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The OSCE and EU as Security Actors

Peacebuilding, Peacekeeping and Conflict Management

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This Food for Thought paper is a document that gives an initial reflection on the theme. The content is not reflecting the positions of the member states but consists of elements that can initiate and feed the discussions and analyses in the domain of the theme. All our studies are available on www.finabel.org

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INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War had enormous consequences on the management of power by international actors. While the two global superpowers managed relations and ensured the stability of Europe and surrounding areas, the end of bipolarism and the demise of the Soviet Union created a power vacuum. Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Caucasus were among the first areas to have witnessed the outbreak of internal conflicts, generated by secessionist pressures and ethno-cultural issues. Within this context, the disappearance of the USSR and the partial disengagement of the United States paved the way for several new global players to ensure the stability and security of Europe and its periphery. The United Nations, NATO, the OSCE, and the EU have filled that empty space. Each has exploited its means and capabilities, often in a multilateral environment and in collaboration with others.

This work will focus on the role of the European Union and the OSCE in crisis management in Eastern Europe. Indeed, given their functional overlap in peacebuilding and peacekeeping, the various strengths and weaknesses of these organisations will be analysed with regard to their crisis management operations. After evaluating the various advantages and disadvantages of the OSCE and the EU comparatively, their strengths and weaknesses will be further highlighted in two case studies: Georgia and Ukraine.

The OSCE and the EU are widely considered to be two of the most important international organisations in the Eurasian security system. Both of these organisations are dedicated to peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the post-soviet region and are attempting to foster peace in the area.[1]

At first glance, these two actors bear a lot of similarities: both of them are described as actor's sui generis,[2] define the promotion of international peace as one of their major objectives,[3] and pursue their objectives via means of soft power.[4]

However, while their overall goals are comparable, their capabilities stem from their institutional density and policy effectiveness vary considerably. This is especially true regarding the developments in the aftermath of the fall of the Iron Curtain. With the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Defence and Security Policy (CDSP), the EU managed to expand its range of tasks to areas that were previously held by the OSCE.[5]

While the EU went through a process of dynamic development, the OSCE stagnated in the institutional form it took in the mid-90s and got largely marginalised vis-à-vis the EU. Peters even refers to the OSCE as the "forgotten transatlantic security organisation" that struggles to find its purpose in a wider Europe that is dominated by other security actors such as the EU or NATO.[6]

This functional overlap between the two organisations did not just side-line the OSCE in the European security system but also established a deeply asymmetrical relationship. As the Secretary-General of the OSCE once put it:

"The EU is the elephant in the room. But we can think of the EU as the elephant, the Council of Europe as the dog, and the OSCE as the flea. And of course, the flea can bite the dog that bites the elephant."[7]

However, while many scholars had been complaining about the declining relevance of the OSCE,[8] it managed to regain relevance during the conflict in Ukraine.[9]

These two organisations' roles in the Eurasian security system are embedded in the historical context of their institutionalisation and their varying degree of institutional density and effectiveness.

The OSCE as a Cold War Institution

The creation of the OSCE is closely linked to the bipolar order that emerged after World War II and the process of relaxations of tensions between 1969 and 1975 that is widely

1. European Parliament, 'The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)'.
2. Lietzmann 'European Constitutional Politics and Contingency: The European Union as a 'Sui Generis' Political Entity', 2.
3. European Parliament, 'Strengthening the OSCE: a role for the EU', [online].
4. Larivé, 'The European Architecture: OSCE, NATO and the EU', 158.
5. Ibid.
6. Peters, "The OSCE, NATO and the EU within the "Network of Interlocking European Security Institutions": Hierarchization, Flexibilization, Marginalization", 400.
7. Galbreath, 'Convergence Without Cooperation? The EU and the OSCE in the Field of Peacebuilding', 189.
8. Trachsler 'The OSCE: Fighting for Renewed Relevance', 1 [online].
9. Lehne, Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis, 18.

known as "Détente."[10] The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was perceived as a way to "multilateralise the territorial status quo and, on a symbolic level, bring World War II to a close".[11]

While the establishment of the CSCE was perceived to be a major Soviet victory at the time of its foundation, later historians have shown that it constituted only a "pyrrhic victory" for the Soviet Union, "because the struggle against the regime by dissidents was aided by the provisions of the Act's third basket [about the cooperation in humanitarian and other fields], which played an important role in the ultimate dissolution of the Soviet system."[12]

After the collapse of the Eastern bloc in 1989/1991, the mission of the CSCE was largely completed. With the Soviet adversary gone, an institution that promoted cooperation and Détente between two antagonistic blocs had become redundant.[13] The CSCE was the brainchild of the Cold War system, an international order that had now vanished. So, what purpose should an institution like the CSCE fulfil in this new international environment?

Instead of dissolving the Cold War institution, it was decided to transform the conference-based CSCE into an intergovernmental organisation. In an era where many intellectuals and government officials across the world believed in an imminent "End of History" that would lead to the "universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government,"[14] the purpose and the main goal of the OSCE were adjusted to the new situation. While it was mainly an institution to manage relations between two opposing blocs during the cold war, its main task now became "to facilitate confidence building measures and transparency among states, support for the democratisation process in evolving democracies and the protection of minority rights."[15] The OSCE was transformed into a tool to integrate the former communist states into the liberal international order and to democratise the post-communist space.[16] A set of Western values and norms such as human rights, gender equality, good governance, and the promotion of democracy became part of the institutional DNA of the newly formed OSCE.[17]

This change of names – from a conference to an organisation – also signifies an increased degree of institutional density. To guarantee continuous dialogue between the participating states, the Permanent Council was established in Vienna as the main decision-making body of the OSCE. Decisions in the area of military-related security issues are, on the other hand, taken in the Forum for Security and Cooperation. The Secretariat in Vienna and its head, the Secretary-General, support the chairmanship throughout the year with insights from numerous task units. To address the increased emphasis on human rights, three institutions were created: The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights; the Commissioner on National Minorities;

10. Békés 'The Long Détente and the Soviet Bloc: 1953-1983`, 31 [online].
11. Wenger and Mastny, 'New Perspectives on the Origins of the CSCE process', 19.
12. Rey, 'The USSR and the Helsinki process: 1969-75', 78.
13. Laursen, 'Foreword', 13.
14. Fukuyama, "The End of History?", 4.
15. Zyla "Soft Power: The Role of Canada in the OSCE', 136
16. Stefanova, 'Institutionalist Theories: The OSCE in the Western Balkans', 55.
17. Larivé 'The European Architecture: OSCE, NATO and the EU', 164.

and the Representative of the Freedom of the Media.[18]

Another major step in the evolution of the OSCE was the introduction of the OSCE field operations, which are deployed in states suffering from civil or international conflicts. The mandate of these operations is twofold. Firstly, they try to facilitate political processes to settle conflicts and, secondly, inform the OSCE community about the developments in the states where the missions are present.[19]

While the institutionalisation of the OSCE was an overall success, there were also major setbacks. Despite the establishment of a number of organs, the institutional structure of the OSCE remained relatively weak. It fell short of introducing a real, treaty-based organisation that would be a regional equivalent of the United Nations.[20] Due to these persisting institutional problems and the consensus required in the decision-making process, the OSCE is often caught in a stalemate. As there are currently 57 states participating in the OSCE, all of them with different political and strategic goals, a consensus is often hard to achieve.[21] As Richard Sakwa outlines: "in the security sphere, the OSCE plays an invaluable role as conflict mediator and regulator, but it failed to become the genuinely inclusive and pre-eminent security body in Europe some had anticipated after the Cold War."[22]

Functional Overlap Between the EU and the OSCE

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the EU started to expand its scope of functions considerably. As the EU delivered on the promise of "an ever-closer Union"[23], it went through a process of functional "de-specialisation" and became what Peters calls "OSCE-ified", by adapting measures, means, and aspects that

18. Dominguez, 'Introduction: The OSCE as a Security Provider', 22-23.
19. U.S. Mission to the OSCE 'Field Operations', [online].
20. Venneri, 'Missed Opportunities to create a Pan-European Collective Security Organization', 49.
21. Dominguez 'Introduction: The OSCE as a Security Provider', 22.
22. Sakwa, Russia against the Rest: The Post-World War Crisis of World Order, 25.
23. Treaty on European Union. Consolidated Version, (2012), Article 1 [online].

were previously associated with the OSCE.[24] This resulted in a functional overlap that threatened to marginalise the OSCE.

Just like the OSCE, the EU adopted a normative, value-based approach that reflects the EU's goal to contribute to the "building [of] a better world."[25] This normative approach is deeply influenced by the prospect of a Kantian democratic peace and the assumption that democracies are in general more peaceful and less likely to resort to violence as a means to achieve their political goals.[26]

The assumption that democracy and peace are intrinsically linked, was already outlined in the European Security Strategy 2003, which argued that a "world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens."[27]

One of the main frameworks to foster democratic peace as well as spreading European values in the former Soviet space is strongly connected to the procedures the EU developed in its process of enlargement.[28]

The EU built a framework for engagement in the region that was modelled after the enlargement process but came short of full membership: the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).[29] The ENP conceives an institutional, legal, and policy framework for peacebuilding. The main assumption underlying the ENP is that the transformation of conflict requires "the prior establishment of the rule of law and effective governance structures. […] The EU can thus induce peacebuilding by supporting capacity building within third countries."[30]

The second traditional pillar of EU peacebuilding and conflict management is to support preventive crisis management by diplomatic means.[31] These mediation efforts are carried out by the European Delegation, the EU's special representatives, and the CFSP High Representative.[32] Examples of the key diplomatic role of the EU in conflict management and resolution include confidence building in the conflict between Moldova and Transnistria through the EU's delegation in Chisinau or the "Six Point Agreement" between the EU and Russia that ended the war between Georgia and Russia in 2008.[33]

This "OSCE-ification" of the EU had especially strong repercussions on the OSCE missions.[34] The OSCE is still the dominant actor in the area – it currently deploys 15 field operations in Eastern Europe and Central Asia[35] – but the EU is catching up. The EU has been extremely active since the launch of its first operation in 2003 and has constantly expanded the territorial scope and the areas of responsibility of its missions.[36] The EU currently counts 7 missions in Europe and Eurasia, making it the second most active peacekeeper in the region after the OSCE.[37]

24. Peters, "The OSCE, NATO and the EU within the "Network of Interlocking European Security Institutions": Hierarchization, Flexibilization, Marginalization", 399.
25. European Commission (2003), 'A Secure Europe in a better World: European Security Strategy', [online].
26. Nilsson et al., "Democracy and Security in the EU's Eastern Neighborhood?: Assessing The ENP in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.", 46-47.
27. European Commission (2003), 'A Secure Europe in a better World: European Security Strategy', [online].
28. Galbreath, 'Convergence Without Cooperation? The EU and the OSCE in the Field of Peacebuilding', 188-189.
29. Smith 'Enlargement, the Neighborhood and European Order', 335-338.
30. Tocci, 'The EU as a peacebuilder: Actorness, Potential and Limits', 60-61.
31. Peters, "The OSCE, NATO and the EU within the "Network of Interlocking European Security Institutions": Hierarchization, Flexibilization, Marginalization", 392.
32. Tocci 'The EU as a peacebuilder: Actorness, Potential and Limits', 56.
33. Axyonova et al.," Regional Organizations and Secessionist Entities: Analyzing Practices of the EU and the OSCE in Post-Soviet Protracted Conflict Areas.", 414.
34. Ham, 'EU-OSCE Relations: Partners or Rivals in Security?', 140-141.
35. OSCE 'Annual Report 2018', 55
36. Tsagourias, 'EU Peacekeeping Operations: Legal and Theoretical Issues' , 107.
37. European External Action Service 'Military and civilian missions and operations'

Capabilities of the EU and the OSCE

The EU has been defined as being more capable and effective in shaping international security than its "natural born partner"[38], the OSCE. While the OSCE is often described as being merely a "talk-shop", that is incapable of addressing emerging conflicts adequately,[39] the EU has the advantage of offering something in return for its efforts to promote peace: access to its single market.[40]
The effectiveness of the means the EU is using to foster peace in the region is especially apparent when compared to the OSCE tools. Both of the OSCE's most important peacebuilding tools – the field missions and the conflict mediation service – suffer from the merely political character of the OSCE, which solely relies on the voluntary commitment of its participating states to comply with; or make usage of the mechanisms the OSCE has to offer.[41]
But the OSCE also has certain advantages when compared to the EU that stem from its geographic scope and the fact that all post-soviet states are Member States of the organisation.[42] While the peacebuilding missions of the OSCE are an internal matter, in which the OSCE is directly engaging with its participating states, the EU's peacebuilding missions are primarily part of its foreign policy and an external matter. This comparative inclusiveness of the OSCE is a huge advantage when it comes to conflict mediation and peacebuilding. The membership of the post-soviet countries gives the OSCE a degree of legitimacy and credibility to deal with conflicts in this region unmatched by the EU. The OSCE is also the only international organisation that provides a platform for dialogue and confidence building in the region.[43] Its major strength rests in its flexibility to quickly adapt to new political realities and to provide a structured communication process between the conflicting parties, in a way that satisfies their interests at stake.[44]

THE OSCE AS A PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM

Peacekeeping as an Internal Matter Within the EU

The research and promotion of peace have always been at the heart of the construction of the European project. This was illustrated shortly after World War II by the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950,[45] which preceded the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. The agreement sought

38. Paunov, 'Assessing the Success of EU-OSCE Cooperation: a Case of Mutualism?', 375.
39. Zyla "Soft Power: The Role of Canada in the OSCE', 136.
40. Houtum and Boedelte, "Questioning the EU's Neighborhood Geo-Politics: Introduction to a Special Section", 122.
41. Stenner 'Understanding the Mediator: Taking Stock of the OSCE's Mechanisms and Instruments for Conflict Resolution', 271-272
42. Peters, "The OSCE, NATO and the EU within the "Network of Interlocking European Security Institutions": Hierarchization, Flexibilization, Marginalization", 394.
43. Stenner 'Understanding the Mediator: Taking Stock of the OSCE's Mechanisms and Instruments for Conflict Resolution', 271
44. Stenner 'Understanding the Mediator: Taking Stock of the OSCE's Mechanisms and Instruments for Conflict Resolution', 263
45. European Parliament - Committee on Institutional Affairs, 'Selection of texts concerning institutional matters of the Community from 1950 to 1982.', 1982, p. 47-48, [online].

to deprive the six states of this community (Italy, Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and France) of their means to go to war.[46] This logic continued throughout the European process until the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) ratified by the Maastricht Treaty (1993),[47]as well as the Common Security and Defence Policy (1999).[48] Since 1975 the OSCE has acted with its own tools as a partner of the EU to preserve European peace.[49] The OSCE aims to maintain peace within the European continent, acting through the establishment of a forum in which its 57 participating states can dialogue to preserve peace as well as through operations aimed at maintaining peace, democracy, and the rule of law.[50] It is interesting to observe that the use of the OSCE has suffered from the fact that some EU Member States have favoured other entities such as NATO and its means of defence, or from the fact that the EU itself is developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy.[51] Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the OSCE remains the only *sui generis* organisation that allows a common dialogue for peace on the European continent between Canada, Russia, the United States, and the countries of Europe and Central Asia.[52] This preference for NATO and the European Union's tools may result in a lack of investment on the part of certain states or in tensions within the OSCE, particularly with Russia, which challenges certain commit-

ments that bind it to this organisation. At a time when tensions between the EU and Russia continue to rise, notably after the explicit rejection of three EU diplomats during an official visit by Joseph Borrell to Russia,[53] as well as the Russian show of force at the Ukrainian border[54] at the gates of Europe, the importance of this multilateral dialogue allowed by the OSCE is highlighted.

The OSCE's role of multilateral dialogue is reminiscent of the Council of Europe, which was created in 1949 after The Hague Congress and allows 47 European states to come together for dialogue to promote democracy, the rule of law, and to preserve peace in Europe.[55] It should be noted that within the European Council there is an "OSCE and Council of Europe" group responsible for the EU's relations with the Organisation and the

46. Eur-Lex, 'Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community', [online].
47. European External Action Service, 'Common Foreign and Security Policy', [online].
48. European External Action Service, 'Common Security and Defense Policy', [online].
49. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 'The European Union', [online].
50. European External Action Service, 'OSCE', [online].
51. Peters, "The OSCE, NATO and the EU within the "Network of Interlocking European Security Institutions": Hierarchization, Flexibilization, Marginalization", 381-402.
52. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 'Who we are', [online].
53. European External Action Service, 'Russia: Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell at the EP debate on his visit to Moscow', [online].
54. William and Emmott, Reuters, April 20, 2021.
55. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 'The Council of Europe', [online].

Council of Europe.[56] What is important to observe is the advantage of what the OSCE brings over the Council of Europe: while the latter comprises only European States, the OSCE counts among its members, in addition to the European States, States from Central Asia as well as Canada and the United States. Moreover, the OSCE operates through a single administration (as a *sui generis* organisation) and can set up specific operations to preserve peace and democracy in Europe.

OSCE STRUCTURE, IN-DEPTH OPERATIONS & GOALS

The OSCE is made up of several structural entities that enable it to carry out its objectives: the Parliamentary Assembly, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration and the OSCE Minsk Group.[57]
The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, composed of 323 parliamentarians from OSCE member countries, provides a forum for deepening international cooperation on economic, political, security, and human rights issues. The Assembly hosts parliamentary debates and serves as a diplomatic forum. It should be noted that the Assembly contributes to the strengthening of democratic institutions in OSCE Member States while developing mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution.
The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities intervenes in OSCE exchanges and processes when national minorities are associated with situations of tension that may develop into conflict. In such cases, he makes recommendations to advise the States concerned on the way forward.
The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights provides expertise to civil society and participating states to promote the rule of law, democracy, and human rights.
The OSCE Minsk Group, co-chaired by the United States, France, and the Russian Federation, pursues the objectives of the Minsk Process related to Nagorno-Karabakh situation and conflicts, to provide an appropriate framework for conflict resolution.[58]

The OSCE establishes operations to address the need to strengthen democracy and human rights. OSCE operations are agreed by consensus among the organisation's Member States. Some operations assist institutional change by supporting legislative reforms and others work on conflict prevention, monitoring, or post-conflict management.[59] The first OSCE missions were conducted in the 1990s in the Western Balkans. It was indeed

56. European Council, 'Working party OSCE and Council of Europe', [online].
57. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 'Institutions and structures', [online].
58. Hakala, "The OSCE Minsk Process: A balance after five years".
59. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 'What we do', [online].

the continuing deterioration of the situation in this geographical area that led the OSCE to think about its interventions and means of intervention to enable it to work towards the prevention and resolution of these conflicts.[60]
In 2018, the OSCE deployed its missions in three areas of Europe: the Balkans, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. There are now six OSCE missions in the Western Balkans. The main purpose of these missions is, in addition to promoting democratisation, the rule of law and institutional consolidation, to monitor the war crimes process and protect the rights of local minorities.[61] The success of the OSCE mission in Kosovo can notably be illustrated by its influence in establishing the Belgrade-Pristina agreement.[62] Another example of the OSCE's work in the Western Balkans can be found in Albania, where the OSCE works on a wide range of issues, including anti-corruption, electoral assistance and arms control. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the organisation aims to work towards reconciliation and stability in the region while ensuring the development of regional integration. The organisation is therefore active in many areas of Eurasia through its field operations (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, Skopje, Moldova, Ukraine, Donetsk, etc.).[63]

THE EU'S PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

EU's External Action in Crisis Management

Created to ensure stability and prevent the emergence of new conflicts on European soil through economic integration, the EU has undergone radical changes and evolutions throughout its existence. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Maastricht Treaty laid the foundations for including an external dimension of the European Union, the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), which failed to immediately meet the expectations of Member States by showing all its limits during the conflicts in Yugoslavia.[64] Indeed, the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo served as a wake-up call, forcing the members to reassess the state of the European Union's security strategy. In this framework, France and the UK seized the opportunity to push towards forming a true security and defence policy, as part of the wider foreign dimension of the Union. In the early 2000s, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was launched. It was subsequently renamed Common Defence Security Policy (CSDP) with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty.
In this context, the EU began working to develop a capacity for action that would allow it to intervene and contribute to the gover-

60. Williams, "Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation".
61. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 'OSCE field missions' work in promoting regional co-operation important for stability in Western Balkans, 2 December 2015', [online].
62. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 'Mission in Kosovo', [online].
63. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 'Where we are', [online].
64. De Coning and Peter, United Nations peace operations in a changing global order, 233.

nance of international security.[65] Indeed, as Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states, the CSDP "shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security following the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States".[66]

Between the lines of this article, it is already possible to trace the main characteristics of the EU's crisis management interventions. First, they concern the external dimension of the EU. Peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and conflict prevention operations do not guarantee the "defence" of European territory, a function that remains prerogative of NATO or national defence of individual states, but act as stabilisers for areas outside the Union.[67] At the same time, the EU does not have the common capabilities to conduct operations autonomously but has to rely on resources provided by Member States. Their reluctance often forces the EU to favour instruments typical of its institutional character, such as the single market.[68]

Traditionally, the EU has been committed to contributing to international security and peace by harnessing its economic, civil and regulatory power.[69] Efforts have been geared towards economic development, strengthening the principles of good governance and civil society, respecting human and minority rights through a wide range of policies and instruments. These include trade and development cooperation policies, the enlargement policy, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), external relations, and others.[70]

The enlargement policy has gained a central position in peacebuilding efforts, especially since the beginning of the integration process of Central and Eastern European states in the 1990s. Candidates for EU membership must comply with a series of strict criteria to join. These are not limited to the approximately 80,000 pages of the Acquis Communautaire but also include the internalisation of a range of European civil and political values, as exemplified by the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993.[71] The potential of this instrument is enormous, as candidates are forced to meet the demands of the European Union and it has already proved to be a determining factor in peacebuilding operations in the Western Balkans.[72]

However, efforts could not be limited to those states that wanted and were more likely to become members. To consolidate stability and prosperity in the rest of the EU periphery, the Union extended the benefits of closer economic integration with its regional partners within the European Neighbourhood Policy framework. This was ensured in exchange for implementing a series of reforms, designed to improve respect for the rule of law and human rights, to reform the economy for greater economic prosperity, to improve cooperation

65. Ibid.
66. Treaty on European Union. Consolidated Version, (2012), [online].
67. Keukeleire and Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, 173.
68. Ibid., 174.
69. Björkdahl, Normative and military power in EU peace support operations.
70. Duke and Courtier, EU Peacebuilding: Concepts, players and instruments, 22-25.
71. Haukkala, H. "Normative and military power in EU peace support operations", 49.
72. Duke and Courtier, EU Peacebuilding: Concepts, players and instruments, 33.

in the field of security, and lead to regulatory convergence with EU rules.[73] Nevertheless, this policy has already shown that economic incentives alone are not sufficient to avoid crises and ensure stability in the absence of a real prospect of joining the Union.[74]

Outside the economic sphere, the European Union has immensely valued the political dialogue, the nature and scope of which varies from the agendas and the actors involved. Such efforts are usually led by European Delegations, the High Representative of the CFSC, or EU special representatives and involve the inclusion of all parties to the actual or potential conflict in view to maintaining or consolidating peace.[75] This tool has often been used in conjunction with the strong appeal of economic integration in crisis management operations in various areas, including Eastern Europe.

Alongside its traditional soft foreign policy instruments, the EU has also included means of hard power in its efforts, namely military coercion, the threat of punishment, and the deployment of military force.[76] This was done because the EU identified the lack of military capabilities as the main weakness in supporting crisis management and safeguarding human rights violations.[77] After several attempts to create a large military force, the Battlegroup concept was finally introduced in 2004. It consisted of a force of 1500 units from the Member States, highly efficient and deployable within 5-10 days from the approval by the European Council.[78] This was an evolution that allowed the military dimension of the CSDP to be operationalised at the European level, providing the EU with a capacity to react quickly.[79] Two years earlier, under the Berlin Plus Arrangements, it was also agreed that the EU could conduct operations either outside NATO's framework or make use of its capabilities and assets. At the same time, NATO would guarantee EU access to its planning facilities and would make its own European Commando available on request for an EU-led operation.[80] Nonetheless, these developments once again underline the EU's dependence on the will of the Member States and the capabilities of other international actors in enjoying the ability to exploit military means in external interventions. An example of these shortfalls is represented by the Battlegroups, which despite having been operational for more than 15 years have never been used in crisis management operations.[81]

In analysing EU crisis management, the various developments and interconnections with other international organisations, in particular the United Nations, should not be overlooked. The European Union has gradually developed a distinctive approach to operations management, which includes the ability to react to a wide variety of challenges. But that approach also features some characteristics compatible with UN-led activities. Both institutions are engaged in the prevention, maintenance, stabilisation and consolidation

73. Ibid. P.25
74. Haukkala, H. "Normative and military power in EU peace support operations", 57.
75. Duke and Courtier, EU Peacebuilding: Concepts, players and instruments, 21.
76. Björkdahl, Normative and military power in EU peace support operations, 109.
77. Ibid., 108.
78. Duke and Courtier, EU Peacebuilding: Concepts, players and instruments,16.
79. Keukeleire and Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, 177.
80. Ibid., 176.
81. Nováky, N. Rethinking EU Crisis Management-From Battlegroups to a European Legion?, 2.

of peace. They use a mix of civil and military tools, and pursue similar objectives, namely the achievement of security, the strengthening of the rule of law and institutions of governance, human rights promotion, and others.[82] Over time, the EU has become an autonomous actor in crisis management and on many occasions works alongside the UN, potentially supporting its operations in different ways, such as in 2003 with the ESDP military operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with the mission on the contemporary rule of law in Kosovo, and more recently in the Central African Republic and Mali. [83] However, the ability to combine its immense economic and regulatory power with diplomatic efforts and exploit military means has on some occasions made the Union the preferential channel for guaranteeing stability on the international scene.

EU's Peacebuilding and Peacekeeping Operations

Over the past two decades, the EU has become a key player in managing international crises. After an initial period of conceptualisation of the ESDP, the Union launched its first police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003.[84] Since then, 19 EU overseas missions have been completed. It currently continues to operate in another 6 military operations and 11 civilian missions with a staff of about 5000 people.[85] These operations are part of the Union's External Action under the CSDP label and involve deployment to three different continents (Europe, Asia, and Africa) to ensure international stability and contribute to the security of the EU. It is the Member States of the Union that decide on the deployment of missions and operations during the Foreign Affairs Council. These missions operate in the context of EU regional policies and in coordination with the European delegations located in the area.[86]

Article 43.1 of the TEU provides a list of actions and duties, better known as the Petersberg tasks, to be carried out in the context of CSDP operations including joint disarmament, military advice and assistance, conflict prevention and peacekeeping, peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, and other humanitarian and rescue tasks. At the same time, the article specifies that these actions "can contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in the fight against terrorism in their territories".[87]

While the TEU does not preclude the establishment of crisis management operations that combine both military and civilian elements, they are usually either of a military or civilian nature.[88] The civilian dimension of EU crisis management involves the deployment of non-military actors, such as judges, police officers, mediators, and other categories of civil servants who contribute to a collective effort aimed at reforming the security sector, promoting the dialogue, strengthening the rule of law, good governance, civil admin-

82. De Coning and Peter, United Nations peace operations in a changing global order, 238.
83. Ibid., 248.
84. Ibid., 231.
85. EEAS, (2019), 'Military and civilian missions and operations', [online].
86. Ibid.
87. Treaty on European Union. Consolidated Version, (2012), [online].
88. De Coning and Peter, United Nations peace operations in a changing global order, 234.

istration and protection.[89] These functions are based on capacity-building and counselling and are carried out in a multilateral context that includes a multitude of actors responsible for crisis management. In practice, almost all civilian missions were launched at the invitation of the host state.[90] These also include the EUMM mission in Georgia, set up in the wake of the 2008 war and EUAM, launched in 2014 in Ukraine.[91] Nevertheless, civilian missions have a series of shortfalls, which concern the availability of specialised personnel deployable at short notice, adequate financing, the ability to create synergy between the various civilian capabilities, and civilian and military capacities, as well as the difficulties in cooperating with other actors involved in collective efforts.[92]

On the other hand, in the military sphere, operations fall under the definition of crisis management since they do not reach the level of belligerence of coercive or war operations and should not require the identification or military defeat of an enemy. With the exclusion of Operation EUNAVFOR Med, which presented an approach that could lead to a peace enforcement activity, the other military operations did not have peace enforcement mandates, making them conceptually different from those conducted under the authority of other international actors. [93] These operations are divided into two different types: those that can be created with a UN Security Council Resolution and those established based on an invitation from the host state.[94] The main limitation of military operations is the aforementioned EU's lack of autonomous military capabilities. It relies on the willingness of the Member States to contribute to joint efforts. The reluctance of some states to deploy national troops along with the inadequacy of military equipment and a reduced

89. Keukeleire and Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, 181.
90. De Coning and Peter., United Nations peace operations in a changing global order, 237.
91. Axyanova et al., "Regional Organizations and Secessionist Entities: Analyzing Practices of the EU and the OSCE in Post-Soviet Protracted Conflict Areas", 417-425.
92. Keukeleire and Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, 182.
93. De Coning and Peter, United Nations peace operations in a changing global order, 235.
94. Ibid.

budget explains why the Union sometimes fails to intervene adequately.[95]

After the deployment of 36 missions and operations, the European Union has developed an unprecedented conception of security policy based on culture and on characteristic beliefs that lead the organisation to act specifically in crisis management. These actions encompass both military means and traditional economic and regulatory instruments, on which the Union has invested enormously to ensure stability through the development and promotion of its characteristic principles and values.[96] The EU has conducted these stabilisation efforts in the outer areas mainly out of awareness of the strong link with its own inner security.[97] Over the years, CSDP has continued to evolve by embracing a range of new tools to respond to the growing threats stemming from the external dimension. As also shown by the most recent operations and missions in the Sahel and the Mediterranean, as well as by the development in terms of ambitions and funds, the latest of which strengthens its external action with a funding of 5 billion dollars[98], the European Union continues to grow and to establish itself more as one of the main international players in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and crisis management.

CASE STUDIES

Georgia: A Failed OSCE Peace Mission and the Current EU Peacekeeping Mission

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a separatist conflict broke out in one of the former USSR republics, Georgia, when the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia proclaimed themselves independent from the central government of Tbilisi in 1991 and 1992. The war resulting from these internal conflicts was a matter of international interest since the region represented an area of high international importance due to economic and resource matters. On one side, there was Russia, which supported the autonomic pressures, and on the other side, the EU, the US, and NATO, which did not recognise the demand for independence of the two regions. A Joint Control Commission (JCC) was established in 1992 after the ceasefire agreement in Sochi between Georgia and Russia. The JCC was composed of all parts, namely Russia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia, and Georgia. Moreover, the JCC itself established a Joint Peace Keeping Force (JPKF) composed of equal parts of Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian troops to maintain the stability in the regions[99].

The OSCE peacekeeping mission started in November 1992 to promote the negotiations between the conflicting parts in South Os-

95. Keukeleire and Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, 177.
96. De Coning, and Peter., United Nations peace operations in a changing global order, 237.
97. Poopuu, B., The European Union's Brand of Peacebuilding: Acting is Everything, 81.
98. EEAS, 'European Peace Facility - Investing in Peace and Security', [online].
99. Stöber, "The Failure of the OSCE Mission to Georgia – What Remains?", 205.

setia and support the United Nations in the conflict in Abkhazia[100]. Moreover, later on, it was tasked to support democracy, promoting human rights, and participate in the JCC meetings.

The OSCE mission lasted more than 15 years, however, both its capacity and political power always remained too limited to find a real solution to the conflict.[101] The observers' number was insufficient, and the mission only could monitor a small portion of South Ossetia, not comprehending the tunnel that linked the region with the Russian North Ossetia. Furthermore, the influence the OSCE mission exerted over the JCC was not sufficient. It was merely participating in the meetings without having the possibility to vote and therefore to impose its vision and decisions on all the parties concerned[102]. Moreover, the majority of members of the JCC, namely Russia, North Ossetia, and South Ossetia were in favour of the secession, excluding Georgia. Together with the weakness of OSCE in the JCC, it was clear that the conflict parties were not willing to cooperate. Therefore, the success of the mission was difficult to achieve[103].

The OSCE mission was criticised by both Georgia and South Ossetia, being accused of ineffectiveness. In the years prior to 2008, the conflict between Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia worsened, reducing OSCE's possibility to act. In 2008, the situation reached a point where the 1992 negotiations of Sochi, in which the parties agreed on the ceasefire, were deteriorated to a point in which communications between the parties resulted to be inefficient[104]. In December 2008, the OSCE mandate came to an end.

Georgia and its internal conflicts remained at the margins of the EU foreign policy agenda until 2008, when, after the failure of both the OSCE and the UN missions in securing the region, the EU itself took a prominent role as a peacekeeping actor in Georgia[105]. The then-French president Sarkozy engaged personally in the mediation process between Georgia and Russia and securing the role of the EU as a peacekeeper in the region[106]. Between August and September 2008, the Six-Points Agreement was approved, and it stated among the main goals to end all the hostilities, the prohibition of the use of force, the access to humanitarian aid, the withdrawal of Georgia's troops to their usual bases, the withdrawal of Russian troops to the lines prior to the outbreak of the hostilities, and the necessity to work on stability agreements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia[107].

After Georgia's request to establish a monitoring mission, the European Union Monitoring Mission to Georgia (EUMM Georgia) was authorised in September 2008 and deployed in record time. The mission's main goals are, on one hand achieving a long-term stability between Georgia and the other parties, and on the other hand stabilising the situation in the region in the short term[108]. The EU mission does not have access to all the areas of the

100. OSCE, (2008), 'OSCE Mission to Georgia' [online].
101. Van Rie, "The role of the OSCE in the conflict in Georgia", 321.
102. Ibid., 320.
103. Stöber, "The Failure of the OSCE Mission to Georgia – What Remains?", 207.
104. Ibid., 215.
105 Freire, et al., "The EU's security actorness: the case of EUMM in Georgia", 469.
106. Ibid., 470.
107. Council of the European Union, (2008), 'Extraordinary meeting General Affairs and External Relations', [online].
108. Council of the European Union, (2008), 'Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP of 15 September 2008 on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia', [online].

conflict since it does not have the possibility to patrol the South Ossetian and Abkhazia Administrative Boundary Lines, but only the adjacent areas[109].

The only duty of the EUMM Georgia is to observe and monitor the situation in the conflict areas. Maintaining a visible presence in the region not only contributes to the security of the territory but also gives a sense of trust to the people living there[110].

The EU presence in Georgia marked a turning point in its role as a conflict manager, since it represented the first time in which the EU could test its capabilities as a security actor and imposed itself in the region as a more effective player than the OSCE did during its mission in the region.

Ukraine: Renewed Relevance for the OSCE

After the failure of its mission in the Caucasus and the decline of its role as peacekeeping actor, the OSCE regained importance when it became the only capable actor of intervening in the Ukrainian crisis of 2014, since it represented the most accountable organisation to manage the conflicts in the region[111].

The European Union proved itself to be inadequate in taking control of the stabilisation process in Ukraine. In fact, from the Russian point of view, it was the EU itself that had triggered the crisis offering the Ukrainian government the possibility to sign an economic and political Association Agreement in

2013, and an intervention of NATO was even less acceptable from a Russian perspective[112].

The crisis erupted after the then-president Viktor Yanukovych suspended the Association Agreement, which led to protests called "Euromaidan" where Ukrainians in favour of the partnership with the EU were protesting against the government's decision being firmly against a pact with Russia. In the meantime, Russian military forces entered Crimea and in the eastern regions of the country, Donetsk and Luhansk, with pro-Russian rebels asking for independence[113]. The Russian presence in the country became clear. Therefore, the OSCE at the time represented the only international presence operating in the areas of the conflict[114].

The Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (SMM) was deployed on 21 March 2014, thanks to a formal request of intervention from Ukraine itself after the conflict worsened in different areas of the country[115]. The first monitors reached the country in less than 24 hours, showing the newly regained role of OSCE as a conflict manager[116]. The SMM

109. European Union Monitoring Mission. 'About us'. [online].
110. Lewington, "Keeping the Peace in the South Caucasus: The Eu Monitoring Mission in Georgia", 56.
111. Lehne, (2015), 'REVIVING THE OSCE European Security and the Ukraine Crisis', [online].
112. Ibid.
113. Thompson, CNN, February 3, 2017.
114. Liechtenstein, "The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission has become the Eyes and Ears of the International Community on the Ground in Ukraine", 1.
115. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 'OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine', [online].
116. Lehne, (2015), 'REVIVING THE OSCE European Security and the Ukraine Crisis', [online].

has aimed to report the security and the humanitarian conditions of the people living in the conflict regions and to promote dialogue and cooperation among the parties involved. Even as a civilian mission with unarmed monitors, their presence proves to be fundamental in the region since it has helped raise awareness of the critical situation, which indirectly might have helped with the containment of the conflict.

On 5 September 2014, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Minsk, after negotiation of the so-called Trilateral Contact Group composed of senior representatives of Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office. This agreement set up a mechanism that helps the parties understand when a violation of the ceasefire happens. It aims for an inclusive dialogue and the economic recovery of the regions affected by the war. However, due to the escalation of the conflict in February 2015, OSCE, Ukraine, Russia, and the representatives of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic signed another document for the implementation of the Minsk Agreement, thanks to the intervention of the then-French President Sarkozy and the German Chancellor Merkel, called Minsk II[117].

Even if the conflict in the region did not stop after the Agreements, the mission is still in place after seven years, and it is still regarded as a success for OSCE. It is the only international body that has access to almost every part of Ukraine, with only a few limitations in the eastern part of the country, and it is considered "the eyes and the ears of the international community on the ground"[118].

CONCLUSION

The OSCE and the EU are two of the most important security organisations in the Eurasian security system. However, while both organisations bear some similarities regarding peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and conflict management, they fulfil different roles in international security.

Firstly, the territorial scope of the EU and the OSCE varies considerably. While the EU's peacebuilding efforts are part of its external relations, the OSCE has the advantage of covering far more states – from Vancouver to Vladivostok – and being more inclusive and legitimate in its approach to peacebuilding and conflict management.

Secondly, the EU's means to foster peace in the area are vastly different from the OSCE's approach. While the EU is primarily relying on its diplomatic, economic, and regulatory power to shape its relations with third states, the OSCE's main strength lies in its ability to facilitate dialogue between conflicting parties and in being perceived as an impartial actor in the area.

117. Allan, "The Minsk Conundrum: Western Policy and Russia's War in Eastern Ukraine", 11.
118. Liechtenstein, "The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission has become the Eyes and Ears of the International Community on the Ground in Ukraine", 9.

Thirdly, the differences between the EU and OSCE in the area of peacebuilding are especially apparent in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine. The EU managed to become the dominant force for peace in Georgia in the aftermath of the Russo-Georgian war, because it could harvest its economic and diplomatic power. In Ukraine, on the other hand, the OSCE was the preferred choice to tackle the evolving conflict due to its impartiality and inclusiveness.

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Created in 1953, the Finabel committee is the oldest military organisation for cooperation between European Armies: it was conceived as a forum for reflections, exchange studies, and proposals on common interest topics for the future of its members. Finabel, the only organisation at this level, strives at:

- Promoting interoperability and cooperation of armies, while seeking to bring together concepts, doctrines and procedures;
- Contributing to a common European understanding of land defence issues. Finabel focuses on doctrines, trainings, and the joint environment.

Finabel aims to be a multinational-, independent-, and apolitical actor for the European Armies of the EU Member States. The Finabel informal forum is based on consensus and equality of member states. Finabel favours fruitful contact among member states' officers and Chiefs of Staff in a spirit of open and mutual understanding via annual meetings.

Finabel contributes to reinforce interoperability among its member states in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the EU, and *ad hoc* coalition; Finabel neither competes nor duplicates NATO or EU military structures but contributes to these organisations in its unique way. Initially focused on cooperation in armament's programmes, Finabel quickly shifted to the harmonisation of land doctrines. Consequently, before hoping to reach a shared capability approach and common equipment, a shared vision of force-engagement on the terrain should be obtained.

In the current setting, Finabel allows its member states to form Expert Task Groups for situations that require short-term solutions. In addition, Finabel is also a think tank that elaborates on current events concerning the operations of the land forces and provides comments by creating "Food for Thought papers" to address the topics. Finabel studies and Food for Thoughts are recommendations freely applied by its member, whose aim is to facilitate interoperability and improve the daily tasks of preparation, training, exercises, and engagement.

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