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(Original signed)

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FDE.1.R

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL PAPER – FDE.1.R

1. **References** :	2. **Other references** :
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7. Title:

TO DEFINE THE FINABEL LAND FORCES (FLF) CONTRIBUTION TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR) WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH (CA).

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10. Key words:

Comprehensive Approach, Finabel, Land Forces, Security Sector Reform (SSR)

11. Abstract:

Initially the study addresses the concepts of Comprehensive Approach, Security System Reform and their linkage.

After, it will lean on the requirements, structures and organizations inherent to Land Forces followed by a reflection on their relation with local forces.

Adequate organization and tailoring of the force will also be addressed as well as its training, education and enabling requirements.

Further, relations between Land Forces and non-military actors and their expected interaction will be generically scrutinized.

The assessment process, its outcomes, and its association to the force success and ability to adapt to the circumstances thus becoming an important part of the Land Forces contribution will be addressed at the end.

Introduction

Current and future operational environment requires multiskilled and flexible force structures. Relations with other actors and local forces are omni-directional and only synergy will produce effective results that will optimize the output and reduce the costs. Security Sector Reform (SSR) will undoubtedly play an important role in pre-empting, rebuilding or developing actions in a crisis/conflict situation. A common understanding of how to perform and conduct assistance will increase interoperability, simplify coordination processes and improve the quality of procedures. In a comprehensive environment it´s also important that other actors and key players understand the purpose, capabilities and limitations of the actions that military forces can deliver in this area. Common awareness will enhance Joint, Inter-Agency and Multinational (JIM) coordination, relation, expectations and procedures.

The intention of this study is to define the Finabel Land Forces (FLF) contribution to SSR within the context of a Comprehensive Approach (CA).

The study will identify the types of activities land forces are expected to conduct within the remit of SSR. It will also seek to clarify how land forces will contribute to the overall effort and interact with other actors within the context of a wider approach. From this, when in planning, it will be possible to derive the capabilities required of a land force to conduct such activities.

The far-reaching latitude of military actions within SSR urged the delimitation of the subject so it could turn coherent with most of the international organizations assumptions and it could meet universal accepted international rule of law. Thus, the study will remain focused on a SSR activity that occurs according to the following assumptions:

-in a post-conflict environment;
-upon request/invitation from the state or under a mandate/resolution of the United -Nations Security Council (UNSC) or any other international/regional organization
-under the rule of law;
-under local ownership.

Concurring with the established scope, other subjects require to be clarified, not as starting points, but as common accepted concepts. Thus, a common understanding of CA and SSR will be worked throughout the length of the study, as they will constitute the basis of an holistic outcome of any endeavour of this type. Their common understanding, or at least their acceptance, will definitely ease the harmony and potentiate the efforts of every actor in the field.

In the instance of meeting other approaches and perspectives a common knowledge base was used for this study, namely, the OECD DAC Handbook on SSR as well as the several conceptual documents issued by the EU in this particular area.

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Chapter I - Concepts

1.1 **About the generic concept of Comprehensive Approach.**
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Contemporary crisis and conflicts witness a wide and complex interaction of military and non-military actors[1] through a sphere of collective and complementary activities and areas. The actions took by each one of them – seldom coordinated – create the most diverse effects, even adverse, throughout the operational space where they operate. Whether there are different objectives and agendas, the lack of common purposes, and coordinated/complementary actions, leads to a loss of effectiveness in an overall context. Only a coherent CA, integrated at all levels, can lead to a holistic outcome that will allow the optimization of scarce resources, transcend time constraints and guarantee synergy in all the approach vectors[2].

This CA shall integrate and synchronize the following three pillars: providing security, assisting in reconstruction and development, and assisting in good governance. With regard to the first pillar – providing security – land forces are expected to work within the framework of sound military professionalism (effective military engagement after thorough analysis of Mission, Enemy, Terrain, available Troops, and Time) and with respect to the mandate constituting the legitimate foundation of the military intervention (e.g. a United Nations Security Council Resolution). With regard to the other two pillars, land forces have to support efforts by other actors within its available means and capabilities. An example concerning the reconstruction and development pillar is the building up, or assisting, of land forces. Concerning the good governance pillar an example is contributing to the organization of fair and impartial elections (e.g. safe transportation of ballots and assisting on protection of candidates).

A comprehensive approach requires interdepartmental and a coherent coordinated action by both governmental and non-governmental agencies. The required coordination and synchronisation of actions by the multitude of actors involved is attained by fostering unity of effort through the elaboration of a coherent campaign design. In a European Union (EU) framework the coordination issue can be easily surpassed by the existence of a European Union Special Representative (EUSR) that will allow political coordination of EU's actors action on the ground.

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[1] Non-military actors are Individuals, International Organizations (IO), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), Governmental Organizations (local or not), Contractors and the Media.
[2] Application of the diplomatic, military and economic instruments of power, to the all extension of the constituent parts of a society (commercial, education, rule of law, information, humanitarian and health, military, economic, diplomacy administration and governance).

A CA recognises that the military may support another department and FLF activity may thus be supportive to civilian action at times, but without them being given command of military forces. At other times the military will play the supported role. FLF activity must sit within the context of the overall CA.

FLF must be prepared to play a wide role in the difficult period when in a hostile security environment which prevents the full engagement of non-military agencies. They will be asked to integrate with all relevant actors in a JIM environment, as well as having the capability to combine into a broader range of actions under the direction of different Ministries. Commanders at all levels will need to plan to integrate and tailor the military response in accordance with the aims of Other Government Departments (OGD).

1.3 About the generic concept of Security Sector Reform.

According to OECD, Security Sector[3] can be defined as a system that includes: core security actors (*e.g.* armed forces, police, etc.), security management and oversight bodies (*e.g.* ministries of defence and international affairs, etc.), justice and law enforcement institutions (*e.g.* judiciary prisons, etc,) and non-statutory security forces (*e.g.* private security companies, etc.)[4].

As for EU, the Security Sector Reform (SSR)[5], will contribute to an accountable, effective and efficient security system, operating under civilian control consistent with democratic norms and principles of good governance, transparency and the rule of law, and acting according to international standards and respecting human rights, which can be a force for peace and stability, fostering democracy and promoting local and regional stability. The support of a SSR, within a EU framework, shall be based on the following principles:

Democratic norms, internationally accepted human rights principles and the rule of law;

Respect for local ownership;

Coherence with other areas of EU external action.

SSR seeks to increase the ability of a state to meet the range of both internal and external security needs in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, human rights, transparency and rule of law, thus the

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[3] According to OECD, this definition has become established internationally , so in other references other terms like " security system", "security system reform" or SSR may be found although with the same meaning.
[4] OECD DAC Handbook on SSR, Page 5.
[5] EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform (SSR).

conceptual outcome of a SSR is to build its capability up to a level where it can assume responsibility for its own roles and the sustainment of its forces and support the State in the provision of security and stability of the country.

SSR in a post-conflict environment is a part of 'nation building'. It encompasses the development (or amelioration) of professional, responsible and efficiently functioning security structures. SSR requires simultaneous and synergetical actions at all relevant levels (national political level, provincial/regional/municipal political level, staff levels of security sector agencies, unit level of security sector agencies). This actions will include dismissing all those forces, weapons, means of warfare and institutions that are no longer necessary, giving the dismissed personnel a perspective and reforming the remaining structures and personnel.

It will also refer to educating, persuading and integrating the main actors of the Security Sector.

1.4 Security Sector Reform within Comprehensive Approach.

By its nature SSR is a politically driven activity as it is about power and sovereignty, use of force, status and income, society's values (freedom, rights and security) and one´s nation political system and architecture. For long-term success, any campaign involving SSR will attempt to address the root causes of insecurity, and that is likely to require an approach that combines economic, governance and security measures, in order to meet the coherence with the other areas of external action.

Instead of scoping exclusively on a very limited range of activities and areas a much more synergic and holistic approach is advocated. This posture will require SSR planners not to isolate one activity or area from the other. The comprehensive approach encompasses the integration of assessment, planning and execution of all activities, at every level of military, political, economic, social and environmental departments and organizations. The ability to understand possible variations from supported activity to supporting must be reflected in the flexibility of planning. Dynamics of the environment will continuously push towards a more demanding coordination and synchronization of actions and analysis of its effects. This approach will ensure that, from the early stages, all the lines of action, such as good governance, rule of law, respect for human rights and long term institution building, will be mutually reinforcing, and will simultaneously avoid duplication and ensure coherence of efforts between all actors.

Chapter II – Requirements

2.1 Expected missions and tasks of the Finabel Land Forces in Security Sector Reform within a Comprehensive Approach environment.

In view of SSR, military forces in general – including Land Forces – have to recognise, that they stand side by side with non-military organisations, particularly with other agencies. Successful SSR cannot be achieved by military operations or any other department activities on their own. Successful SSR will mainly be achieved by non-military measures; military operations are just designed to lay the foundation for non-military action.

As already stated Land Forces may vary between supported and supporting element, therefore it is expected that the respective missions and tasks will also accompany those variations. The level of attainable CA also depends on the operational environment and situation in the crises area as well as on the availability of assets which are provided by other agencies/organisations.

The higher the threat level and the lower the capabilities of local police/security forces to handle this threat the more necessary is the use of military forces to establish security and restore public order in a direct approach;

Once the threat is mainly constituted by former warring factions other than local gangs, organised crime groups and/or single disaffected perpetrators, the focus of SSR initially lies mainly on military operations, providing security and therefore setting the prerequisites for a successful SSR. The local police force organization and level of response will also influence on the degree of supported/supporting role between police and military forces. Along these relations it is imperative that justice mechanisms, economic causes, etc., will also be addressed in order to generate conditions for success – keeping in mind this has to be achieved by other departments. Tasks may also vary in a more direct/indirect approach and the level of interaction with the society in general may also have peaks. The lower the threat level and the higher the capabilities of local police forces to handle this threat, the more military forces can concentrate on their sole natural mission in SSR, namely the military reform that means mainly mil-to-mil focused mission, usually under the designation of Military Assistance. In this phase the CA usually looses importance in view of the level of interaction with other departments but is still within a comprehensive and overarching political end-state.

Military contribution is initially aimed at the first pillar - providing security - but will shift its contribution towards the two other pillars. This contribution to the two other pillars needs to be limited in space and time and may take place only (1) as long as an acceptable security level has not been reached, or (2) in the event that civil actors are not present enough in the area plagued by conflict or (3) if a specific

military knowledge or expertise is required (more specifically: certain aspects of SSR, like providing training to local forces).

As part of crisis management, SSR is expected to accompany an incremental process in which the role of the military, and consequently the Land Forces, is largest at the outset and will diminish as civilian agencies take over and local capability grows in strength and effectiveness. Logical expected military roles, missions and tasks/sub-tasks are:

-Assess the capabilities of the Local Forces (LF). This assessment, although superficial, can initially be done during a fact-finding mission but it is expected to be a dynamic and continue issue along the mission;

-Continuously contribute to the development of the SSR plan;

-Establish presence in the conflict area and provide security:

-Provide assistance to local forces in combat against a military organised opponent/insurgent;

-Operations against non-military organised violent actors – elimination of threats;

-Control sovereign territory (including border control and coast guard);

-Ensure/control/restrict/stop populations freedom of movement (according to the various situations);

-Secure infrastructure, organisations, important persons, buildings and minorities;

-Show of force (to increase security perception of local population);

-Secure and, indirectly or directly, assure support to populations' sustainment with vitally important goods.

-Assist with and the conduct of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) operations;

-Audit the security situation in the conflict area and identify gaps and deficiencies;

-Contribute to the development of efficient local defence structures and units, thus crating conditions to assist on the:

-Definition and creation of a competent local chain of command;

-Definition of recruitment requirements and procedures;

-Training of LF (process will not stop with the completion of basic training, but continue through collective training in units and a staged introduction to operations as required by the particular situation);

-Transition from Training to Mentoring (in some occasions it will be able to go up to Partnering). As LF capabilities increase the focus will shift from a purely training role, through mentoring LF and via a handover of responsibility, to Partnering;

-Promotion of a professional ethos;

-Encouraging the military to define its tasks (deriving from political guidelines) in relation to external security (security of the state);

-Assisting on LF evaluation;

 -Procurement;

-Support and assist to the equipment line of development;

-Develop and oversee essential security infrastructure;

-Assistance in Combat Support (CS), Combat Service Support (CSS), Close Air Support (CAS), Close Air Attack (CCA) and Medical Evacuation (Medevac) management;

  -Relation building between local, other paramilitary and national military forces;

-LF Command and Control (C2) capacity building;
-Joint combined operations management;
-LF information sharing and management;
-Assisting, advising and mentoring civilians reforming host government ministries.
-Support the implementation of the SSR plan within available means and capabilities.

Wider FLF support to SSR could also include contributing to Defence Reviews and formulating Defence Policy, developing defence Infrastructure and Training Facilities, and direct technical assistance where LF are not capable of providing it. Additionally there are other tasks such as assisting in liaison and passage of information between units and advising on aspects of administration and support.

While in a conflict, the military role is commonly accepted and known; in a post-conflict environment it is imperative that the military role is correctly and fully identified, beyond this perception. A clear assessment on the fact-finding mission will undoubtly open entry points that if correctly exploited will create advantage on trust building and security perception. A clear general concept, with fully identified civil-military actions, clear areas of responsibility and a fully acknowledged chain of command (with full respect for local ownership), will easily become coherent, generate unity of command and generally accepted.

2.2 Land Forces Security Sector Reform oriented structure and training.

Military involvement in SSR will require a specific set of capabilities, which will need to be tailored to any circumstance. The precise nature of support will vary and consequently the precise structure will also vary. It is therefore not reasonable to permanently restructure Land Forces envisaging one dedicated SSR. However FLF will need to be flexible enough to rapidly reconfigure as well as work seamlessly with other non military actors and the ability to rapidly reconfigure away from more traditional military roles is vital. This capability may easily come by a set of in-hand specialists, trained and ready to be employed according to the multitude of environments. The creation or restructuring of SSR oriented capabilities will be required. In most cases, specific pre-deployment training (mission oriented) is crucial for success. In order to avoid an improvised preparation or adaption, there will be the requirement to create a training structure or capability that can prepare a force for the scope of SSR activities coherently with the early assessments. This cannot be created as part of the force generation process for deployment and so it ought to be worked and assured as a standing capability.

A "train the trainer" capability is also fundamental. The creation of such capability is not an activity that should be carried out as part of pre-deployment training. Thus existing structures may need to change to create a "corps" of deployable trainers. This could be through a specific training course or by through career training as part of existing career courses.

The ability to create connected specialists (*e.g.* police, justice, mentors or cultural specialists) should also be considered as central. These capabilities may arrive for a mission, before the mission or may be something that FLF wish to create as a standing capability (cultural specialists). Experience shows us that some countries have already used "reservists" successfully. These personnel cover roles not found in the armed forces being called upon to deploy as required.

The types of activity foreseen in SSR (*e.g.* monitoring, mentoring, training and liaison) generally require the employment of higher numbers of Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO), thus requiring a specific tailoring in its structure and manning for the duration of the SSR activity. A good example of the response to this specific tailoring need is the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT), organized according to the needed capabilities to conduct SSR type activities. If the ability to man, train, support and deploy such units does not exist it may have to be created.

Due to several constrains (national caveats, financing, etc.) it is to be expected that troop numbers and characteristics may not be the ideal to achieve all the desired effects simultaneously. Limits on numbers may require sequencing or phasing, thus limiting the effectiveness of overall activity. Mitigation of these occurrences may be attained with the training, creation, inclusion or use of transversal capabilities like:

- Courses to help the staff understand the cultural, social and political dynamics and ethnic religious design of the LF and the population;

- Provision of courses in order to create trainers who are able to design and run training courses covering the spectrum of Officer and NCOs;

- Suitable C2 systems to jointly operate with LF partners supporting security simultaneously allowing information sharing and management;

- Access to suitable CS and CSS systems, either from the LF, the SSR force support or even, where relevant or required, civilian support structures;

- Coherent exploitation of the resources available in each partner nation;

- Common Force Protection (FP).

2.3 Relation between missions, tasks and force structure.

Over time FLF have generally been configured, structured and trained for regular combat operations and so, at the start of any SSR campaign, it is likely that forces have to be adjusted and even new capabilities created. This is in contrast to conventional warfare where force packages are assembled from already trained force elements in accordance to the thoughts described on the last paragraph. If this has always been true concerning regular warfare, new operating environments have induced the creation and maintenance of new or less developed capabilities. These capabilities have slowly been gaining their space on force structures in a way that allows, in a "military universe", a comprehensive use of military power, adjusted in coherence, to the operational demands. Equally, since the operational context will

never stop evolving, so the security force will never cease to adapt. Even the best designed force must remain agile, flexible, adaptive and responsive to the ever changing demands of the operational theatre.

In planning structures, FLF will need to take in account the requirement to integrate other actors, governmental and NGO, and vice-versa, into all aspects of the mission. Equally, forces may need to be tailored to specific roles. The military may be required to take on roles that fall outside of its traditional remit. Accordingly it would receive specialist advisors (*e.g.* Police) and will therefore need to be structured to receive such support. As part of a CA the structure will need to take account of the need for collaborative processes, shared understanding and concerted action as these tend to be aspects common to SSR in a CA. The "new joint concept[6]" provided by CA bears new challenges for military organization and leadership, because military actors have to synchronise their actions with civil organizations and vice versa. The principal of obey and command is not implemented that strict in the civil sector as in military. For that, military actors deployed in civil environment/staffs have to get accommodate in a more participated/shared process of decision-making rather than a mission/commander´s intent oriented one. Hence, this means a higher personal responsibility within the specific field of reference and a enhanced necessity of persuading based upon technical capacity. Furthermore, the integration of civil actors into military organization may require a more cooperative leadership attitude.

Typically the force might need to be structured respecting two main groups: (1) a staff oriented structure, comprising enablers and embodying specific areas of expertise, which will assess, plan and overview the execution, and (2) a execution oriented structure:

 - HQ (multinational or not);

- Integration Cell (mainly oriented for internal and external coordination);

- Deployable training, mentoring and liaison teams;

- Evaluation teams (in accordance to external and internal evaluation standards they must be outside the teams explained above);

- Cultural and language specialists;

- Logistic cell (for provision of equipment and equipment support to LF – may also conduct infrastructure support and management);

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[6] Understood as the full interaction between all actors present at the operations space or, those in anyway, influence the actions that occur in it.

- Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) elements;

- Specialist cell (depending upon the specific SSR roles and tasks – *e.g.* police, border and legal/justice).

- Organic Force Protection;

   and,

- Framework Forces – enable and conduct the bulk of the routine security operations and can provide a degree of security and support until such functions can be taken over by LF;

- Capacity Building Task Forces – are made up of units who will conduct the bulk of the military aspects of SSR activity. They are likely to be embedded in LF units or work closely alongside them. They must be capable of ensuring their own force protection, but must be trained, equipped and resourced to carry out their primary function as trainers, advisers and mentors, even in non-permissive security environments. They should have a deep cultural understanding of the local population and will need to build robust working relationships with them;

- Enablers – often joint, are those elements that move, sustain, maintain and support the other elements of the force. This element can often prove to be a very large proportion of a contingent in any mission and the requirement for enablers should not be underestimated;

- Specific Task Forces – depending on the complexity of the SSR problem and the security situation, there may be a need to develop specific task forces that target narrow aspects of SSR.

The functions and thus limitations of each level of command will, of course, differ. An observable trend, for SSR and stability, is that HQ at lower levels are having to have greater functionality in terms of specialists for intelligence, CIMIC and effects and, in consequence, they are growing in numbers and capability. Technology is allowing greater and faster dissemination of information than ever before but also requires more manpower to process it.

Force level specialists are still concentrated at higher levels (*e.g.* Political Advisors, Legal Advisors, etc., normally at Task Force / Component Command level) but their expertise is starting to filter down.

Merging of the CA with campaign objectives is believed to happen at the highest levels (Task Force /Ministery of Defence), and this is unlikely to change in the near future, as they expectedly will remain as proxy between the political and tactical levels.

Chapter III – Local Forces

3.1 Ensuring Local Forces training capability independence upon Finabel Land Forces.

> *Give a man a fish and he will eat for a day. Teach a man to fish and he will eat for a lifetime.*
>
> *Confucius*

Any development of a culture of dependence by local forces and officials is to be fully avoided. The first step towards independent capability building is fostering local ownership along the whole of the SSR process. From the early stages it is important that local authorities appropriate the commonly agreed objectives and principles. This will lead to an active local support of the process including its implementation and sustainability. Comprehensively, the SSR force may assist on reforming the defence sector by providing assistance at all of its levels, from policy definers, defence structures down to the troop training level, not forgetting complementary bodies like management or suppliers. It is imperative that the role is based on assistance, technical advice and training the trainer.

Also, when designing the SSR process, its sustainability should be a key piece of the mechanism. Encouraging the participation of local authorities and civil society by addressing local needs and demonstrating benefits to wider groups of people will steer towards sustainability.

A set of reference dates, related to states to be achieved, should also be established from the beginning, allowing either to generically measure success as to define goals to be met. These conditions to be met shall reflect at all times the principle of local ownership. This set of data is the first step for an exit-strategy.

The ability to advise, steer and influence personnel in a direction that will allow them to fulfil their operational tasks and simultaneously develop capacity is a step beyond that of actually training the LF. As stated, SSR activity should encourage the LF to take responsibility for its actions whilst continuously assessing them.

On a lower level, creating a "Train the Trainer" capability amongst the LF early on, will permit an easier transition for the self-training function. Likewise, creating local training centres and areas and handing them over to local forces when practical, will allow greater responsibility to be given to the LF as will equipping local forces to levels that they become able to act independently.

Of vital importance is to plan and monitor the transition from training and coaching, via mentoring, to partnering, ensuring a smooth progression that will not overwhelm LF but allow them to gently "break clean" from a possible dependence on FLF for training.

As part of this process, creating local force operational successes, meeting pre-established criteria, will demonstrate to them their capabilities but will also allow them to develop their own operational experience that can then be passed on by them, with confidence, as a training task. This will also be of great contribution for motivation and trust building.

3.2 Land Forces assisting in the motivation and trust building among Local Forces during their recruitment, training and employment.

> *The journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step.*
>
> *Chinese Proverb*

SSR personnel should attempt to develop a strong professional relationship with the LF personnel and, as possible, get to know them personally. Developing language skills, sharing food, sporting and social events, living alongside them and taking an interest in their backgrounds and families goes a long way to establishing a good rapport between LF and FLF (this can be achieved by partnering). Conversely seemingly small cultural blunders, or lack of cultural and traditions respect, can easily set back training programmes significantly and ruin interpersonal relationships.

The sharing of risk utilising joint bases and joint actions at the lowest possible level will assist in creating trust and good relationships. For the conduct of operations shared planning and information / intelligence if possible will do the same. Creating LF operational successes will breed confidence, in FLF as trainers / mentors and in themselves and their commanders. The force should aim to transition to local force lead as soon as possible – risk can be taken but it is vital to get the balance right.

Early FP providing will also contribute for trust and confidence levels. This will depend upon the initial levels of competency among the LF, as well as the priority given to FLF. There will need to be a balance struck between employing forces to protect and employing forces to conduct SSR activities. Local forces should be allowed to focus on training and not concern themselves with their own security. However it is vital that a LF "face" is put on all operations, including their own security. Integrating LF security forces into the campaign also provides a platform for on the job training and mentoring. However, care should be taken to ensure that

they are not over-faced before they are demonstrably capable. It may be that, after an initial brief period of training, local forces may start to conduct the following tasks as they transition to full responsibility for their own protection:

  - Static guarding and border security tasks;

  - Patrolling areas that have earlier been secured such as development zones;

  - Facilitating local contacts while working with FLF to overcome language barriers and develop mutual cultural understanding, whilst gaining shared intelligence;

  - Conducting deliberate operations having been set up for success;

  - Protecting host government officials.

Clearly it is important to get the balance right; poorly trained and disciplined LF can exacerbate a problem and create mistrust in the forces of law and order. Once an acceptably secure environment is established, the commander should consider moving from an international military security lead to local lead. This will be both a political and a security judgement.

Chapter IV – Other actors

4.1 Finabel Land Forces interaction with other actors.

As previously stated, military forces in general understand that their role, only when in coherence with non-military organisations, will contribute for the overall effect as much any other agency or actor, when in harmony and synchronized. Successful SSR cannot be achieved by military operations on their own but they will become of high importance when creating the conditions for other to happen. A secure environment will allow stability, essential for political, economical and social development and it´s fundamental to people´s well-being.

Within a CA environment most of the times the question is not to what extent you can achieve interaction but, if that interaction exists at all and if all actors are willing to "negotiate" and adapt their agendas, priorities and goals, to make first things first. In a CA environment, all actors – including the military – need to interact in a spirit of "unity of effort" as part of an overall campaign plan. Actions to foster and maintain unity of effort include (1) establishing "codes of conduct" by mutual agreement between the military and NGOs, (2) drafting "memoranda of understanding" between the military, other governmental departments and host nation officials, and (3) by establishing liaison at all relevant hierarchical levels[7].

FLF will interact through tailored command structures permitting passage of information, planning and activity at all appropriate levels. This may be through collaborative planning cells in Headquarters permitting all actors to shape activity. It will happen through regular meetings to pass information, discuss approaches to problems, take decisions and set policy. It will also include activities conducted together or in parallel within the scope of the overall CA.

Liaison and briefing is likely to be a key requirement for any FLF HQ and thus the FLF structure will need to use a deployable liaison element whose function may also include the ability to brief and interact with actors who cannot or do not wish to interface with FLF within bases.

FLF will need to be trained to minimise friction during interaction with other interested parties within the Area of Interest. This will require a degree of cultural awareness and understanding, not only of the host nation, but also of allies, NGOs and other government departments who may be involved. Options for pre-

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[7] The considered hierarchical levels are understood as the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The tactical level is the one in which FLF and LF engage with allies, adversaries and neutrals. The operational level is the level that links military strategic level with the tactical level – it's the level that campaigns are planned and conducted. Finally, the strategic level is the level that gathers development and employment of military power in order to meet end-states derived from or set by the analysis of national strategic objectives.

deployment training, and by implication interaction, could include seminars and briefing days bringing together all, or as many as possible, actors so that interaction begins before deployment. Operational concepts to implement shall foresee and include overcoming such frictions through a policy of creating and maintaining trust and collaboration with principal partners, with the aim of identifying together the most appropriate way of preventing conflicts and / or resolving them. This may be achieved through:

- The definition of interoperability plans, based upon the level of integration / partnership required, and;

- Education and training activities, relative to the activities and approaches of other actors, to take place during regular training;

- Permanent and enduring partnership with key actors to identify solutions to the problems of interoperability.

On the FLF side, at the tactical level, CIMIC groups provide a basis for liaison with NGOs. They are trained to focus on interaction and liaison between the military and other actors. However at lower levels, Division, Brigade and Regiment, there is still a requirement to plan and conduct CIMIC activity. If not present, then these capabilities will need to be created either from within the existing structures or by augmentation. As already stated, interaction will not be limited to such teams but will happen at every level in almost all functions, thus commanders at all levels will be required to liaise and interact with their local counterparts.

However, one must recognize that in many cases the level of CA will highly depend on the situation in the crises area and the level of assets which are provided by the agencies/organisations.

In conclusion, Land Forces are expected to work closely together with other actors, well emancipated but not dominant in CA. More than a "who´s leading" question, the core of this relation is how deep one understands the shift from supported to supporter role and how far to embrace it. Acceptance of coordination and cultural awareness is key for success.

4.2 Establishing a common system of Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) in order to assess and inform the Land Forces contribution to SSR.

As an integrated part of a system that delivers a reform, FLF must set an assessment method that will allow at any time to evaluate to what extent the organization is doing the "right things right" and its outcome impact on the whole of the SSR. Assessment determines 1) the performance of own troops – execution of actions / tasks; 2) determines the effectiveness of those executed actions by measuring the achievement of results; 3) and enables to draw conclusions about past situations, in some cases make forward looking estimates about future trends, and make recommendations (e.g. to move on to the next phase of a plan or make adjustments to the plan based on these conclusions).

To measure and evaluate "right things right", two systems should be established, an internal and an external one. The internal will allow FLF to measure the efficiency of their acts (*e.g.* the correct processes, the correct actions, the correct materials). The external one will allow to measure the effectiveness of their actions, *e.g.*, if the outcome is up to the previously established standards. As far as the impact in the whole of the SSR, this should be evaluated by a higher organization and a feedback must be driven to FLF in order to be analyzed and correct any gaps or adverse effects.

The whole of these systems have their genesis upon the design of the SSR assistance program. According to OECD, when designing these programs, the principles of program designing[8] are transformed in objectives according to the areas of work and under influence in tandem with local problems. The objectives, in order to make sure to be accountable, should pass a "hard-test" through the SMART swage – specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bounded. After setting the objectives, in order to assess them, indicators[9] must be elected for each of them. Indicators can also be checked upon their validity when in building up.

Relations between objectives/criteria/indicators, as well as the checklist for developing indicators, have already been established by OECD and they can be found on annex A and B. Military will set up their own ones, in consonance to the

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[8] The principles for designing SSR assistance programs are: (1) improve the delivery of services, (2) strengthen the oversight in order to improve accountability, assure human rights respect and the upheld of the rule of law, (3)enhance local ownership of SSR, and (4) increase the sustainability through developing human capacity and strengthening budgetary processes.

[9] In order to create a common understand of what a indicator is, the USAID, for instance, defines it as "measure that helps answer the question of how much, or whether, progress is being made toward a certain objective". According to the International Institute for Sustainable Development "…an indicator quantifies and simplifies phenomena and helps us understand complex realities. Indicators are aggregates of raw and processed data but they can be further aggregated to form complex indices."

campaign design, allowing the military commander to permanently assess the objectives completion as well as, later, support an exit strategy.

The focal point on establishing objectives, against criteria, through common agreed indicators, in a CA environment is that all of them will be shared. Once in a CA environment there will be no such thing as non-shared objectives, criteria and indicators. Every actor will have its role, even if minimal, when it comes to any outcome. Every single actor must bear in mind that he himself is a system, part of a system of systems. At all time, he/it will be held co-responsible, through its actions or omissions, of every outcome in the field.

Chapter V – Conclusions

No peace and security without development and no development without peace!

Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah

The complexity, variables and dynamics of today´s operational environment has led to a point in which one cannot act upon an entity without prior understanding and acknowledgment of its multifaceted characteristics. Realising that making use of a comprehensive approach, in order to achieve a complete and coherent effect upon a system, is the first step towards success.

In times where rationality, economy of forces and optimization are key words, applying this holistic and comprehensive concept when making use of one's instruments of power will generate a more balanced, efficient and effective outcome, thus conducting to a desired end-state in a fashionable way.

Land Forces as part of one´s instruments of power need to realise the responsibility of synchronization and coordination with other actors, and vice versa, in order to contribute to the desired outcome, whether playing a supporter or supporting role.

Security Sector Reform, despite different approaches or concepts, basically aims on transforming a state/nation inefficient and ineffective provision of security, usually devoid of accountability and oversight, into an effective and efficient security system, operating under civilian control consistent with democratic norms and principles of good governance, transparency and the rule of law, and acting according to international standards and respecting human rights. SSR is a political process that provides a framework for several actors to operate in a wide-range of security activities enhancing and developing human security as well as state security.

Land Forces may vary their contribution in this process according to the operational environment and will usually be tailored specifically in accordance to the needs found during initial phases. Roles and relationships between actors should be initially clearly depicted and assessed during the whole time thus enhancing and optimizing the output of every action and also the stipulated relations. Within the process of tailoring the force specialized education and training, as well as specific support elements (cultural advisors, legal advisors,…), must be taken into account.

Local ownership as basis to the process must comprise agreed objectives and principles. Assistance to all required levels, from policy definers, defence structures down to the troop training level, not forgetting complementary bodies like

management or suppliers should be made available on assistance, technical advice and training the trainer.

Only by creating peace and security one provides an adequate environment for capacity enhancement and development. A capable and developed state will be able to provide security and well being. Land Forces are part of this process.

Acronyms

CA .... Comprehensive Approach
C2 .... Command and Control
CAS ....Close Air Support
CCA... Close Air Attack
CIMIC... Civil Military Cooperation
CS.. Combat Support
CSS .... Combat Service Support
DDR.. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
ESDP.. European Security and Defence Policy
EU... European Union
EUSR.. .European Union Special Representative
FLF... .Finabel Land Forces
FP... .Force Protection
HQ.. ..Headquarters
IO... International Organizations
ISTAR.............................. . Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and
   Reconnaissance
JIM............................. .... Joint, Inter-Agential and Multinational
LF... Local Forces
Medevac... Medical Evacuation
MoD.. Ministry of Defence
NGO.. Non-Governmental Organizations
NCO.. Non-Commissioned Officers
OGD.. ..Other Government Departments
OMLT.. Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams
SF... Special Forces
SSR... Security Sector Reform
UNSC.. United Nations Security Council

Annex A – OECD objectives/criteria/indicators relation matrix

Source: OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform, 2007, Page 73.

Annex B – OECD Checklist for developing indicators

Source: OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform, 2007, Page 74.