



**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
INTEGRATION OF EFFECTS WITHIN THE
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND THE
IMPLICATIONS ON THE STRUCTURE AND
ORGANIZATION OF HQS.**

**You can download this study on
www.finabel.org**

FOREWORD OF GENERAL (BE) BERNARD JACOBS **Chairman of the Finabel Principal Military Experts' Committee**

Created in 1953, the Finabel committee is the oldest military organisation for cooperation between European Land Forces; it was conceived as a forum for reflection, exchange, studies development and proposals on common interest topics for the future of its members.

Finabel, as the only regional organisation at this level, strives at:

- promoting interoperability and cooperation of land components while seeking to bring together concepts, doctrines and procedures;
- contributing to a common European understanding of land defence issues. It focuses on doctrine, training and the joint environment.

Finabel aims to be a multinational, independent, apolitical and informal forum at European Land Forces level, based on consensus and equality of member states.

By offering the opportunity to the member states' officers and Land Forces Commanders to meet, Finabel favours fruitful contacts in a spirit of opening and mutual understanding.

It contributes to reinforcing interoperability of Finabel member land forces in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU), and ad hoc coalitions; Finabel neither competes with nor duplicates NATO or the EU military structures but contributes to these organisations in its unique way.

Initially focused on cooperation in armament's programmes, Finabel quickly shifted to the harmonisation of land doctrines, starting from the statement that should be first obtained a common vision of force engagement on the terrain before hoping to reach a shared capability approach and the realisation of joint equipments.

Finabel studies are recommendations freely applied by its members. However, these studies are the result of an intensive and in-depth work carried out by many officers from various EU member states, who have applied on them their expertise, operational experience and enthusiasm.

I sincerely wish that Finabel studies will be concretely useful and find the place they deserve in our Land Forces, in order to facilitate interoperability and improve our daily tasks of preparation, training, exercises and engagement in external operations.

Bernard JACOBS



FOREWORD



Working Group Alpha



**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INTEGRATION
OF EFFECTS WITHIN THE DECISION-MAKING
PROCESS AND THE IMPLICATIONS ON THE
STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF HQS.**

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL DATA STUDY A.26.R

1. <u>References</u> : Title and draft mission paper approved by the PMEs meeting 2/2008.	2. <u>Other references</u> : See annex 2
3. <u>Promulgation</u> : 14 January 2010	4. <u>Revision</u> :
5. <u>Number of pages</u> : 23	6. <u>Classification</u> : Unclass
7. <u>Title</u> : To recommend a process of analysis and decision-making that allows the integration of the various effects/lines of operation (which include hard and soft, physical and non-physical effects) so that they converge into the development of an overall plan and the achievement of the desired end-state. The study must define the structure and organisation of the HQs needed to put into place the overall plan. <u>Short title</u> : “Recommendations for the integration of effects within the decision-making process and the implications on the structure and organization of HQs”	
8. <u>Originator</u> : FRANCE	9. <u>Address</u> : LtC Frédéric Turquet Division doctrine / Bureau engagement 1 place Joffre ; BP53-00445 ARMEES FRANCE Tel : (+33) 1 44 42 81 73 frederic.turquet@cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr
10. <u>Key words</u> : Environment, effects, lines of operation, tactical level, planning, assessment, organisation, non military actors.	
11. <u>Summary</u> : In order to achieve his mission in today’s complex environment of operating ‘amongst the people’, the commander, at the tactical level, must have a thorough understanding of the environment in which he finds himself; he must be capable of using all military and non-military means at his disposal; and he must be capable of making them converge in a complimentary manner towards the desired objective. He therefore needs to have at his disposal specific planning and operating processes as well as the various means which will allow him to plan his different actions, to measure their effects and to re-orientate them in the pursuit of further objectives.	

PRESENTATION PAPER

12. Abstract : (same classification as the study)

a. Interest / usefulness of the study

This study examines and recommends an analytical and decision-making process that could be used by future operational and tactical planners in the prosecution of a military task given to an EU BG force package. It also investigates and makes recommendations as to the level, structure and organization of the HQs needed to conduct the recommended process. The study draws on current national and allied (EU, NATO, other) planning doctrine and best practice. It also proposes a headquarters structure and hierarchy that can deliver the planning process. It provides the basis of a common understanding of an agreed planning process that could be used by future planners.

On completion, this study could be used by troop contributing nations as a basis for the planning and conduct of operations at the operational and tactical levels. It could provide advice and guidance for future EU BG commanders and their HQ staff. As it will establish common planning guidelines, it could also serve as a base document for the development of future standard operating procedures and inform the structure and working practices that need to be developed in any future EU BG package.

b. Main aspects

- complex environment of operating 'amongst the people', including military and non-military actors ; various form of the opponent;
- the need for an holistic approach;
- thinking the manoeuvre in terms of effects;
- lines of operations and level of use;
- estimation and assessment through an iterative process;
- staff organisation and incorporation of non-military actors.

c. Main conclusions

- The environment is much more complex now and also characterized by the human factor. Other civilian, institutional or military actors are involved in the crisis resolution. Knowledge of this new environment is vital.
- The commander must gain a good understanding of the desired end state.
- The commander must be able to adapt his action to reach the desired end state in the most expedient way. The aim is to find solutions that achieve the desired effects and at the same time minimize the risk of undesired effects.
- As far as the organisation is concerned, the commander of the Force remains the key element. But, to help the commander in his choices, he has to bear on all the cells of his staff. The major roles are given to the J/G5&J/G3 chiefs.

d. Main recommendations

The study lists the main recommendations which are related to the process of analysis, the decision making and the organization of the HQs, among others.

The following recommendations from the report are suggested:

- In general terms, planning should take into account the complex environment in which the EUBG has to manoeuvre. We have to be aware of the nature of the modern opponent, in all his variations. Obtaining the support of the local civilian populations becomes a major goal.
- Tactical commanders should be involved in the planning process from the outset.
- The military action should be coordinated with all other actors involved. The soldier is no longer the only one responsible for the resolution of the crisis. It will only find a positive outcome in a comprehensive approach involving military and civilian at the different levels of command (OHQ, FHQ, HQ BG).
- The analysis process should be based on and thought through in a comprehensive way (political, economic, social, human, and military). It must take into account the entire environment and various public opinions (local, national, international).
- The commander of the Force should think in terms of effects on his opponents and all the forces committed, through an iterative process. The desired end-state should be obtained through the establishment of lines of operations which must converge towards a centre of gravity. Even if the focus is on the operational level, the tactical commander can translate these lines of operations at the tactical level.
- The desired effects should be considered as early as possible in the planning phase by integrating all positive and negative consequences in order to take appropriate actions. The creation of a matrix of effects is desirable at this level and will allow the commander to prioritize.
- It is recommended that regular evaluation takes place, in order to be able to modify the intensity or the relevance of the actions carried out. Various criteria of assessments must help the commander to adapt his action according to the results.
- At the operational level, it is recommended to create a planning cell with all representatives' actors of the theatre. At the tactical level, there is no fixed organisation. It is up to the commander to reorganise the CP.
- Lastly, for a better effectiveness, the working group recommends the incorporation of the non-military actors from the beginning of the process, in spite of the difficulties and divergences of opinion.

1. INTRODUCTION

Finabel studies cover a wide spectrum of land operations issues. The aim of these studies is to establish a common basis of understanding at the operative (functional) level between troop contributing nations. Although the studies themselves do not constitute formal doctrine in its true sense, they do allow all member states to participate in establishing a consensus in a number of important areas of future collaboration.

Planning for military operations is a collaborative process. The need for common understanding and procedures is particularly apparent when several member states collaborate in the spirit of multinational military operations. To be effective, the planning process itself must be well understood by all of those involved so that effort is harnessed in the swift production of coherent plans and orders.

1.1. AIM

In order to achieve his mission in today's complex environment of operating 'amongst the people', the commander must have a thorough understanding of the environment in which he finds himself; he must be capable of using all military and non-military means at his disposal ; and he must be capable of making them converge in a complimentary manner towards the desired objective. He therefore needs to have at his disposal specific planning and operating processes as well as the various means which will allow him to plan his different actions, to measure their effects and to re-orientate them in the pursuit of further objectives.

The aim of this study is to formalise this approach and to make all Army personnel aware by developing a genuine state of mind about the global tactical action that all have to possess.

1.2. LIMITATIONS

As each potential mission and operational situation will be different, it will not be possible for the study to identify specific lines of operation to be used in all circumstances. Rather, the Study may use examples to illustrate its argument, but it will avoid being over prescriptive in its recommendations.

The study draws on a wide variety of national and allied doctrine in order to determine whether any significant differences of approach to decision-making exist between member states. It may identify solutions that create common ground, and make appropriate recommendations. Its purpose is not to create a new decision-making process, but to identify and draw on best practice from across member states on how best to integrate the various lines of operation.

2. DEFINITIONS

- **Desired end-state (DES)**

The end-state is the political and/or military situation, which needs to exist when an operation has been terminated on favourable terms. The end-state should be established prior to execution. The ability to plan and conduct operations for conflict termination depends on a clear understanding of the desired end-state.

- **Centre of gravity (CoG)**

Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight (AAP-6).

- **Decisive point (DP)**

A point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information environment (AAP-6).

- **Effect**

An effect is the cumulative consequence across the environment caused by one or more actions and will lead to a change in the situation in one or more dimensions of the engagement space.

- **Target**

The object of a particular action, for example a geographic area, a complex, an installation, a force, equipment, an individual, a group or a system, planned for capture, exploitation, neutralization or destruction by military forces (AAP-6).

- **Lines of operation (LoO)**

Lines of operations link decisive points in time and space on the path to the centre of gravity. Commanders use them to focus combat power towards a desired end-state in a logical design that integrates all the military capabilities of a joint task force in order to converge upon and defeat the CoG of opposing forces.

3. CONTEXT

3.1. TODAY'S OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Recent conflicts are characterised by the increased numbers of civilian actors. The aim of these conflicting parties, which are mostly carried out under the aegis of large international organisations, is no longer the systematic destruction of an identified opponent through a direct confrontation. In contemporary operations which takes place amongst the people, the battle is fought against an enemy which is often indistinguishable from the local population and native environment, with the aim of defeating or winning over the various sections of society.

3.1.1. Nature of the opponent

During current operations, committed forces can be confronted with different kinds of enemies. Besides, this term is more and more replaced by belligerents, which refers to the potential differences.

The opponent, in his varied forms, reasons fast and uses the combination of means of the datasphere (digital space where information that influences public opinions circulates) and the cyberspace (virtual space where digital information circulates) to reach his desired end-state (DES). The opponent is likely to be mixed up with the civil population and therefore, it is very difficult to identify and to detect its activities and supporting system.

Therefore, the opponent:

- uses modern means of communication to lead information or disinformation campaigns ;
- compensates its numerical and technical inferiorities by the use of new technologies ;
- is aware of the weaknesses of the « legitimate » forces (UN, NATO, EU, etc.) and relies on these (restrictive mandate, blocking rules of engagement, etc.) to « unseat » /weaken the Force ;
- fights the military force through both political and diplomatic means ;
- may try to influence and gain sympathy of public opinion by taking advantage of its supposed weakness compared to the power of the Force.

3.1.2. A new environment

(a) Operating in complex scenarios

A scenario is considered complex when simultaneous operations of different intensity and nature occur (conventional military operations, operations against asymmetric enemies and humanitarian operations, for example), and when different actors to those, habitually involved in a conventional armed conflict, intervene or are present (such as international organizations, NGOs, tribal militias, criminal organizations, etc.). Also, the local civilian population will probably have cultural values and standards of living quite different to those of the states that constitute the military force.

(b) Characteristics of today's operating environment

The human factors mainly characterize the operating environment.

There is the presence of other actors actively involved in the resolution of the conflict such as: representatives of the UN or other civil administrative organizations, NGOs and armed personnel of security companies, etc., as well as personnel of the international mass media. These actors may have different attitudes towards the force that can range from total acceptance and cooperation to hostility. Also, these actors can have quite distinct objectives leading to rivalry amongst them.

The majority of the force's objectives are to be found in built-up areas, where civilian populations are located.

Also, the values, customs, cultural references and perceptions of the civilian population are very different to those of the military force.

There is a need to co-ordinate the military operations with the action of a civilian administration (local or international).

Finally, the military force finds itself restrained by political control from home territory, resulting from the impact public opinion has over the outcome of operations. Success is a matter of opinion.

3.2. THE IMPACT ON THE MILITARY

(a) Initially, the military might be the only organization capable of operating within an operational area due to the security situation. The military force provides security in order to restore essential or vital services (water, electricity, transport, etc.) by other actors. This security can only be obtained by the conduct of joint actions with the local or international police, justice and local authorities.

(b) But we sometimes witness a loss of predominance of the military factor in favour of civilian factors. The Force can become a secondary actor (public order, restoration of state authority, etc.) or an actor by influence (justice, economic support, diplomacy, etc.).

The achievement of military objectives will usually be a precursor or milestone on the way to achieving the political end-state. Therefore, decisions should be focused on the long-term effects that must be achieved whenever operational tempo permits.

(c) It is essential that the military operation commander understands the strategic aim and to appreciate its feasibility on a military level and is able to express the underlying needs. Likewise, the tactical commander has to be involved as soon as possible in the planning phase of the operation at the higher level, in order to be able to take part in it.

(d) It is therefore essential that the stabilisation phase is prepared from the design of the operation, by integrating the financial and organisational lines of operation, among others. The initial intervention phase has to be planned and thought through with stabilisation/normalisation in mind. Vital facilities will be key to the immediate needs of the population.

(e) Finally, military and civilian actions have to be coordinated to keep the coherence of the operation. In the initial stages of any campaign it is highly desirable that the military commander takes the leading role particularly if the security situation is fragile.

3.3. MEETING A REQUIREMENT

3.3.1. Knowledge of the environment

- (a) We cannot understand the comprehensive approach specifically without knowing the environment. Acquiring this knowledge is essential before any operation. Information seeking has to play a part in every field: political, diplomatic, cultural, ethnic, religious, economic, social, infrastructure, information, etc. It must be noted that all forces at work must be identified and analyzed. It is neither limited to the indigenous population, parties and institutions; nor to the operations area. Partners and allies as well as entities outside the operations area constitute forces that influence the conduct and outcome of the operation.
- (b) The success of a comprehensive approach lies in the thorough knowledge of the environment. Indeed, only this knowledge enables intelligence staff actors to be correctly oriented. In order to understand the perception of the operations by the opponent, his decision cycle and his means, to have an influence in very specific fields, such as information. Intelligence staff actors have the elements at their disposal to carry out an in-depth analysis of the battle space through the different fields of the environment. The knowledge of the environment makes it possible to identify the targets on which an action must be carried out in order to achieve a desired effect.


3.3.2. The need for an holistic approach

The main requirement is the need to plan and conduct military operations in a holistic way. This approach will allow the integration of the increasing number of elements involved in military operations, so that military and political objectives are coordinated, and military capabilities contribute to achieving the desired end-state.

3.3.3. Necessity to focus on the opinion of all actors involved

Opinion, which is a product of judgment, is formed by matching expectations with the perception of reality.

Expectations and perception are based on values and beliefs and all impact on each other. Therefore, the final judgment and opinions are ruled by expectations. Opinion translates internally into faith (will); externally into moral cohesion.



Success is achieved when the right expectations have been created and it is perceived that these expectations are, or will be met. Expectations therefore are the key. Action will have to be focused on the handling of expectations. Directly by effective communication; indirectly by making the perception of reality match with what has been communicated. Our actions therefore have to be preceded, accompanied and followed by our messages for the target audience(s).


4. THE EFFECTS

The land commander has to think out his manoeuvre in terms of effects on his opponents, but also on allies and the environment. He needs to plan the use of assets he has at his disposal. An effect at operational level will concern global threats of the theatre or threats that are common to subordinate levels of command. During the planning, the tactical commander will have to change the operational effects into effects at his level. An effect at tactical level will be the result of local actions, which normally produce limited effects on the area of operations (but the commander must take into account that an action in his area can cause an effect in an other area). They will be planned and conducted at this level and will be particularly brief, because they apply to specific points.

4.1. CLASSIFICATION OF EFFECTS

Effects can be one or more of the following :

- Intended effects. Effects that produce a pre-determined group of effects are termed intended effects.
- Unintended effects. Those effects that are not anticipated or envisioned to be associated with the desired end-state are referred to as unintended effects.
- Simple. One effect on one target, in one field.
- Combined. Several effects are defined to reach a same goal, for instance, the disruption in the logistic flow of the opposing faction by the destruction of delivery channels and effects on the population in order to deprive the rebellion of its support inside and outside the country.
- Direct. They are most of the time the result of a physical action aiming at destroying or neutralising an opponent element.
- Indirect. It aims at reaching a goal in another field by acting in a specific field; for instance, the rebuilding of a school will have an impact on the population, and therefore on its attitude towards the military force.
- Desirable. Effects that go in the direction of the DES.
- Undesirable. Effects that go against the desired effect, expected or not.



Involvement of an effect

4.2. ACHIEVEMENT OF EFFECTS

- (a) Every effect has to be an intermediary step between a situation at the time « T » and the desired end-state. It concerns one or more actors and must include a notion of deadline. An effect has to be translated by a physical or psychological impact on the environment or the actors (friend, opponent, population, etc.) and has to constrain them to change their attitude or to accept the desired goals.


- (b) An exclusively military-focused approach may allow tactical and operational objectives to be achieved. However, it may fail to fulfil strategic objectives, due to excessive friendly, collateral or opponent casualties. It also allows a better definition of the course of action in complex scenarios, such as peace support operations, where classic procedures – as occupying an area or destroying the opponent – are hardly applicable.
- (c) Consideration of effects during planning does not only involve determining desired effects, but also anticipating the potential undesired effects resulting from our actions. Similarly, opponent effects on friendly forces/population should also be considered. Also, the potential effects caused by other actors –such as the mass media, civil agencies, civilians– present in our AOO should also be anticipated.
- (d) The effects sought, and the actions undertaken to obtain them, can have a physical or non-physical – and frequently psychological – nature. There is a tendency to think that effects-based planning involves few physical actions and effects, and that psychological effects and actions are predominant. This is only partially true. It should be noted that one of the objectives of considering effects during the planning process is to achieve maximum exploitation of military operations. This frequently involves seeking morale and psychological effects, since they give more advantages than exclusively physical effects, although these are not excluded. In fact, the most efficient effects are those combining physical with non-physical actions, especially with psychological actions, which serve as a multiplier element. For instance, in a peace support operation, the continuous presence of our forces in specific difficult areas, combined with PSYOPS, CIMIC, and civil organizations' cooperation on the ground might produce a stabilizing effect. In conventional operations, an INFO OPS campaign followed by a limited – but forceful – military action can demoralize the opponent, and destroy its command and control system.

5. LINES OF OPERATIONS

5.1. HOW ARE LoO DEVELOPED

- (a) Lines of operations connect some decisive points, which are all intermediary goals to reach, in order to achieve the neutralisation of the opposing centre of gravity and subsequently to reach the desired end-state. Every line of operations represents a majority of physical or non-physical actions and connects decisive points arranged sequentially.
- (b) With these lines of operations it is possible to have a view in the long run of the operation. The achievement of the desired end-state involves goals to be reached on lines of operations, these goals being also translated into decisive points. These decisive points are used during the planning to define the effects to achieve, the tasks to be done, and finally the missions of the subordinates. These can be conducted in different places, for different targets, at different tempos and for different goals.
- (c) By searching for the synchronisation, it is possible to integrate the many means to converge on the opposing CoG (firepower, information control, deception, specific operations, manoeuvre, etc.).

- (d) They represent lines of coherence that make it possible to reach directly or indirectly the centre(s) of gravity by taking advantage of the weaknesses of the opponent and by avoiding the direct confrontation with his forces while acting in specific fields. The final goal is the achievement of the desired end-state.



Example of lines of operations at operational level


5.2. LEVEL OF USE

- (a) The operational level creates its lines of operations depending on the desired end-state defined by strategic level (political-military) in all the fields in which it wants to carry out an action to reach a decisive point.
- (b) At the tactical level, lines of operations are not usually employed, except at the highest levels when lines of operations are implemented at the tactical level. These lines of operations are generally a reflection of those at operational level. However, they can be specific to the tactical level when they are specific to the tactical area of engagement.
- (c) The higher tactical level can sometimes extrapolate its own lines of operations from lines of the higher level (the line « humanitarian aid » gives rise to support to populations, which is more concrete) or it can create new ones that match with a reality of its area.

At tactical level, lines of operations are more concrete, adapted to a given area and time, and directly linked to operations on the battlefield, while taking advantage of all available fields. They should appear during the initial reflection. They can be geographical, thematic (deterrence, counter insurgency, etc.) or functional. One of these lines can be dedicated to protecting the force's centre of gravity (CoG).

- (d) Decisive points at the tactical level are used as they are (security of logistic areas or urban areas) adapted to the local situation (freedom of circulation or support to local forces), or derived from the planning process. Besides, they will be more precise. A specific target or geographical place is often associated to a decisive point. In the illustration below, the mentioned logistic areas or communication channels concern the battlefield.

Finally, a decisive point at operational level can give rise to two tactical decisive points. The decisive point « SSR-DDR » at the operational level can be translated at tactical level by “the organisation of points of reassembling/recovery of armament and the disarmament of armed groups”.



Example of lines of operations at tactical level

- (e) Lines of operation and their decisive points are usually projected as separate horizontal tracks to be followed towards objectives leading to the centre of gravity. These separate tracks suggest that the various lines of operation are not linked by time or space. However, an action on a specific line may have an impact on the progress on other lines. In the same way, to reach a decisive point in a specific line, action may be required on other lines. Effects provide these vertical / diagonal relations between the lines of operation.

6. PLANNING

Planning of military operations is a continuous and cyclical process which starts after decisions are made at the political level, going through the military-strategic level, the operational level, and the tactical level. Its aim is to constitute a coherent whole, with a common goal, shared with other elements of the national power of the different nations constituting the coalition/international organization involved (NATO or EU).

6.1. PLANNING LEVELS

- (a) If we focus on the operational and higher tactical level, the intellectual process, in general terms, is similar at both levels and consists of four conceptual phases: precise definition and thorough understanding of the problem to be solved; detailed analysis of the context of the problem; definition of the different options to solve the problem; and choosing one of those options.
- (b) The comprehensive approach must be taken into account from the beginning of any military action, notably for the management of resulting effects. Therefore it should be implemented iteratively. During the intervention phase, the knowledge of effects to be achieved by the tactical staff drives him into integrating them in his thinking, in order to avoid unintended negative effects. At least, if we cannot avoid them, we are aware of the risk, and we can prepare to face them. Therefore, it is essential to study and take into account the consequences (favourable or not) of the current military action during the next phase in order to give guidance to the military force.

This approach must be integrated into the operational planning from the beginning. If it is developed in parallel, it could give the impression that it is an artificial design and the sole aim is to measure the evolution of the tactical manoeuvre. If it is integrated into the operational planning, it makes it possible to define the action of the formation. There is a cohesion between the mission and the effects to be reached.

- (c) A direct discussion between the commander and his subordinate commanders should occur regularly during the planning process. The aim of this is to ensure that the staff understands what the commander's intend is, what effects are to be achieved, how to do it, and what limitations, restrictions and obstacles can emerge during the execution.

6.2. REQUIRED EFFECTS AND PLANNING

- (a) Commanders, at the tactical level, will contribute to achieving the effects desired by the operational commander, who, at the same time, has received guidelines from the strategic level. In fact, tactical commanders will only be allowed to implement effects-based planning in a limited way, since they do not have as many capabilities and the same information available as that at the operational level, especially as we go down from higher tactical echelons. In any case, the tactical commander should always consider the effects of his actions on higher levels. He must avoid incompatibility with the

effects determined at higher levels. An apparently successful tactical action may work against strategic desired effects –for example, due to unexpected collateral damages.

It is very important to be fully aware of potential desirable and undesirable effects that may be caused at the tactical level. This aspect must be considered by all unit commanders, and in certain cases, by every soldier. In completely transparent operations for the public opinion – due to the presence of the mass media – some individual decisions or a decision taken by a small unit commander can have effects that may affect the tactical level, it can have strategic or political consequences. Actions causing civil casualties, damages to civil infrastructures, too high rates of friendly casualties or abuses of prisoners/civilians may have enormous negative effects on ongoing operations. Just one person causing an incident of this kind, can ruin the whole effects planning at the operational level.

- (b) At the end of the analysis phase of the mission, lines of operations are defined. They can be listed in a matrix in a form like below.

Like a plan of manoeuvre, this table should be updated continuously.

Line of operations	Decisive point	Effects to be reached	Targets	Messages	Actions	Actors	Assets	Measurement of the effect / responsible

Table of effects

The lines of operations and the table of effects are used to elaborate the course of action, including the phasing. Actions defined in the table make it possible to define the missions of the lower units.

- (c) Within tactical planning, desired effects are determined in the Commander’s Intent, while the actions necessary to achieve those effects will be determined in the COO, and in subordinate units’ missions.

6.3. PRIORITISATION

- (a) Including the concept of “effects” in the planning process does not necessarily involve a change in the prioritisation of the objectives. The planning itself will determine what the desired effects are after fulfilling our objectives. However, priorities will be determined in the mission analysis, in the study of factors involved in the operation (where the understanding of the environment will be of great relevance), in the limitations established, in the feasibility of the different lines of actions and in the desired end-state.
- (b) The importance of the various actors for achieving the objectives, matching these objectives with those of the other actors and identifying differences and commonalities, strengths and weaknesses must be taken into account to identify and prioritise the influence to exert on each target audience in time and space.

7. ESTIMATION AND ASSESSMENT

This phase is vital because it makes it possible to take stock of the ongoing operations with regard to the desired end-state, by providing the commander with an assessment of the progress towards the decisive points and thus conduct the comprehensive approach.

7.1. CHOOSING THE RIGHT ACTION

In general terms the following considerations are important.

- (a) Commanders should conduct current operations in a manner that sets the conditions necessary for future operations. Operations are conducted not only to defeat the opponent but also to restore a stable peace. The success or failure of the stabilisation is often determined by the initial actions.
- (b) The support of the local population is the key factor to durable success and the way forces behave in that context is crucial.
- (c) The first phase begins with an analysis of the situation and the mission to develop a clear appreciation of “what” must be accomplished, under what “conditions” and within what “limitations”. Based on this appreciation, it then focuses on determining “how” operations should be arranged within an overall operational design. The operational design provides the basis for subsequent development of the operational concept as well as the detailed plan. Operational art is applied to determine how best to conduct operations (ways) using available forces and capabilities (means) to achieve the objectives (ends) efficiently and within acceptable risks. Key to the application of operational art is the ability to envision the employment of forces and their effects in time and space, to appreciate the realm of possibilities and to anticipate probable outcomes as well as their implications.
- (d) The first step in mission analysis is to gain a thorough understanding of the higher commander’s planning guidance (CPG). A common understanding must be confirmed with the higher commander through discussions between superior and subordinate commanders during planning.
- (e) Civilian and military (IO, NGO, GO, belligerents, populations...) actors can only be to give in or shift course if they see a benefit from doing so. They will not change if they feel there are other – maybe better – alternatives. It is important that the solution is also acceptable to other actors as well as the intended target audience. The feeling of an unjust reward will create undesired effects and is to be avoided. Obviously the solution needs to be credible.

Manage expectations relates to the prerequisite to create the right expectations because these are the norm used when military actions are judged. Most actors have expectations of the military that are wrong, too high or even opposing each other. Therefore it is essential to create the right image of what the military is to accomplish and what can and / or will

be done in space and time. By creating the right expectations and subsequently meeting them credibility and positive judgement is gained. Managing expectations is more than just clarifying the intent of the military force and capabilities. It also means altering expectations in case of differences or contrasts in interest. Finally it also relates to an opponent. At the higher levels clear messages must be sent to the opponent that addresses political and military intent.

Related to an opponent managing expectations also means sending messages to create deception and surprise.

Shape the perception of reality means the actors get the right image of the operational environment and the forces at work; and within that framework of what the military is capable of doing, is doing and has done. On the one hand this supports creates the right expectations; on the other hand it serves to show that what has been announced has been achieved. Shaping perception relies on effective communication. However, the military are not the only one that originates messaging. All those who are affected by or observe military action will relay information about the event in some way. Therefore perception also relies heavily on Presence, Profile and Posture and the way military action is executed. With regards to an opponent the right image clearly is the one that supports the military intent. This relates to showing that what has been announced is being done. But it also means affecting his situational awareness by manipulating or attacking his means for observation, communication and his command structure and information systems.

The actors must be convinced that the future provided by the solution is realistic and will or can be realized within a specific (acceptable) term. Rewards and threats or sanctions are an inherent part of the game and used to induce an extra stimulant.

7.2. THE UNDESIRED EFFECTS


They can be avoided, if every solution is examined in accordance with a number of generic attentions:

- (a) Integrity and ethical behavior according to our standards;
- (b) Legitimacy of our actions;
- (c) Credibility of political goals and all related activities managed by military forces and international community;
- (d) Mutual respect within a joint, combined force and between the military and non-military partners;
- (e) Prejudice must be avoided;
- (f) An appropriate use of force;
- (g) A relative transparency according to the requirement for operational security.

7.3. ASSESSMENT

Estimation and assessment relies on two questions:

- Are the good things done (notion of criterion of implementation) ? Do we do things right?
 - Are the things well done (notion of criterion of efficiency) ? Do we do the right things?
- (a) The assessment must continuously intervene and the frequency is to be defined according to the tempo of the operations. It makes it possible to provide the commander with an assessment of the situation and some proposals: change in the effects to be reached, actions to be undertaken, efforts to be done in specific fields (influence operations, CIMIC, rebuilding aid, etc.). During the intervention phase, an estimation can be necessary every day. During the stabilisation phase, a weekly tempo seems to be more adapted because it takes more time to obtain effects.
- (b) This assessment is done by information supply coming from many sources: personnel in charge of conducting operations, intelligence chains, CP cells, troops on the battlefield (from the private to the officer), local authorities, etc. The success of this phase lies partly in combat forces, which are the most appropriate to bring concrete information. It is therefore essential to formalise and to systematise the exploiting of observations (simple format of reports and systematic debriefing for instance).
- (c) Two types of indicators can be used. The first ones make it possible to ensure that a special action has really been conducted without foreseeing the obtained effects; they are indicators of implementation. Indicators of efficiency measure the obtained effects and must make it possible to work out if they fit the expected effects, or if we obtain unexpected effects are they favourable or not? Measures of effectiveness should avoid subjectivity and will vary with each situation and desired effect.
- (d) The indicators, regardless of their nature, have to be tangible (measurable /quantifiable), significant and adapted to the mission, and finally have to be observable by units. They are not at all rigid. An indicator defined during the planning can be useless or difficult to assess. It is therefore useful to eliminate or modify it.



Assessment

8. STAFF ORGANISATION AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVEL

8.1. FUNCTIONS REQUIRED FOR PLANNING AND MEASURING EFFECTS

The Commander plays a crucial role. It is the commander that decides the effects to be achieved, in other words how to approach the various actors. He designs the message.

- (a) At the operational level, there will be a need for representation – in person or by other means – of the military and non-military partners (e.g. from the other services involved and IO's).
- (b) Finally, all military assets and capacities can be used: air assets (including helicopters), artillery including mortar and naval gunfire, conventional forces, special forces, engineers, CIMIC, PSYOPS, INFO OPS, intelligence¹, local forces.

Intelligence is of course vital in this process. It enables the acquisition of knowledge, the definition of targets in the general sense, and the definition of measures of efficiency and assessment as well as reports on the situation. The obtained results depend mainly on performances of all these assets regarding the coordination.

¹ HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, OSINT, RADINT, EW.

(c) All the Staff's cells (from J/G1 to J/G9) take part in this process.

(d) Coordination with all actors in the theatre is required: IO/NGO/GO, political, diplomatic, economic and reconstruction team. This coordination with civilian actors remains the major issue. Indeed, questions are numerous: which level must be in charge of the coordination? In which organisation can we consider the attendance of representatives of other ministries in our staff?

8.2. ORGANISATION

8.2.1. Common to both levels

Key to successful staff work is information gathering, processing and exchange. Structural or physical organisation must be adapted to that necessity. As exerting and evaluating influence is at the heart of the matter, standard organisation should be the norm.

8.2.2. Operational level

The staff coordination of effects, on behalf of the commander, should be a shared responsibility of Chief Plans and Chief Ops. Chief Plans can draw on the normal planning group in which all functions are represented and reinforced with external representatives / advisors as required. Chief Ops draws on the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) which should also include all functions. If this is not the case due to CP lay-out (e.g. because of clustering) the CP / staff should have the flexibility to restructure according to operational demands.

For co-ordination between Plans and Ops and for preparatory staff work in the battle rhythm, it may be deemed helpful to create an effects coordination board.

8.2.3. Tactical level

At tactical level, there is no specific structure for the planning and the management of effects. Here, the integration of different actions is the main task. However, by taking into account this manoeuvre from the initial phase, it is possible to consider restructuring the CP to respond to the growing importance of environment functions during the stabilisation phase, new missions for lower units and possibly forces. The tactical commander strives for efficiency (union between limited assets and concentration of forces) in the use of assets.

9. INCORPORATION OF NON-MILITARY ACTORS IN THE PROCESS

Coordination with all actors in the theatre is required to reach a better effectiveness: IO/NGO/GO, political, diplomatic and economic, etc. This coordination with civilian actors remains the major issue.

However, to systematise non-military actors' incorporation is not easy, since these actors do not have the same interests as the deployed force.

This leads to the following potential solutions:

- (a) For non-military assets provided by the nation – political level – for the operation, these actors must be incorporated into the planning process at the higher echelons – strategic and operational – in order to thoroughly understand their responsibilities, capacities, limitations and especially, to establish the coordination measures required to facilitate development of actions at the tactical level.
- (b) The military force should achieve its objectives as well as the objectives of a non-military actor. When compatible, the military force should coordinate to support all actions. For this purpose, it is important to introduce the inputs required for the military operation planning, through liaison officers and periodical meetings. Depending on the OPSEC required and on their action in the theatre of operations – shared objectives, willingness to cooperate with the military force – the possibility of their deeper integration into military planning and into operational conduct should be considered.

10. CONCLUSION

The global approach is the responsibility of all levels of command. Philosophy is the same for all: search for the efficient use of military assets and increased coordination with civil actors. This approach does not mean reorganisation of Staffs or revolution of operational processes. Indeed, this approach only requires a possible reorganisation of existing assets in order to define a central core (coordination cell) that manages the participation of every Staff's cell.

	STRATEGICAL	OPERATIONAL	TACTICAL
Starting point	Political DES	DES	Superior's order
Planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Definition of DES •Search for cooperation MN and national •Campaign Plan •Force generation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Definition of military DES of its level •Definition of actions to reach DES •Definition of effects-based operation •Operation plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Definition of effects to be reached of its level •Definition of actions depending on available assets •Definition of effects-based maneuver
Conduct		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Conducts effects-based operation in its area •Assessment of results 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Conducts effects-based manoeuvre in its area •Assessment of results
Execution			By subordinated units
	Adapted force generation	Adapted to existing assets	

ANNEX 1

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AOO	Area Of Operations
AOR	Area Of Responsibility
BG	Battle Group
CIMIC	Civil-Military Coordination
CoA	Course of action
CoG	Centre of Gravity
COO	Concept of Operations
CP	Command Post
CPG	Commander's Planning Guidance
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reinsertion
DES	Desired End State
DP	Decisive point
EW	Electronic Warfare
FHQ	Force Headquarters
HQ	Headquarters
HUMINT	Human intelligence
GO	Governmental Organisation
INFO OPS	Information Operations
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
ICP	Initial command post
IO	International Organisation
JOC	Joint Operation Centre
LoO	Lines of Operations
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
OHQ	Operations Headquarters
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
RADINT	Radar Intelligence
SIGINT	Signal intelligence
SSR	Security Sector Reform

ANNEX 2

REFERENCE PAPERS

NATO

Guidelines for Operational Planning, OTAN, 2004, AAP-6, 2006.

UK

The UK military effects-based approach, Joint Doctrine Note 1/05, Sept 05.
Incorporating and extending the military effects-based approach, Joint Doctrine note 7/06, Sept 06.

US

“Effects-based operations: change in the nature of warfare”, Brigadier General David DEPTULA (US), Aerospace education foundation, 2001.
“Effects-based operations: a new way of thinking and fighting”, Major RICKERMAN, School of advanced military studies, USA

FR JOINT

Méthode de planification interarmées MARS (PIA 05-401).
Méthode de Planification Opérationnelle, version provisoire.

FR ARMY

FT 01, « Gagner la bataille, conduire à la paix ».
FT 02 « Tactique générale ».
Concept exploratoire des Forces Terrestres Futures, « La synergie des effets », EMAT/BCSF.
Concept d’emploi des forces en phase de stabilisation, approuvé le 21 juin 2005, n° 980/DEF/EMAT/BPO/EO/10.
Doctrine des forces terrestres en stabilisation, approuvée le 23 novembre 2006, n°000744/DEF/CDEF/DEO/BENG.
Méthode d’Elaboration d’une Décision Opérationnelle, version provisoire de 2004.
La manoeuvre globale, 1° édition de 2008.



**FINABEL: AN EXPERTISE FORUM CONTRIBUTING
TO EUROPEAN LAND ARMIES INTEROPERABILITY
SINCE 1953**

PRESENTATION


* When the committee was set up the name Finabel was chosen as being an acronym of the first letter of each of the founding nations, and was written in capital letters. Following the expansion of the committee it was decided that Finabel would become a proper noun, no longer referring to the founding countries' initial letters, and be written in lower case.

THE ONLY MILITARY ORGANISATION IN EUROPE TO DEAL WITH LAND DOCTRINE

The Finabel* Committee was created in October 1953 on the initiative of the Army Chiefs of Staff of France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Germany joined Finabel in 1956, the United Kingdom in 1973, Spain in 1990, Greece and Portugal in 1996. In 2006, Finabel decided to enlarge itself to the whole European Union. This is a dynamic process and more than the two thirds of land forces of the EU members have already joined Finabel (for example, Poland and Slovakia as soon as 2006).

Initially focused on cooperation in armament's programmes, Finabel quickly shifted to the harmonisation of land doctrines, starting from the statement that should be first obtained a common vision of force engagement on the terrain before hoping to reach a shared capability approach and the realisation of joint equipments.

The studies carried out by Finabel take the form of:



- **Reports**, which re-present the results of conceptual studies entrusted to the Working Groups;
- **Agreements**, which relate to the military characteristics of equipment;
- **Conventions**, which standardise procedures, testing methods and glossaries in order to facilitate exchanges between member states.

AN ACTIVE NETWORK CONTRIBUTING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A JOINT EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDING OF DEFENCE ISSUES

Finabel contributes to the development of a joint European understanding of defence issues focusing on interoperability, doctrine and the joint environment, while keeping its land specificity. Finabel neither competes with nor duplicates NATO or the military structures of the EU but contributes to these organisations, with which it has tight links, in its unique way.

As an independent, apolitical and informal reflection forum, Finabel offers its land doctrine expertise at the disposal of European land forces.



Finabel COS meeting in Athens - 2009

For over 50 years the Finabel Committee has operated in a spirit of fairness, consensus and openness. It is also:

- a working method which has proven its worth: Finabel studies are generally carried out within a few months;
- an active and efficient network: Finabel enables staff officers from its member states to discuss freely about operational issues they encounter, in an atmosphere which encourages the exchange of views;
- an enduring spirit of camaraderie: the special atmosphere within Finabel creates a strong personal relationship with the institution as well as a feeling of solidarity and friendship between its members. We can rightly speak of a true “Finabel spirit” which gathers all its members.

For over 50 years the Finabel Committee, by stimulating and encouraging the harmonisation of national concepts, has played a role in the creation of a comprehensive and consistent doctrinal resource for European armies. It continues to provide their Chiefs of Staff with an exceptional, unique and inventive tool.

A UNIQUE LEGAL STATUS REFLECTING THE FINABEL SPIRIT

The Finabel organisation is an international *de facto* association whose members are selected by their respective governments on the basis of their qualities.

Finabel provides recommendations, freely applicable by the land components of its members.

There is no supranational or international body leading or directing the work of Finabel. Rather it is solely the responsibility of the Chiefs of Staff of the land forces. The agreements reached within Finabel remain objectives that the member states strive to achieve within the limitations of their national doctrines and resources.

Thanks to its specific status, Finabel enjoys a level of independence, autonomy in its work and freedom of speech which does not exist in other multinational military bodies.

A SIMPLE STRUCTURE AND EFFECTIVE AND FLEXIBLE OPERATION

The Army Chiefs of Staff Committee	Executive Committee of Finabel, this is the highest level. It meets once a year to summarise work of the past year and to establish the objectives for the coming year. The chairmanship of this committee changes annually.
The Principal Military Experts' (PME) Committee	<p>This steering committee is made up primarily of officers responsible for doctrine, planning and studies within the staffs of the land components of Finabel member states.</p> <p>The committee meets twice a year to analyse the directives of the Chiefs of Staff and reformulate them in terms of missions to be distributed among the Working Groups. Belgium has provided a chairman for this committee since the creation of Finabel.</p>
The Permanent Secretariat	Located in the Belgian general staff in Brussels, it is the only permanent structure of the Finabel Committee and deals with administrative and organisational matters.
The Working Groups	Seven Working Groups, which are the mainstay of Finabel, carry out studies in various areas of interest to the Armies.
Coordination Commission	Chaired by the Head of the Permanent Secretariat, it gathers all Working Groups' chairmen. Its aim is to provide a better coordination between all Finabel members and a close collaboration between the groups.

THE HEART OF FINABEL: THE STUDIES AND THE WORKING GROUPS

The Finabel Working Groups' delegates are knowledgeable staff officers who, over the years, have developed an extensive body of European doctrine in the fields considered a priority by the Chiefs of Staff in the full spectrum of military operations. The flexible operation of the institution and the rapid production of studies allow the Chiefs of Staff to take into account urgent topics.

The freedom which prevails in Finabel creates conditions to cover a lot of questions concerning land operations and makes Finabel's studies even more relevant. Although the studies themselves do not constitute formal doctrine in its true sense, they do allow all member states to participate in establishing a consensus in a number of important areas of future collaboration.

As the Finabel meetings take place in each member state in turn, the experts of Finabel have created an informal, friendly and active community. Moreover, even if the participation in all Working Groups is highly recommended, it is no longer mandatory.

The corpus made up by Finabel (encompassing hundreds of reports, agreements and conventions in at least two languages) is made available by each member state to the staffs, major commands and schools, reflection and doctrine bodies.

In order to allow the fast consulting and sharing of information, all promulgated documents are available through a secure website, which is managed by the Finabel Permanent Secretariat.

SIMPLE LINGUISTIC AND BUDGETARY ARRANGEMENTS DESIGNED TO FAVOUR EXCHANGES

It is important to stress the fact that, in the interests of fairness, all participants in Finabel meetings have the opportunity to use their national language, which is translated into French or English by interpreters.

The official language of Finabel is French for the Executive and Steering Boards.

The language used in the Working Groups is English.

All Finabel documents are written at least in French and in English.

In budget matters, the annual national contribution is minimal: each country belongs to one of the three contribution groups (200€, 3000€ or 16 000€) based on population.



FINABEL EMBLEM

This emblem includes two swords crossed, which represent the Finabel land identity since its origin. The twelve stars remind the strong link with Europe that Finabel has had since its creation. The shield embodies defence of peace, foundation of our forces. The centre of the emblem shows two antiquity divinities in front of a shield. On the left you find Mars, Roman God of War, expressing its violence. On the right you find Minerva who personifies the ordered side of War abiding by rules which characterise our democracies. This Symbol can be summarised by the expression “Reflection serving military action”, which is the goal of Finabel.



TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE WORKING GROUPS

Working Group	Field	Terms of reference	Study example
ALPHA	Effective engagement	To study and harmonise the doctrine, methods of action and procedures relating to the use of land forces.	Defined together with the European Union Military Staff: Conceivable employment doctrine(s) for an EU Battle Group (EU BG) at tactical level.
CHARLIE	Effective logistics	To carry out studies and exchange views with the aim of ensuring the success of operations carried out by Finabel nations in an increasingly complex environment through effective logistics.	Command and Control in the field of multinational logistics.
GOLF	Force protection capability and survivability	To harmonise all matters relating to force protection capability and the survivability of troops during operations in the face of all types of threat (classical threat and mass destruction).	Defined together with the European Defence Agency: CBRN EOD Risk Management tool for the incident Commander within an EU BG operation.
LIMA	Effective intelligence	To study all aspects contributing to effective intelligence for land forces, in all senses of the term.	Elaboration of a generic opposing force for military instruction and training purposes.
MIKE	Operational preparation and training	To study the operational preparation and training of the Finabel nations' land forces likely to be deployed together in the framework of joint operations.	Training for military operations in urban areas.
ROMEO	Effective C4	To study the harmonisation and the development of new concepts relating to command, control, communications and computers (C4) in a joint, interagency and multinational environment.	Information warfare in current operations.
TANGO	Conceptual and prospective studies	To draft general concepts for Finabel and subsequently to undertake conceptual and prospective studies in order to create a framework for further studies by Finabel Working Groups.	Study defined together with the European Union Military Staff: Definition of generic missions which can be entrusted to the EU Battle Group (EU BG).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

0. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL DATA STUDY A.26.R	7
1. INTRODUCTION	10
2. DEFINITIONS	11
3. CONTEXT	12
4. THE EFFECTS	15
5. LINES OF OPERATIONS	17
6. PLANNING	20
7. ESTIMATION AND ASSESMENT	22
8. STAFF ORGANISATION AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVEL	25
9. INCORPORATION OF NON-MILITARY ACTORS IN THE PROCESS	27
10. CONCLUSION	28
11. ANNEX 1: ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS	29
12. ANNEX 2: REFERENCE PAPERS	30
FINABEL PRESENTATION	31-38



Quartier Reine Elisabeth
Rue d'Evere 1
B-1140 BRUSSELS

TEL : +32 (0)2/701.71.77
FAX : +32 (0)2/701.71.78

E-mail : finabel@mil.be

You will find our studies at www.finabel.org



.be