 11.

58. Jonathan Amos, (2021), 'UK industry bids farewell to EU's Galileo system', BBC, [online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-55665537>

59. UK Ministry of Defence, 'Seven Decades of Security: NATO at 70', [online] Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/seven-decades-of-security-nato-at-70>

60. Bakker, et al., European Defence, 18.

rorism, and space⁶¹.

As Shea puts it: “in a nutshell, the stronger NATO remains, the more influential the UK’s voice will be in Europe”⁶². However, the Alliance would still need the EU for many aspects related to its military operations, such as military mobility across Europe, cyber defence, or civilian missions. It is evident that the EU is better suited than NATO to take on certain tasks; thereby, a formal division of responsibilities that goes beyond the outdated Berlin Plus Agreement seems appropriate⁶³.

Interlinked with NATO, there is a “special relationship” with the US. This might be bolstered even further in a post-Brexit security landscape, increasingly detached from the EU. The UK has always proven to be the more committed in defence and security among Washington’s European allies and a traditional bridge across the Atlantic.

Nevertheless, Brexit deprived the UK of its leverage over EU initiatives, as it can no longer influence the direction of EU defence cooperation from within. Aware of this, the US has already enhanced its bilateral dialogue with EU capitals, justifiably losing interest in the broker role once played by London⁶⁴.

Moreover, any thorough defence partnership with the US would be subject to the risk of being an asymmetrical one: despite the eventual political goodwill, the British military forces are way less relevant in terms of budget, capabilities, technological progress, and personnel compared to the Americans. The



Union Jack and Stars and Stripes, JR P, May 24, 2011

Source: Flickr.com

UK would represent a relatively minor added value to Washington’s larger geopolitical scheme⁶⁵. Plus, the US might be reticent to develop this partnership because the Biden Administration is more pro-European than the previous one. Moreover, US focus is shifting towards the Indo-Pacific to counter China’s ambitions, forcing Europe to take more responsibilities for its security.

Despite this, the UK might also seek to deepen its security and defence collaboration with the whole Anglosphere, particularly with the Five Eyes partners (the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), which already are its primary international network for exchanging intelligence⁶⁶.

5.2 Multilateral and bilateral partnerships across Europe

Most likely, the UK will try to lead and shape European defence through the many multilateral arrangements already in place and those

61. Shea, “European Defence After Brexit: A Plus or a Minus?”, 91.

62. *Ibid.*

63. So far, no further formal arrangement has been feasible due to the controversy related to the lack of official recognition between Turkey (a non-EU NATO member) and Cyprus (a non-NATO EU member).

64. Alice Billon-Galland, UK defence policy and Brexit: Time to rethink London’s European strategy, European Defence Policy Brief, European Leadership Network, (October 2019), 3.

65. *Ibid.*

66. Bakker, et al., European Defence, 21.

about to emerge. Among these, the UK leads the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) whose aim is to cooperate with nine Northern European allies to develop high-readiness assets for rapid deployment⁶⁷. The post-Brexit UK might consider emphasising this format, amplifying its operational planning capacity in the Northern neighbourhood.

Besides, the UK is part of the launch of the European Intervention Initiative (E2I), a framework intended to share strategic outlooks among major European powers to increase their readiness and effectiveness towards crisis scenarios⁶⁸. Outside of existing structures such as NATO or the EU, this project may enable the UK to remain anchored to the European defence landscape.

Another crucial element for the revitalisation of the UK defence strategy in Europe is to make the most of bilateral agreements with continental counterparts. A large portion of European defence cooperation takes place in this manner. It is now more than ever up to the UK to reinforce these mechanisms. The UK already has close bilateral defence ties with Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands⁶⁹. The Baltic states and Poland are valuable bilateral partners as well, especially for the deterrence of Russia⁷⁰. Moreover, London is intensifying its bilateral links with Germany as a result of the 2018 UK-Germany Joint Vision Statement⁷¹, paving the way for an upgrade in defence cooperation.

However, the most prominent British defence

partner in Europe is France. The two are the major military powers in the area: they both have nuclear weapons and a broad-ranging, technologically advanced armed force, spending the most in security and defence across Europe. They also share political perspectives on the international arena, whereby they often coordinate their foreign policies' positions at the UNSC.

London and Paris formalised and deepened their bilateral defence partnership in 2010 with the Lancaster House Treaties, structuring a framework for cooperation in capabilities' development, nuclear power and operational capacity. For this purpose, they created the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), a binational rapidly deployable force to conduct high-intensity combat operations that became fully operational last year⁷². Moreover, they devised cooperative projects on anti-ship missiles (FC/ASW) and on shared facilities for the testing of nuclear warhead designs (Teutates project), by which they are already using the same radiographic machines⁷³.

Despite this, France and the UK have not moved forward in industrial cooperation as Paris pushes for EU strategic autonomy, promoting more integrated EU defence initiatives. In contrast, so far, Brexit has made London turn in the opposite direction, triggering a reconsideration of its defence strategy. In all likelihood, bilateral defence cooperation between France and the UK will continue

67. Billon-Galland, UK defence policy and Brexit, 9.

68. *Ibid.*

69. Bakker, et al., European Defence, 21.

70. Emma Marry and Maria Antonia Reis Teixeira da Costa, (2018), 'European Defence Ties Post-Brexit: the UK's Development of a Strategic Presence and Cooperation in Europe',

Finabel. [online] Available at: <https://finabel.org/european-defence-ties-post-brexit-the-uks-development-of-a-strategic-presence-and-cooperation-in-europe/>

71. UK Ministry of Defence. 'UK deepens defence cooperation with Germany'. [online] Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-deepens-defence-cooperation-with-germany>

72. Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères. 'The Lancaster House Treaties: 10 years of Franco-British defence partnership'. [online] Available at: <https://www.diplomatic.gouv.fr/en/country-files/United-Kingdom/the-lancaster-house-treaties-10-years-of-franco-british-defence-partnership/>

73. Peter Ricketts, (2020), 'France and the UK: A Decade of the Lancaster House Treaties', RUSI. [online] Available at: <https://rusi.org/commentary/france-and-uk-decade-lancaster-house-treaties>

to shape European defence in the next years. Still, there is a good chance that the back-

ground and conditions will vary, especially due to the rise of the EU as a defence actor.

THE WAY AHEAD: A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL ENGAGEMENT

In the aftermath of Brexit, EU defence cooperation represents a litmus test for the value of the integration project as a whole⁷⁴. Indeed, this is a time when Brussels meets several preconditions to raise its level of ambition in security and defence, including the departure of a staunch veto player, and therefore to become geopolitically relevant on the global stage, while still maintaining a close transatlantic partnership.

On that note, the UK might find itself in a limbo between a careless Washington, more interested in establishing a direct link with EU capitals and concerning more about the Indo-Pacific, and a rigid EU, stressing the compliance with its rule-based approach for participation in defence initiatives.

London may not consider its side-lining from EU defence as a big deal. It might feel reassured by its “special relationship” with the US as well as by the fact that around 90% of its industrial collaboration with European counterparts takes place on a bilateral or multilateral basis⁷⁵.

However, likely, the generation and financing of joint projects will increasingly move within the EU framework, particularly given the

establishment of tools such as PESCO and the EDF⁷⁶. Moreover, as seen above, UK's partnership with France could be weakened by the opposing directives that their defence policies are taking as one side seeks to promote EU defence cooperation, while the other places emphasis on NATO or smaller intergovernmental formats⁷⁷. This might also generate divergence and competition across Europe, leading UK-based companies to deal with different regulations over standards and safety: those are largely determined by either the US or the EU, only occasionally coordinating their stances⁷⁸.

The UK remains a potentially valuable partner for the EU in military and political terms. In the security and defence domains, Brussels would surely benefit from collaborating with London, and vice versa. However, defence cooperation has not been included in the TCA. This is because both parties may have preferred a rather tentative approach, opting for a less formal relationship, that would be able to evolve following changing circumstances⁷⁹. In such a context, mutual trust needs to be built and nurtured over time, even with limited prospects regarding access to EU de-

74. Nissen, *Forged in Crisis*, 50.

75. House of Commons Debate, 14 January 2019. 'Leaving the EU: Defence Co-operation' [online] Available at: https://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2019-01-14b792_5

76. Trevor Taylor, (2020), 'Brexit's Implications for UK Defence Industrial Cooperation with Europe', RUSI. [online] Available at: <https://rusi.org/commentary/brexit-implications-uk-defence-industrial-cooperation-europe>

77. Nissen, *Forged in Crisis*, 51.

78. Trevor Taylor, (2020), 'Brexit's Implications'. [online].

79. Santopinto and Villafranca Izquierdo, *CSDP after Brexit*, 38.

cision-making for Britain. For this reason, frequent formal and informal UK-EU consultations should be on the agenda, providing for a proactive framework for pragmatic engagement.

As far as EU defence initiatives are concerned, Brussels should move forward in the direction of more integration, as it has already done, maintaining a high level of ambition. CARD, PESCO, and the EDF, along with the renewed CDP, are likely to produce outstanding results in the near future, improving capabilities' development and reinforcing the European industrial base through cutting-edge joint projects, partly financed by the EU. On the other hand, the UK will likely remain scepti-

cal at first, as it has always been regarding EU defence cooperation. However, confronted with reality and lobbied by local contractors⁸⁰, it will figure out how to best become involved as a third country to not miss an opportunity that would be hard to catch at a later stage.

Undoubtedly, access to UK's financial resources, diplomatic leverage, and military capabilities, including ISR technology, would be of the utmost importance for facilitating the success of the EU Global Strategy.

However, it is up to London to make a step towards Brussels. Significant progress could be initially achieved by facilitating, or even formalising⁸¹, the relationship between NATO and the EU, favouring a security ar-

Source: <https://www.bisfindingsforbritain.co.uk/images-between-the-uk-and-northern-ireland-and-the-european-union-for-defence/>



UK-EU engagement, March 6, 2019

80. Shea, "European Defence After Brexit: A Plus or a Minus?", 92.

81. Possibly by means of a legal and diplomatic patchwork that could quell the dispute between Cyprus and Turkey.

rangement that would ensure a meaningful exchange of documents and information⁸². This, accompanied by the upgrade of its diplomatic missions in Brussels and other key EU capitals, would enable the UK to have a voice, although very limited, in EU initiatives and could, possibly, push the EU to concede better terms for third countries' involvement. Thus, the UK could help keep EU capabilities development NATO-friendly and convince Washington that it is still a valuable player in EU affairs.

The UK could also increase mutual trust by boosting foreign policy alignment. London could bring forward formal dialogue with the EU before formulating positions and resolutions within the UNSC, creating essentially

a powerful multiplier effect⁸³. Moreover, the UK and the EU could coordinate their international posture and their sanctions policies, as it has recently occurred with the imposition of parallel sanctions on Chinese officials⁸⁴.

Most importantly, the UK and the EU member states should maximise cooperation on regulations and standards through the international bodies they are part of, such as the NATO Standardization Office (NSO) and the European Committee for Standardization (CEN). This would, in turn, help develop, to the greatest extent possible given the British loss of EU membership, a full-fledged European industrial base and enhance interoperability between the respective national military forces beyond bilateral configurations.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In his recent speech at the 2021 Munich Security Conference, UK PM Boris Johnson put international cooperation at the heart of British foreign policy. He emphasised his country's steady commitment and increased contribution to NATO for the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area⁸⁵. However, his address was deliberately silent on the EU's key role in European security and defence. Instead, he displayed Brussels as a limitation to British sovereignty in foreign policy, promptly regained after the completion of Brexit.

In realistic terms, the UK and the EU face the

same security environment, whether they like it or not. Brexit has not changed geography. The UK has left the EU, not Europe. Thereby, it has to tackle the same challenges and threats as those of the EU. For this very reason, as argued above, the two sides should set aside the acrimony of the withdrawal process and struck a compromise for a proactive, pragmatic engagement in defence and security.

On the one hand, the UK cannot address the turbulence and uncertainty of these times by itself: the global technological innovation race and the power of Russia and China are not

82. Giegerich and Mölling, 'The United Kingdom's contribution', 14.

83. Billon-Galland, 'UK defence policy and Brexit', 7.

84. Patrick Wintour, (2021), 'US and Canada follow EU and UK in sanctioning Chinese officials over Xinjiang', *The Guardian*. [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/27/china-responds-to-eu-uk-sanctions-over-tighurs-human-rights>

85. Peter Ricketts, (2021), 'Prime Minister Outlines Vision for International Cooperation', *RUSI*. [online] Available at: <https://rusi.org/commentary/prime-minister-outlines-vision-international-cooperation>

within the reach of Britain alone. On the other hand, the EU's pursuit of strategic autonomy would greatly benefit from UK assets: not only the material (armaments, troops, technology) and economic (defence and research spending, sanctioning power) ones but also the political ones (diplomatic corps, permanent seat at the UNSC, multiplier effect).

In this scenario, the centrality of the United States should not be overlooked. Indeed, Europe is still dependent on the US for its defence, and the EU has a long way to go before it could spare the strategic assistance of Washington. Every stakeholder involved agrees that Europe should take more responsibilities for its defence.

The EUGS, as well as the upcoming Strategic Compass, appropriately heads towards this direction. Therefore, a more autonomous EU could please the US, particularly if it complements NATO by addressing the gaps and shortfalls of the Alliance. For this purpose, the UK should seek to participate as much as possible in EU defence cooperation to not become isolated from the surrounding security network. This would also fulfil a key goal in relation to its preferred bilateral and multilateral type of engagement, making it more relevant from the perspectives of its most important strategic partners: the United States and France.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Amos, Jonathan. (2021), 'UK industry bids farewell to EU's Galileo system', BBC. [online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-55665537> [Accessed: May 5, 2021].

Bakker, Anne, Margriet Drent, and Dick Zandee. *European defence: how to engage the UK after Brexit?*. The Hague: The Clingendael Institute, 2017.

Billon-Galland, Alice. *UK defence policy and Brexit: Time to rethink London's European strategy*. European Defence Policy Brief, European Leadership Network (October 2019).

Black, James, Alex Hall, Kate Cox, Marta Kepe and Erick Silfversten, *Defence and Security after Brexit: Understanding the possible implications of the UK's decision to leave the EU*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017.

Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe, (2015). 'Franco-British St. Malo Declaration (4 December 1998)'. [online] Available at: https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/franco_british_st_malo_declaration_4_december_1998-en-f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f.html [Accessed: April 22, 2021].

Council of the European Union, Decision, 5 November 2020, 2020/1639: *Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 of 5 November 2020 establishing the general conditions under which third States could exceptionally be invited to participate in individual PESCO projects.*

D'Alesio, Paolo. (2021), 'European Defence Fund: Time to Shine', Finabel. [online] Available at: <https://finabel.org/european-defence-fund-time-to-shine/> [Accessed: May 3, 2021].

D'Alfonso, Alessandro. *The UK 'rebate' on the EU budget.* Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service (February 2016).

De Hoop Scheffer, Alexandra and Martin Quencez. *Will Europe Defense Momentum Lead to Anything?*. Policy Paper no. 22, The German Marshall Fund of the United States (June 2017).

European Defence Agency, (2019). 'Ensuring coherence among EU defence tools'. [online] Available at: <https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2019-10-25-fact-sheet-coherence246bb73fa4d264cfa776ff000087ef0f.pdf> [Accessed: May 3, 2021].

European Defence Agency, (2020). 'Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)'. [online] Available at: [https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defence-initiatives/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-\(card\)](https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defence-initiatives/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-(card)) [Accessed: April 28, 2021].

European External Action Service, (2016). 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy'. [online] Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf [Accessed: April 28, 2021].

Faleg, Giovanni. (2016), 'The Implications of Brexit for the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy', CEPS. [online] Available at: https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/implications-brexit-eus-common-security-and-defence-policy/#_ftn2 [Accessed: April 26, 2021].

Ghez, Jeremy, Magdalena Kirchner, Michael Shurkin, Anna Knack, Alexandra Hall, and James Black, *Defence and Security after Brexit: A snapshot of International Perspectives on the Implications of the UK's Decision to Leave the EU.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017.

Giegerich, Bastian and Christian Mölling. *The United Kingdom's contribution to European security and defence.* Military Balance Blog, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, German Council on Foreign Relations (February 2018).

House of Commons Debate, 14 January 2019. 'Leaving the EU: Defence Co-operation' [online] Available at: <https://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2019-01-14b.792.5> [Accessed: May 7, 2021].

Howorth, Jolyon. “The CSDP without the UK: bad for Europe but even worse for Britain”. in *The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives*, edited by Daniel Fiott, 19-20. Brussels: The Royal Institute for International Relations, 2015.

Latici, Tania. *What role in European defence for a post-Brexit United Kingdom?*. Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service (April 2019).

Maas, Ryan. (2016), ‘EU approves budget increase for European Defence Agency’, UPI. [online] Available at: <https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2016/11/16/EU-approves-budget-increase-for-European-Defence-Agency/1391479327856/> [Accessed: April 26, 2021].

Marty, Emma and Maria Antonia Reis Teixeira da Costa. (2018), ‘European Defence Ties Post-Brexit: the UK’s Development of a Strategic Presence and Cooperation in Europe’, Finabel. [online] Available at: <https://finabel.org/european-defence-ties-post-brexit-the-uks-development-of-a-strategic-presence-and-cooperation-in-europe/> [Accessed: May 6, 2021].

Mills, Claire. *EU Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO): a future role for UK defence?*. Briefing Paper no. 9058, The House of Commons Library (January 2021).

Mills, Claire and Ben Smith. *End of Brexit transition: implications for defence and foreign policy cooperation*. Briefing Paper no. 9117, The House of Commons Library (January 2021).

Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères, (2020). ‘The Lancaster House Treaties: 10 years of Franco-British defence partnership’. [online] Available at: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/united-kingdom/the-lancaster-house-treaties-10-years-of-franco-british-defence-partnership/> [Accessed: May 6, 2021].

Nissen, Christine. *Forged in Crisis: The EU Common Security and Defence Policy after Brexit*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2017.

Official Journal of the European Union, (2019). ‘Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community 2019/C 384 I/01’. [online] Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12019W%2FTXT%2802%29> [Accessed: May 4, 2021].

PESCO, ‘PESCO | Member States Driven’. [online] Available at: <https://pesco.europa.eu/> [Accessed: May 6, 2021].

Ricketts, Peter. (2020), ‘France and the UK: A Decade of the Lancaster House Treaties’, RUSI. [online] Available at: <https://rusi.org/commentary/france-and-uk-decade-lancaster-house-treaties> [Accessed: May 7, 2021].

Ricketts, Peter. (2021), 'Prime Minister Outlines Vision for International Cooperation', RUSI. [online] Available at: <https://rusi.org/commentary/prime-minister-outlines-vision-international-cooperation> [Accessed: May 7, 2021].

Santopinto, Federico and Lou Villafranca Izquierdo. *CSDP after Brexit: The Way Forward*. Directorate-General for External Policies, European Parliament (May 2018).

Shea, Jamie. "European Defence After Brexit: A Plus or a Minus?". *European View* 19, no. 1 (April 2020): 88-94.

Tardy, Thierry. *Revisiting the EU's Security Partnerships*. Brief Issue no.1, EUISS (January 2018).

Taylor, Trevor. (2020), 'Brexit's Implications for UK Defence Industrial Cooperation with Europe', RUSI. [online] Available at: <https://rusi.org/commentary/brexit-implications-uk-defence-industrial-cooperation-europe> [Accessed: May 7, 2021].

Tsertsvadze, Irina. "Britain and the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union". *Connections* 16, no. 3 (Summer 2017): 73-86.

UK Government, (2019). 'Political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom'. [online] Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/840656/Political_Declaration_setting_out_the_framework_for_the_future_relationship_between_the_European_Union_and_the_United_Kingdom.pdf [Accessed: May 4, 2021].

UK Ministry of Defence, (2018). 'UK deepens defence cooperation with Germany'. [online] Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-deepens-defence-cooperation-with-germany> [Accessed: May 6, 2021].

UK Ministry of Defence, (2019). 'Seven Decades of Security: NATO at 70'. [online] Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/seven-decades-of-security-nato-at-70> [Accessed: May 5, 2021].

Wintour, Patrick. (2021), 'US and Canada follow EU and UK in sanctioning Chinese officials over Xinjiang', *The Guardian*. [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/22/china-responds-to-eu-uk-sanctions-over-uighurs-human-rights> [Accessed: May 7, 2021].

Yussupova, Azizam. *Brexit: Its Implications on European Union's Defense Policy*. Brussels: Finabel, 2016.

Created in 1953, the Finabel committee is the oldest military organisation for cooperation between European Armies: it was conceived as a forum for reflections, exchange studies, and proposals on common interest topics for the future of its members. Finabel, the only organisation at this level, strives at:

- Promoting interoperability and cooperation of armies, while seeking to bring together concepts, doctrines and procedures;
- Contributing to a common European understanding of land defence issues. Finabel focuses on doctrines, trainings, and the joint environment.

Finabel aims to be a multinational-, independent-, and apolitical actor for the European Armies of the EU Member States. The Finabel informal forum is based on consensus and equality of member states. Finabel favours fruitful contact among member states' officers and Chiefs of Staff in a spirit of open and mutual understanding via annual meetings.

Finabel contributes to reinforce interoperability among its member states in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the EU, and *ad hoc* coalition; Finabel neither competes nor duplicates NATO or EU military structures but contributes to these organisations in its unique way. Initially focused on cooperation in armament's programmes, Finabel quickly shifted to the harmonisation of land doctrines. Consequently, before hoping to reach a shared capability approach and common equipment, a shared vision of force-engagement on the terrain should be obtained.

In the current setting, Finabel allows its member states to form Expert Task Groups for situations that require short-term solutions. In addition, Finabel is also a think tank that elaborates on current events concerning the operations of the land forces and provides comments by creating "Food for Thought papers" to address the topics. Finabel studies and Food for Thoughts are recommendations freely applied by its member, whose aim is to facilitate interoperability and improve the daily tasks of preparation, training, exercises, and engagement.



Tel: +32 (0)2 441 79 38 – GSM: +32 (0)483 712 193
E-mail: info@finabel.org

You will find our studies at www.finabel.org



European Army Interoperability Centre



www.linkedin.com/in/finabelEAIC



[@FinabelEAIC](https://www.facebook.com/FinabelEAIC)



[@FinabelEAIC](https://twitter.com/FinabelEAIC)