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Promulgation of report Finabel Study **ENG.3.R**

**LAND UNITS CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS IN A
COMPLEX OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ENG.3.R

<p>1. <u>Finabel references:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - FINABEL Studies T.37.R & A.25.R - FINABEL study Nr T.38.R - Mission Paper ENG.3.R - Questionnaire ENG.3.R 	<p>2. <u>Other references:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - AJP-3 (B), Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations - AJP-3.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations - ATP-3.2.1, Allied Land Tactics - AJP-3.14, Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection - AJP-4(A), Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine - AJP-4.9, Modes of Multinational Logistic Support - AJP-4.10, Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine - AAP-06, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French).
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INTRODUCTIVE REMARKS

The aim of the study is to determine an ideal generic composition of Land Units at Battle Group (BG) / Task Force (TF) level and to determine all critical and relevant Land capabilities, in order to be able to deal in a flexible way with the wide range of possible missions in a Complex operational Environment (COE).

The numerous operational experiences in recent conflicts have generated lessons identified that, after the necessary studies and experimentations, originated important lessons learned regarding the structure of units, necessary capabilities, new challenges that we need to deal with, and also may determine new tasks, posture and focus of our soldiers and leaders. All nations are focused on learning from each other in that domain to adapt quickly in order to fill the identified gaps, although this can sometimes be a slow process. The objective of this study would be to determine the organization and necessary capabilities for Land Units that would maximize their flexibility, performance and chances for success.

- The study will strictly focus on the BG/TF level, both integrated or being part of a large Unit.
- The study will focus mainly on security and peace support operations campaign themes¹ and on all activities that must be conducted in those scenarios.

Brief Description

- Using lessons of current conflicts, the study will identify all Land capabilities and assets within the different "Combat Functions" at the BG/TF level that have been proven to be critical and decisive in the framework of security operations.
- The study will then examine and propose possible structures and relationships among these capabilities and Units (centralization or decentralization).

This study can be utilized by planners by providing a tool to determine the best possible task organization for such kind of missions and an insight regarding the priorities when it comes to the development of operational capabilities to closing capability/equipment gaps within the shortest possible time.

¹ ATP 3.2.1, (...) describes the broad general conditions that exist in an area of operations and provide principles to guide planning and action as a campaign progresses. Campaigns and their operational objectives are realised through the assignment and execution of tactical activities.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The character of conflict is constantly changing. Smart adversaries have moved quickly to counter our considerable conventional strengths and they will continue to do so. The sources of potential conflict are increasing and their forms diversifying. The global system is becoming increasingly interdependent and interconnected. The character of conflict is changed by the consequences of war, as human beings adapt to it, and as a result of human development, for example in knowledge, need or interest. The evidence points to a conflict's contemporary character being dominated by *contest*², *congestion*³, *clutter*⁴, *connection*⁵ and *constraint*⁶:

Conflicts that Land Forces are currently involved in require them to have many capabilities that are different from those needed in past conventional conflicts, and that most probably will be needed also in future conflicts. The main reason for this is the fact that the Operational Environment is different nowadays, and will be different in the future.

² It is the degree and complexity of the contest that characterizes the contemporary environment: an interconnected web of elements, such as access, freedom of manoeuvre, legitimacy and narratives will be contested and will need to be fought for. Adversaries will contest *all* areas in which we could once assume an advantage through technology. Technological diffusion and the ability of adversaries to match or outstrip our rate of investment and progress will force contest upon us in ways we have previously planned to avoid through dominance. Adversaries will also contest physical and virtual space – close, deep and rear – using multiple means, old and new. And ideas, ways of life, traditions and social trends will be contested, sometimes violently, at home.

³ Construction, population growth and the concentration of people around scarce resources will create congestion. We will be unavoidably drawn into urban areas, the littoral and lower airspace. The ground will often be densely populated, possibly with dissatisfied and disadvantaged people, many of whom will be armed. Instability and adversary tactics will unavoidably draw the conduct of operations into these areas. Congestion will increase the uncertainty of second and third order effects and will inhibit manoeuvre and the use of firepower. The offshore seas, the airspace and orbital space will also grow more congested, with platforms and fixed structures, as human expansion reaches outwards and upwards.

⁴ As a result of congestion, growth and deregulation the operating space is growing more cluttered and filled with things arranged in a disorderly fashion. A mass of ambiguous targets will challenge our ability to understand and discriminate. Clutter aids concealment, particularly for indigenous actors with local knowledge, and this will confound technical sensors and put new emphasis on the need for local, human engagement and understanding. Adversaries will exploit neutral spaces, thereby increasing the risk of possibly unacceptable collateral damage if they are attacked

⁵ Human action and inter-action, our own and that of our adversaries, is gravitating towards inter-connected nodes. These nodes are centers of activity, for example air and sea ports, confluences of movement and communications, and centers of governance and commerce. The nodes are connected by networks, such as supply and trade routes and computer networks. The accelerated and all-pervasive expansion of cyber inter-connectivity, and the internet, continues to have a major effect. Both nodes and networks will require protection and will be threatened with attack, exploitation and disruption. All aspects of Globalization have accelerated and exaggerated both the progress and the effects of inter-connection

⁶ Legal and social norms, which are essential to the legitimacy of our actions, will limit us, but not necessarily our adversaries. Risk aversion, a lack of tolerance for widespread damage and long-term commitment (particularly if operations are seen as 'discretionary'), and pervasive media coverage are increasingly constraining our freedom to operate, but will not affect all sides in conflict equally. Debates over ethics, legitimacy, human rights, proportionality and the definition of success will obstruct a coherent narrative and handicap the operational freedom to seize and hold the initiative. Periodically, particularly in democracies, economics will constrain defence spending, forcing unwelcome or potentially debilitating choices over capability

The employment of Land Forces is expected to occur in scenarios considered complex⁷ where there is the possibility of the occurrence of simultaneous operations of different intensity and nature (conventional military operations, operations against asymmetric enemies and humanitarian operations, for example), and when different actors to those habitually involved in a conventional armed conflict intervene or are present (such as international organisations, NGOs, tribal militias, criminal organisations, media, etc.). Also, the local civilian population will probably have cultural values and standards of living quite different to those of the states that contribute the military force that is employed.

Another challenge is understand and be prepared to conduct expeditionary operations which are associated with sending forces to fight in conflicts far from home bases, as the following definition states, is the projection of military power over extended lines of communications into a distant operational area to accomplish a specific objective (AAP-6).

For a further understanding the key elements for true expeditionary operations involve forces that are self-contained and self-sustaining; they are tailored to the task, portable, highly mobile and (hopefully) decisive (Geoffrey Till, 2009). Another key factor is the inherently joint (multi-service) nature of these operations, and that they are usually limited in scope, with little or no advanced warning or planning, and involving the use of rapidly deployed undertaken at short or very short notice and the projection of force into a foreign setting. Expeditionary operations encompass the entire range of military operations. To undertake these expeditionary operations, it's needed to maintain or develop high readiness, strategic mobility to provide lift and insertion capabilities, an operational level deployable headquarters, modular force packaging, lean and highly capable logistics support and the ability to sustain its force. Expeditionary operations to be successful must mesh limited reaction time, the necessity to deploy additional forces, and political and economic⁸ limitations.

1.1. FACTORS

1.1.1. Complex/uncertain/unpredictable

The Future Operational Environment (FOE) will be characterised by uncertainty, mainly because of the involvement of non-state actors using high levels of violence, which makes the conflict

⁷ According with FINABEL Study (T 37.R) A scenario is considered complex when there is the possibility of the occurrence of simultaneous operations of different intensity and nature (conventional military operations, operations against asymmetric enemies and humanitarian operations, for example), and when different actors to those habitually involved in a conventional armed conflict intervene or are present (such as international organizations, NGO's, tribal militias, criminal organizations, etc.). Also, the local civilian population will probably have cultural values and standards of living quite different to those of the states that constitute the military force.

⁸ The problem is that equipping and developing a force for expeditionary operations is not easy and it is generally very costly. *'there are high barriers and higher standards to get to into the [expeditionary] playing field, and you don't buy a ticket for this contest with mere rhetoric or press releases'* (Lieutenant General John Rhodes)

uncertain and unpredictable. It should also be taken into consideration that this complexity is also due to the wide spectrum of connections between the elements composing it (State and non-State actors in a totally globalized environment).

These actors that do not apply conventional rules and tactics will be nearly impossible to distinguish from the local civilian population, making it difficult to face and to fight against them.

The increased presence of IOs and NGOs in the battle space, the growth of services outsourcing and the appearance of private security companies, are indicators of the increasing complexity of the operational environment.

But also the Information Revolution (IR) is changing the characteristics of conflicts. The progress in information technology will impact every domain and aspect of society, whilst the Internet will provide adversaries with a command and control system, intelligence collection, learning tools, information operations (InfoOps) capabilities and financial supply. In summary, military leaders will have to deal with a complexity that will mainly arise from the omnipresence of the mass media and social media and the multidimensional aspects of future warfare (multi-national, multi-agency, multi-domain and multi-response).

1.1.2. Population

The respect and support from local populations will remain an important issue for future conflicts, in which the decisive battle will probably be for their “hearts and minds” (friendly and opposing forces alike will fight for the support of the people), so the environmental understanding of the Area of Operations will become critical. The analysis and understanding of different groups of the local population, their various attitudes towards our mission and their mostly network-based connections with the adversary is essential. Therefore a continuously improved human terrain analysis / human geography remains an important prerequisite for our operations.

One important possibility to influence the population in future conflicts will remain InfoOps, also of crucial significance is a consistent and coordinated approach with all other actors in the area. Thus, capabilities such as CIMIC and Intelligence Fusion are of utmost importance.

1.1.3. Urbanization and/or physical environment

Urbanization will be one of the most important factors in the FOE. The mass migration of population to urban areas will continue in the future, creating mega-cities that can become unstable if they are not properly governed.

This urbanization will increase the likelihood of urban operations, and will impact land force involvement in full spectrum operational tasks.

Another consequence of urbanization is the risk of the abandoned rural areas being controlled by criminal and terrorist groups.

The physical environment is becoming yet more demanding partly owing to increasing temperatures or climatic variation, but certainly due to urbanization and declining natural resources.

The urban environment will bring the conflicts to areas where the vast majority of inhabitants do not take part in combat actions, challenging the soldiers and small unit leaders, platoon or squad, to take the proper decisions in a way to seek a zero collateral damage posture. In addition, all their decisions and actions will quickly influence the population towards its attitude to our mission.

1.1.4. Joint, multinational and inter-agency environment

Future operations will be joint, multinational and inter-agency, at all levels of command.

The coordination and necessary comprehensive approach among all involved actors will become extremely complex and a key issue for the success of operations.

This large number of involved organizations will provoke the congestion of some parts of the Area of Operations (AOO), such as the entry points of urban areas.

In the context of complexity and uncertainty of the FOE, intelligence will play a crucial role in the development of operations, providing the elements of information required in a comprehensive approach.

Operations in the land environment cannot be conducted in isolation of the others: air, maritime, space and cyber will always have a direct, and sometimes decisive, effect; and they will almost always be key enablers for operations on land. In a maritime nation, the sea will have an effect directly or indirectly in all that is done, especially if anything but the lightest of forces are required to deploy abroad. Air supremacy will provide freedom of manoeuvre and protection for forces on the ground. It will enable land forces to use this dimension for rapidly deployable forces, to use systems, manned, unmanned or both, to strike and to perform reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition tasks, and also benefit tactical forces conducting a large spectrum of operations and missions.

1.1.5. Physical environment

The non-linear characteristic of current and future AOO will require leaders at all echelons of command to be capable of acting independently, basing their decisions on an autonomous evaluation of the operational environment. This fact will increase the importance of the mission command concept, defined as the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution, based upon mission orders, for effective mission accomplishment.

Time, space and strategic compression are increasingly constricting. The speed of communication and change, and increasing physical congestion, are together reducing the freedom to manoeuvre in the land environment, physically and mentally. Margins for error are

reducing. Tactical mistakes have always had the potential of impacts on strategic level, but the chances of that happening nowadays are increasing exponentially.

The traditional physical limits of land operating areas are becoming harder to define and sustain as borders become more porous, instability more regional, and threats more global and interconnected. Areas of responsibility will become increasingly hard to define.

It appears likely that most large land operations will involve multinational coalitions. This has a breadth of implications from headquarters size and structures, through force sizes required to retain credibility and influence, right down to developing the necessary language skills.

Globalisation will link future challenges across large geographic distances and virtual domains, thereby creating a global joint operations area (JOA). Each of the environments will be affected differently, and will be interlinked and porous, with activities in one having effect in others. Our adversaries will attack at seams between the environments or at perceived vulnerabilities such as the civilian element of a comprehensive approach to operations, or will focus on areas that fall outside of the traditional battle space, such as in cyberspace.

1.1.6. Information

Information operations will be an important tool in the current and future operational environment.

ISR will play a crucial role in such a way that the trend will be the conduct of intelligence-driven activities.

The complexity of future adversaries and operating environments will require a new approach to intelligence and information-gathering, and a new approach to understanding all elements of the environment in which land operations will be conducted, including, in particular, the cultural aspects. Only maximizing the hunt for intelligence and creating structures even at lower levels to manage all the available sources can create a superiority that determines a rapid and accurate decision process, allowing the leaders and their staff, if applicable, to run the cycle of tracking the target (people, terrain or event); choose the best means, among all the capacities that you have, to achieve the desired purpose, suppress, neutralize or destroy; monitor the action on target; assess if the effect was obtained; re-attack, if applicable, with the same delivery system or other system more adequate to that situation; exploit the advantage and start a new cycle.

1.1.7. Logistic support

The expeditionary character of current and future operations considers the use of modern land forces which require modular logistics structures in which sustainment is required to support

forces throughout all phases of the operation, and can assume, isolated or mixed, one or more of the next forms⁹:

- *National Support Elements(NSE)*
- *Role Specialist Nation (RSN)*
- *Logistic Lead Nation (LLN)*
- *Third Party Logistic Support Services (TPLSS)*
- *Multinational Integrated Logistic Support Units (MILU – MIMU; MJLC- JLSG)*
- *Mutual Support Arrangements (MSAs)*
- *Host Nation Support (HNS)*
- *Centralized contracting*

The adequacy of logistics is measured by its ability to perform its sustainment function and the distribution of supplies. Sustainability is a measure of the capability to maintain logistics support for all users throughout the theatre for the duration of the operation. An operation cannot be successful unless it is logistically supported and sustained in combat in an adequate, reliable, and timely fashion. A new concept will provoke a mind change from “*supply-based*” to “*distribution-based*” nations, while NATO or EU authorities seek a collective responsibility for logistics support of NATO’s and EU’s multinational operations. This collective responsibility encourages nations to share cooperatively the provision and use of logistics capabilities and resources to support the force effectively and efficiently.¹⁰

Logistic activity in a land environment is more difficult if the layout of the battle space becomes less linear, and lines of supply and communication become more vulnerable accordingly. The enduring realities of demand, dispersal, duration and distance will mean that only land forces of sufficient mass and logistic resilience will thrive.

1.1.8. Media

New technologies and the IR will expand the role of the media in the FOE, as the capacity of dissemination of information will be much greater. Embedded media are a reality nowadays.

This fact will be used by opponents to communicate their messages as wide as possible, in order to influence public opinion in troop contributing countries as well as in the host nation and local region pending on what means are available to them.

Moreover, the presence of the media throughout the AOO, and their influence on public opinion, will require a more detailed planning and accurate execution of the operations, in which the prevention of casualties, both own and opposing, and the prevention of collateral damage, will play a key role.

⁹ AJP-4.9, Modes of Multinational Logistic Support, November 2005

¹⁰ AJP-4(A), Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine, December 2003

1.1.9. Force protection

The public opinion sensibility to own casualties, and its influence on decisions at the highest levels, will continue to have great importance in the development of all force protection¹¹ measures needed to avoid any loss of human lives.

Friendly forces are lucrative targets to undermine their will to continue to carry the fight to the enemy. Enhanced tactical protection is an absolute necessity to conserve and protect Soldiers, operation bases, and equipment.

All leaders must understand how protection applies at the tactical level and to leverage available technologies to enhance it.

1.1.10. Technology

The amorphous and diffuse nature of potential adversaries means that seeking solutions through technological dominance as a substitute for mass may be an unrealistic goal. The ability to revert to low-technology methods, if high-technology solutions fail, will remain essential for land operations.

Conversely, technology must be exploited to retain an asymmetric edge over less developed adversaries wherever possible, but the wide availability of advanced technology, coupled to adversaries' access to funding and lack of procurement constraints, may make the maintenance of a technological edge in the land environment increasingly difficult.

It is unrealistic to hope that modern technological solutions will 'sanitize' conflict in the land environment: a degree of 'collateral damage' will remain an almost inevitable unintended side-effect of kinetic action, regardless of advances in precision technology, particularly if adversaries choose to operate and hide among the population.

Our qualitative technological advantage is being eroded. Cheap technology is widely available and many of our potential adversaries are unconstrained by our procurement methodologies and restrictions. Where we have a technological advantage it should be exploited, but it cannot be relied upon alone to achieve superiority. Furthermore, a technological edge cannot be relied upon to lower force densities: future operations, particularly those 'among the people' are likely to continue to require large numbers of personnel to be 'among the people' effectively.

¹¹ According to AJP – 3.14 Allied Joint Doctrine For Force Protection – *“all measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve the freedom of action and operational effectiveness of a force”*

1.2. THREATS AND RISKS

1.2.1. Regular/Irregular/Hybrid threats

A conflict between states will remain a possibility as part of the FOE, and these states can use conventional or unconventional methods to achieve their goals.

On the other hand, threats caused by armed non state actors will be increased in the future, and will become particularly dangerous when they are hosted or operate in conjunction with these states.

This kind of opponents is not bound by International Law and Geneva Conventions and will use all possible methods, even unconventional and inhumane, to impose their will, so the traditional instruments of power are less effective against them.

These adversaries will avoid direct approach, using all political, military, psychological and informational levers that they can employ, seeking also to disperse amongst the AOO.

Thus, future adversaries will use a blend of conventional, unconventional and irregular methods in an unknown mix, so the multi-threat characteristics of future conflicts will be evident in a variety of societal domains (psychological, political, informational, economic, etc.). They will develop and adapt very quickly and without sufficient notice to deter the aggressor or adequately defend the target of aggression.

We may say that hybrid threats are the most likely security threats that army forces will encounter. A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces and / or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. Those threats may involve nation-state adversaries that employ extended forms of warfare; they may choose to fight mainly in populated areas. They employ alternative forces to coerce, intimidate or diminish our forces and / or non-state actors using operational concepts and capabilities traditionally associated with nation-states.

Although adversaries will come in many guises and vary in scale, they may well exhibit some of the basic characteristics of a fielded force, such as a formed military or paramilitary force, or a command system and a common ethos. Land forces will continue to be required to deal with 'conventional' threats, even from 'hybrid' adversaries. The character of these hybrid adversaries means that military activities in the land environment cannot be easily categorised or separated out as they will probably never take place in isolation: most conflicts will require concurrent or overlapping military activities, sometimes in the same place. The relationship of these activities, combined with complexity and hybrid threats, makes a mosaic, or changing kaleidoscope, a more accurate way of visualising the contemporary operating environment than the more traditional 'spectrum of conflict'.

1.2.2. Failed states and regional instability

Failed states¹² can no longer perform basic functions such as education, security, or governance, usually due to fractious violence or extreme poverty. Within this power vacuum, people fall victim to competing factions and crime.

However, states fail not only because of internal factors. Foreign governments and regional instability can also knowingly destabilize a state by fuelling ethnic warfare or supporting rebel forces, causing it to collapse. In most failed states, government troops battle armed revolts led by one or more rivals. Occasionally, the official authorities in a failed state face two or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrest, different degrees of communal discontent, and an excess of dissent directed at the state and at groups within the state.

Failed states will demand Land forces to make an increased effort on stabilization and increased focus on preventive action, to prevent a humanitarian disaster, oriented towards specific areas, like Africa (Mediterranean, central, western and eastern coast), Middle East or Asia, but being prepared to act anywhere in the world.

1.2.3. Proliferation of weapons – including CBRN

Weapons of mass effect¹³ (lethal and non lethal) will be developed and employed in the future as a method of causing widespread damage, including environmental disasters, economic and financial crisis or catastrophic computer damages, increasing the possibilities of Land Forces support to local authorities.

Several countries that are likely to continue with their nuclear, chemical and biological programmes will provoke regional instability and conflicts with rival countries that will not allow them to reach these capabilities. The global market, the search for profits, put in the hands of criminal and other non-compliant groups the possibility to obtain a large variety of weapons increasing its proliferation without control, growing the black market trade, the dispute for local governance – *the strongest is the ruler* – and consequently challenging the troops to adapt their procedures, techniques and tactics against this phenomenon.

Moreover, the access to these assets by terrorist groups will represent a serious threat to the whole world. This trend, plus the instability generated from weak and failed states may increase the likelihood of interstate conflicts that could threaten or have a significant impact, primarily on local / regional security, but can rapidly be extended to international security.

1.2.4. Climate change/ natural disasters

¹² Global policy forum website

¹³ Weapons of mass effect, or WME, are weapons capable of inflicting grave destructive, psychological and/or economic damage. These include chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, or explosive weapons

The natural phenomenon of climate change will continue to provoke significant variations all around the world. Global warming and temperature and precipitation changes will affect the amount of land that is suitable for living and growing crops, resulting in desertification and semi-arid areas. As a consequence of these changes, it is also expected to raise the sea levels, which will most probably provoke the flooding of coastal areas. This factor can impact the conduct of military operations, even if it is not our primary mission, due to the fact that we must be prepared to divert, within our means and capabilities, some of our assets and troops to support non governance organisations or the local population and the local government itself, while being prepared to conduct other tasks and missions.

1.2.5. Cyber warfare

Cyber warfare is understood as the actions taken by a nation-state or other actors to infiltrate another nation's computers or networks for the purpose of causing damage or disruption. The computer network is evolving so rapidly that there is a mismatch between technical capabilities to conduct operations and the regulations and policies. Recognising cyberspace¹⁴ as a new domain in warfare induces us to consider it just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air, and space.

Now ubiquitous, the rapid technological advances will be used by opponents, both the military and financial motivations, to attack communications and also to influence perception of population and adversaries, taking advantage of cyberspace vulnerabilities.

1.2.6. Uncontrolled use of space

The particular environment provided by Space, with no boundaries and an absolute freedom of movement, can be used by adversaries in addition to or as substitute for other resources (command and control, intelligence...).

1.2.7. Demographic evolution

The different demographic evolution (ethnicity, social, cultural and religious relations) between developed and developing countries could be a cause of instability. Whilst in developing countries youth population will be greater and life expectancy will be reduced, in developed countries the situation will be reversed.

1.3. TYPE OF OPERATIONS

While the characteristics of conflicts will change significantly, some other aspects are going to stay, making it necessary to have units and soldiers able to adapt to the rapid changes of the

¹⁴ Global network of interdependent information technology infrastructures, telecommunications networks and computer processing systems in which communication takes place.

situation. Although advances will make technology of greater importance in future conflicts, the human dimension will still prevail in the FOE.

Other factors that can influence changes to military forces:

- The wide ranging employment and simultaneous tasks for Land Forces;
- Expeditionary commitments (causing robust and expensive logistics);
- The complex environment for the commanders and soldiers;
- Humanitarian and disaster relief;
- Support to civilian authorities including homeland defence.
- Support to security sector reform (SSR)

At operational level, predominant campaign themes¹⁵ are combat, security, peace support operations (PSO) and peacetime military engagement (PME). Within these campaign themes, it is important that land forces are able to conduct a wide range of military activities simultaneously and sequentially and transition quickly from one type of operation to another in rapidly evolving conflicts.

Within each one of these four campaigns, four types of essential military activities are conducted simultaneously, with different degrees of preponderance depending on the type of campaign. These military activities are offensive, defensive, stability and enabling.


Even if we must have Land forces prepared to act in the whole spectrum of conflict, from PME to combat, the most likely campaigns will take place under the umbrella of security and peace support operations, in which stability activities will be predominant within the AOO. However, stability activities will not be carried out completely isolated. Offensive, defensive and enabling activities will take place, even simultaneously, within the AOO.

Consequently, the NATO types of operations that Land forces, at BG/TF level, will most likely conduct are NArt 5 Crisis response operations¹⁶ as illustrated as the following:

¹⁵ AJP-3 (B), Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, March 2011.

¹⁶ NASCRO include multifunctional operations, falling outside the scope of Article 5, which contribute to conflict prevention and resolution or serve humanitarian purposes, and crisis management in the pursuit of declared Alliance objectives. One principal difference between Article 5 operations and NASCRO is that there is no formal obligation for NATO nations to take part in a NASCRO.

NASCRO may be limited in objective, means, area, and time depending on the desired end state; however, NASCRO may include offense, defence, stability, and enabling activities. Depending on the situation, NASCRO may be as demanding and intense as Article 5 operations, in particular during enforcement operations. Non Art5– Crisis response operations, for example, require an international mandate by the UN.



2. MISSIONS AND TASKS

Thus, according to the above mentioned and also within the scope of types of operation conducted nowadays, it becomes clear that Land Forces in the future will have to change their mission sets mainly due to the complexity and persistency of stability operations, including support to restoration of essential services, governance and order.

Land Forces will act in the whole spectrum of conflict, from peacetime military engagement, peace support, security to combat. Land Forces will need to be flexible and structured in order to be able to perform different roles within the same campaign.

All types of land tactical activities can be conducted simultaneously. Although, some may be sequential – such as attack followed by defence. Many occur simultaneously, for example, within a combat campaign theme, a force may be attacking in one area while defending in another and conducting humanitarian assistance in a third. Offensive activities in part of the AOO may be reinforced with stability activities conducted by the lead combat forces or by follow-on forces.

A BG/TF in this environment may be called to operate, sometimes in autonomy within an extended area of operations. Commanders need to have decisional autonomy requiring a series

of specific capabilities normally not only in the range of a traditional combat. Under the wide range of operations, listed below¹⁷ are the ones more likely to be conducted in a COE:

<i>Tactical Activities</i>	Offensive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attack • Raid • Ambush • Exploitation • Pursuit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Break-Out of encircled Forces • Feint • Demonstration • Reconnaissance in Force
	Defensive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Delay
	Stability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security and Control • Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR) • Initial Restoration of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Services and Facilities • Interim Governance Tasks • Military assistance to civil authorities
	Enabling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reconnaissance • Security • Advance to Contact • Meeting Engagement • Link-up • Withdrawal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retirement • Relief of Troops in • Combat • Relief Encircled Forces • March • Obstacle Breaching & Crossing
<i>Tactical Tasks and Effects (Not an Exhaustive List)</i>	Offensive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Destroy • Seize 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secure • Support by Fire
	Defensive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Block • Occupy • Guard 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fix • Retain
	Stability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cordon and Search • Observe/Monitor • Vehicle Check Pt • Framework Patrols 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Humanitarian Aid Delivery • Train Indigenous Security Forces • Crowd and Riot Control
	Enabling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Screen • Guard 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Block • Secure

Tactical activities and tasks more likely to be conducted by BG/TF in Complex Operational Environment

¹⁷ ATP-3.2.1, ALLIED LAND TACTICS, November 09

3. CAPABILITIES

3.1. KEY REQUIREMENTS FOR LAND FORCES DEVELOPMENT

From the changed and changing character of the land operating environment, it is possible to make deductions about the key requirements for the development of a force specifically relevant to the future operational environment.

3.1.1. Technology

Despite a closing of the technology gap there are areas in which it is still possible to maintain an advantage. Wherever it is possible to use technology to retain superiority over less advanced opponents such opportunities must be exploited. Research and development for force development should concentrate on areas where this advantage can be maximised, such as: stealth, protection, precision, lethality, mobility (especially from the air), electronic counter-measures, and ownership of the night.

3.1.2. Homogeneity

Land forces structures derive their agility from homogeneity. The greater the degree of unit specialisation and variation, the lower the force's overall level of versatility. Examples of how homogeneity is achieved are: training based on an adaptive foundation, living doctrine and common standards; maximising the number of skills that are treated as core rather than specialised; robust force structures that do not require augmentation; and equipment with as few variants as possible.

3.1.3. Expeditionary

An expeditionary mindset (go anywhere, at any time, for any task) should underpin individuals' and the collective ethos. This attitude, which requires a purposeful, energetic and assertive institutional culture, must be reinforced by: preparedness to fight; high standards of individual physical and mental robustness; a philosophy of clear, centralised intent and properly-resourced decentralised execution; suitable terms and conditions of service, and the ability to project force strategically and quickly, and then to sustain it. Expeditionary is not the same as 'rapid response': an expeditionary approach should have an element of continuous engagement in order to anticipate and prevent conflict, as well as to understand and to react to it.

3.1.4. Defence of the Homeland

While it makes sense to aspire to deal with threats at a distance, using an expeditionary mindset, defence of the homeland may require large numbers of security forces to be deployed at home.

3.1.5. Education

A thorough working familiarity with professional doctrine, coupled with the need for improvisation in the face of the unexpected, and an increasingly complex environment, all require a new emphasis on education. This is what gives people an edge over their rivals. Forces need to be capable of understanding the character of the conflict in which they find themselves: the general situation, the threats, the sources of power, the likely dynamics, and the consequences of actions. Imagination is also important because it feeds innovation, improvisation and the exploitation of indirect approaches and the unexpected. The force requires people who can think to the finish, able to consider second- and third-order consequences and beyond. All of this requires a culture of education and training, led, and sometimes enforced, from the top of the organisation and penetrating down to the lowest ranks.

3.1.6. Understanding

It will not be enough simply to seek to find methods of gathering more and more information or intelligence. The effective resolution of threats will require a new emphasis on understanding the environments in which they develop, and in which we may be required to operate. This will require, at close proximity and over a prolonged period, exposure to diverse people, places and cultures; and to potential and developing problems and threats. It will require complex relationships to be fostered and developed. This will require a new attitude and approach that will entail continuous service and engagement abroad. The magnitude of change that will be required in terms of: foreign area officer numbers and career paths; deployed training teams; training facilities and locations; and terms and conditions of service, should not be underestimated.

3.1.7. Headquarters Structures

The demands of the future land environment are such that small, mobile formation headquarters are likely to be unable to gather, process and disseminate the level of information and understanding required to generate the mixture of comprehension and agility that is needed to retain the initiative in complex modern conflict. Headquarters will need to be structured and resourced to deal with the demands of modern complexity, the management of the relationships required of a comprehensive and multi-national approach, and the spans of command and control on the ground, while also being able to handle the demands and downward pressure from governments and higher headquarters. Larger, more static, main headquarters will need to be supplemented by more mobile, tactical and deployable elements that will allow commanders to remain engaged closely with the conduct of operations when and where the situation demands.

3.1.8. Partnerships

The military instrument must act as part of a comprehensive response, and not in isolation. Given that we seek to deal with intractable problems at reach, there will be an increasing range of political, legal, moral, financial and burden-sharing imperatives to build teams of like-minded partners; and a need for a willingness to work with unfamiliar partners. This will require a comprehensive approach that will require the integration of all levers of state power, often in partnership with allies. Furthermore, the need for mass and favourable force ratios will often be best achieved by integration with, operation alongside, or the development of, indigenous forces.

3.1.9. The Battle of the Narratives

Greater weight will need to be given to influence, and to winning the battle of the narratives. Messages must be well synchronised and articulated across joint, interagency and multinational seams. We will need to be on a positive front foot, not a refutable back foot, across the full range of our audiences.

3.1.10. Balance of Current and Future Operations

Due to the fact that land forces cannot anticipate the exact character of their next fight, they must be sufficiently robustly structured not only to succeed in current operations, but also to adapt rapidly to the demands of the next fight. The highest priority must always be success in current operations, but equipment and structures, and training and education should always be balanced to meet the demands of both. Contingency capability can be modulated, but not sacrificed, in the face of immediate demands.

3.2. TYPE OF FORCES AND THE OPERATIONAL SPECTRUM

3.2.1. The requirements to operate throughout the entire operational spectrum

Land Forces structures must be versatile and modular, capable of combining a mix of capabilities that have the flexibility to accomplish assigned tasks and be prepared for any contingency. These multifunctional units must be able to conduct complex, network enabled operations autonomously in a Joint, Inter-agency, Multinational (JIM) environment. They will have to harmonize different operational functions reducing the need for specialized augmentation through training. The wide range of tasks and missions will require a balance of capabilities appropriate to the potential risks, and consequent kinetic and non kinetic effects.

3.2.2. The need to establish and maintain command and control over a large battle space will necessitate numerous small formations (Company/Platoon level)

3.2.3. A balance amongst different types of forces will be needed to operate in the future environment.

- Light¹⁸ and environmentally specialised forces (airborne, mountain, amphibious, airmobile, etc.) are characterised by quick response, tactical mobility, fast strategic deployability and operational versatility.
- Medium¹⁹ forces have the best balance of capabilities allowing them to operate across a wide range of missions.
- Given that major combat operations are likely to occur, both in a state on state or asymmetric conflict, Land Forces need to maintain a capability that guarantees strong offensive fighting power and mass manoeuvre (heavy²⁰ forces).

¹⁸ Light forces have significant strategic mobility for they can be transported anywhere by aircraft. They are often optimized and trained for operations in specific environments (mountain, arctic or jungle for example) and close terrain. They may be employed as airmobile forces if allocated sufficient resources, support and training. They, however, lack integral firepower and protection. Some vulnerability may be reduced through dispersion, concealment and fortification. The lack of firepower may be offset somewhat through priority calls for indirect fire, aviation and close air support.

¹⁹ Medium forces are land tactical forces that are mounted in mechanized (tracked) or wheeled vehicles with some mobility and protection. They deploy with protected mobility to deliver battlefield and operational agility. Often they have integral direct fire support as part of their vehicles. They form a critical intermediate step between armoured and light forces. They have less protection and integral firepower than heavy forces but more protection and greater tactical and operational mobility than light forces in all but close terrain. However, they have less strategic mobility than light forces;

²⁰ Heavy forces use automotive power to deploy substantial firepower, protection and battlefield mobility. They can apply concentrated firepower to achieve shock action and manoeuvre rapidly under fire cross-country. They are a key element to operations in open terrain and provide the best protection when working in urban areas. However, they are vulnerable to short range attack and thus require intimate protection in close terrain. Their operational mobility and strategic deployment are limited due to their size and weight. They require significant logistical support.

3.2.4. Evaluation of Mobility, Fire Power and Armour and their role in the Spectrum of Conflict.

	High	Medium	Low
Mobility			
Strategic ²¹	Foot	Wheel	Tracks
Tactical	Track	track /wheel	wheel / foot
Fire Power			
Direct	Capability to kill tanks (35mm +)	Capability to kill APC's (35 mm / .50)	Capability to kill personnel (portable)
Indirect	Artillery	heavy mortars	light mortars
Armour			
Ballistic protection (Armour)	Protection against tanks (heavy armour)	Protection against APC's / small arms (light armour)	No protection (no armour)
Needed units	Infantry Fighting Vehicle Tanks Artillery	Armoured Personnel Carrier(track / wheel) Heavy mortars	Armoured Personnel Carrier (wheel) Trucks Light Mortars

Mobility, Fire Power and Armour and their role in the Spectrum of Conflict

3.3. CAPABILITIES REQUIRED FOR COMBAT FUNCTION

Military operations occur across a spectrum of conflict, as identified before. However it's not expected that a conflict will be at just one point on this spectrum. At any particular time there may be a humanitarian crisis, an insurgency, and intense fighting between armoured forces, and restoration of electricity and water supplies the day after. States of peace, tension, conflict and combat may be local or widespread, as well as temporary or prolonged.

Future conflict is more likely to be characterised by an increased confusing of the distinctions between adversaries and also between their various modes of engagement. This complexity requires a more sophisticated and a nonlinear model, nevertheless facilitates the existence of an understanding of the required core capabilities in accordance with the different campaign themes.

3.3.1. Combat Operations

Combat Operations usually involve conventional force-on-force combat, of varying scale, frequency and intensity, between opposing states' armed forces, and tend to be characterized by a series of battles and major engagements with intense combat activity and high logistic

²¹ Strategic Mobility refers to time and space in relation to the deployment distance; Tactical Mobility refers to time and space in relation to the terrain in the AOO

consumption. This demands the employment of full military capabilities. All manoeuvre and fire capabilities are essential for success during major combat operations.

3.3.2. Security Operations

The transition from combat operations to defeat an opponent, to multi-agency stabilization operations to re-establish security, stability and prosperity underpinned by the rule of law and good governance is a critical period. The mix of actors, and their respective motivations, is also likely to be complex and constantly changing.

Conventional opponents even once vanquished may re-appear or be reinforced by irregular activists.

Typically, the opponents will be irregular forces (insurgency²²) that operate against the armed forces, security agencies, national administration, civilian population and economic assets of established states. Identification of irregular activists is made difficult by the nature of their organization, the complex terrain and population within which they tend to operate, and their diverse character.

The security operations, demands a military contribution which is likely to be the re-establish and maintain sufficient security for the local populace and civilian agencies to enable the stabilization process to advance. This involves preventing or containing violence, and protecting people, key institutions. In addition to providing security (until indigenous forces are capable of containing the residual threats), military forces may be required to support a broad range of other initiatives, such as Security Sector Reform (SSR), building an interim governance and restoration of essential services. For this case, Land Forces are required to have a great variety of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities to fulfil the wide range of missions and tasks characteristic of this campaign. Land Forces key capabilities for this kind of operation are mainly focused on: *InfoOps, Key Leaders Engagement (KLE), gain population confidence; avoid/limit insurgent activities.*

3.3.3. Peace Support Operations

Peace Support operations follow an agreement or cease-fire that may have established a permissive environment.

²² According with AJP-3.4.4 'Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency – *“Insurgency can be considered to be an irregular activity, carried out by an organised group or movement. This specific activity is part of a larger group of irregular activities, that all may be the cause of considerable threats to states and human societies, especially in the less stable regions of the world. Insurgency, however, may be considered to be the most fundamental activity, because of its nature and the character of its causes. It may use all other kinds of irregular activities in order to reach its desired end state.*

AJP-3.4.4 defines the term irregular activity as – *“Behaviour that attempts to effect or prevent change through the illegal use, or threat, of violence, conducted by politically, ideologically or criminally motivated non-regular forces, groups or individuals, as a challenge to authority.”*

When the level of consent and compliance is high and the threat of disruption is low Peacekeeping operations are conducted. The purpose of Peacekeeping operations is to sustain a situation that has already met the steady-state criteria established by international mandate, whilst the use of force is normally limited to self-defence. Typical peacekeeping activities include interposition and protection, the interim management of selected civil administration, and humanitarian assistance. So the Land Forces in Peacekeeping operations must be capable of:

KLE; CRC; carry out non-lethal actions; interact with other national and international agencies deployed in the AOO.


When the level of consent and compliance is uncertain, and the threat of disruption is considered to be high Peace enforcement operations are conducted. For that military forces should be capable of applying credible coercive force, impartially, to apply the provisions of any peace agreement. For that reason, the main capabilities required for Land Forces in these peace enforcement operations are:

Force Protection; dissuade parties in conflict; apply the force in accordance with Rules of Engagement; InfoOps; integrate and manage lethal and non-lethal actions; integrate and manage human, imagery, signal and other sources intelligence.

3.3.4. Peace Military Engagement

The peace military engagement are the operations activities related to shape the peacetime environment, that includes confidence building measures, to encourage local or regional stability. Routine activity, such as bilateral or multinational training and exercises, the provision of advisers and specialist training teams, may reinforce cooperation and promote stability. Military effort may also be required, quite separately, to support disaster relief and evacuation operations, focused on preserving the security of the civilian population. The main capabilities required for Land Forces in PME operations are:

Interoperate with allied Land Forces, local security forces and local authorities; assist population in case of natural disasters; participate in multinational Headquarters; clean areas contaminated by UXOs to protect the force.



Areas for capabilities development

3.3.5. More specific capabilities

Having identified the abroad capabilities that forces must be able to undertake under specific campaign theme, and in line with capability areas Engage, Prepare, Project, Command, Inform, Protect and Sustain as shown before, more specific capabilities will be developed now mainly focused in the needed capabilities per combat function that land forces must have to perform, mainly, under the spectrum of security and peace support operations.

3.3.5.1. Command

<u>Capabilities</u>
• To establish adequate C2 structure (forwarded, mobile, tactical, initial entrance...) with the ability of operating on movement at battalion and lower levels of command.
• To provide command and control of up to 5 manoeuvre sub-units and subordinate CS/CSS.
• To forming the framework of a combined arms battle group as well as detaching sub-units to other framework battle groups.
• To plan, conduct, coordinate and control the ongoing operations.
• To plan future operations (more than 72 hours).
• To operate on movement with Communication and Information Systems (CIS).
• C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence).
• To establish connection with national territory with high capacity of data link.
• To interoperate the CIS with allied Land Forces.
• Capability to obtain and disseminate the information required, if possible in real time.
• Capability to establish communication with other national and international agencies deployed in the AOO.
• To coordinate the use of airspace.
• To share the acknowledgement of situation.
• C2 warfare.
• CIS administration and management.
• Key Leaders Engagement (KLE)
• Local leader Engagement
• To establish relations with population and gain its confidence
• Cultural awareness

3.3.5.2. Information and Intelligence

Capabilities

- To lead, collect, elaborate and disseminate on time accurate information and intelligence to a designated processing/exploitation/fusion centre in order to support decision-making, planning and conducting of operations.
- To interoperate with intelligence systems of allied Land Forces and agencies.
- To implementing and maintaining robust communications networks, providing diverse reach back and intra theatre communication capabilities (secure data, voice communication systems)
- To manage the HUMINT and Counter-Intelligence sources and teams.
- To use UAS and UGS at BG/TF.
- To conduct HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT and OSINT.
- To support the targeting process.
- To control the empty spaces.
- To conduct reconnaissance of the terrain and enemy.

3.3.5.3. Manoeuvre and Fire

Capabilities

- To conduct movement, fire and combat capability across all terrain, especially in urban areas.
- To execute operations in a joint and combined expeditionary environment in cold and extreme hot weather conditions.
- To make two efforts simultaneously, to reiterate one and to have one Reserve Unit.
- To manoeuvre in all types of terrain, or roads.
- To operate without service support or replenishment for at least 3 days
- To execute tasks independently at platoon level.
- To emplace direct fire power to penetrate enemy tanks, APC's, or personnel. (35mm up, between .50 and 35 mm and portable weapons).
- To neutralize enemy units.
- To hold the terrain in defensive operations.
- To conduct crowd riot control (CRC).
- To deterrence in order to avoid/limit insurgent activities.
- To know the tactical position of units in real time.
- To engage isolated objectives from long distances (snipers).
- To manoeuvre using the third dimension.
- To produce non-lethal effects.
- To be prepared to support the special operations within the AOO

- To Route Maintenance to support manoeuvre and combat service support
- To conduct route clearance EOD/ IEDD.

3.3.5.4. Firepower

Capabilities

- To use joint fires.
- To support the movement of manoeuvre and reconnaissance units with fires.
- To conduct target acquisition.
- To neutralize or destroy High Value Targets (HVT) from long distance.
- To fire support units have similar mobility and protection than manoeuvre units.
- To conduct precision fires.
- To terminal guidance of ammunition by fire observers and using UAS.
- To obtain “mass of fire” with only one launcher, using different trajectories (MRSI: Multiple Round Simultaneous Impact).
- To implement C-RAM (counter rockets, artillery and mortars).
- To integrate and manage lethal and non-lethal actions.
- To make fire with GPS guided missiles to beat concrete objectives.
- To provide tactical air control (TACP).
- To carry out non-lethal actions

3.3.5.5. Protection

<u>Capabilities</u>
• To search, neutralize, destroy and to train against IED.
• To ballistic protection (Heavy, medium, light, no armour) against enemy tanks, APCs or small arms
• To ensure camp protection and critical infrastructure.
• To protect forces against CBRN threats.
• To conduct fire fighting.
• To protect permanent and semi-permanent facilities from RAM threat.
• To execute medical assistance
• To implement air defence at sensitive points and forces.
• To clean areas contaminated by UXOs to protect the force
• To support Crowd and Riot Control with non-lethal assets and means
• To counter insider threats (green on blue)
• Capability to employ measures to minimise the vulnerability to a cyber-attack, to maintain the degree of continuity of operation acceptable to the Commander during an attack, and to restore services to full operational capability after an attack.

3.3.5.6. Combat Service Support

<u>Capabilities</u>
• To manage forces sustainment.
• To provide transports inside AOO.
• To control movements inside AOO.
• To know the position of logistic convoys in real time.
• To know the status and situation of logistic resources in real time.
• To contribute towards the Reception and Staging Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) of other units
• To combat support units have similar mobility, communication and protection as manoeuvre units.
• To camp construction and operation
• To support camp and outpost protection
• To establish health care.
• To conduct MEDEVAC ²³ .
• To contract local services of host nation.
• To support, even if limited, the initial reestablishment of basic services.

²³ In GE the expertise and the responsibility for medical issues, especially MEDEVAC, AIRMEDEVAC and STRATAIRMEDEVAC are represented by the *Bundeswehr Joint Medical Service* and not by the *German Army*.

- | |
|--|
| • To assess and repair combat damages. |
| • To evacuate disabled equipment. |
| • To manipulate and transport containers. |
| • To perform mortuary affairs. |

We can summarize that only throughout a combined arms approach concept is it possible to conduct warfare and that weapons and units are more effective when they operate in concert than when they function separately. This approach is not limited to combat operations, but has great utility throughout the tactical actions since the strengths of each arm, whether infantry, armour, aviation, artillery or engineers, can be applied as necessary as the balance of military activities alters throughout an operation.

To combine and increase fighting power these arms are integrated by grouping and re-grouping. For combat operations combined arms groupings should be used to create the most potent combinations of armoured, mechanised, light or air manoeuvre forces together with their associated Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements. Properly resourced and task-organised combined arms groups provide a complementary range of capabilities to overmatch a less well-balanced force.

In any operating environment the composition of these groupings will be shaped by the nature of the threat, the physical environment as well as any specified and likely missions and tasks. Understanding the unique and evolving character of each operation is critical to the selection of appropriate force size, mix and posture.

However, as a general guide, groupings should be designed to be capable of four complementary and concurrent tasks. This is known as the 'Principle of Four' with groupings ideally being able to provide the following:

- A Covering Force. To find, gain understanding and fix.
- A Manoeuvre Force. To strike or influence decisively.
- An Echelon Force. To exploit.
- An Uncommitted Force. To provide a reserve.

The ability and flexibility that permits the grouping of capabilities stems from the homogeneity of Land forces. This is achieved, for example, through training based on an adaptive foundation, maximising the number of skills that are treated as core rather than specialised, adopting robust force structures that do not require augmentation, and fielding equipment with as few variants as possible.

4. ORGANIZATION

The task organization of a BG/TF is mission tailored. This should be a very basic step of the Operation's Planning Process. Once received, the mission and tasks are analysed (thoroughly considering the assigned and implied ones). A list of capability gaps (considering the available forces and their capacities) is drafted at the end of the Mission Analysis to define the required Command structure and Force establishment. In the framework of stability (Post-conflict) operations, in addition to the traditional military capacities, there should be an embedded Stability Support Team (including civilian expert with advisory skills) to assist local authorities in the different issues.

Considering the above listed, below we can find some of the modules that can compose the overall operational puzzle, based on the Infantry Battalion (Light / Motorized / Mechanized) and with a BG/TF Modular click-on & -off system:

Modules (alphabetical order):

	Offense	Defence	Stability	Enabling
Aerial Fire Support (RW/FW-CAS, CCA and Direct Support)	X	X	O	O
Air Defence	X	X	-	O
Air Manoeuvre (air assault, air transport, SAR, Medevac, Recce)	X	X	X	X
Armoured (Light / Medium / Heavy/incl. RECCE)	X	X	X	X
Artillery	X	X	X	O
CBRN	X	X	X	X
C-IED	X	X	X	X
Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) ²⁴	X	X	X	X
CIS	X	X	X	X
Cyber OPS	X	X	O	O
Electronic Warfare (EW)	X	X	-	O

²⁴ CIMIC is one of the Capacities, Tools and Techniques (CTT) of Info Ops. Info Ops in itself is not a capacity, but a coordinating function. Therefore, in the modular overview the Info ops CTTs are separately listed.

	Offense	Defence	Stability	Enabling
MILENG	X	X	X	X
HUMINT	X	X	X	X
Infantry	X	X	X	X
ISTAR (e.g. UAS, RECCE, etc.)	X	X	X	X
Key Leader Engagement (KLE)	-	-	X	O
Logistics	X	X	X	X
Medical (incl. Medevac)	X	X	X	X
Military Police	X	X	X	O
Psychological operations (PsyOps)	X	X	X	X
SOF	X	X	X	X

Modules needed per military activity

Legend:

X - Necessary

O - Likely

- - Not necessary

To a lesser extent, the following non-military modules can support the action of a BG/TF commander as “independent advisors”:

- Department of Economic Affairs (D-EA), i.e. in conjunction with D-FA/DA
- Department of Foreign Affairs / Development Aid; Embassy Staff (D-FA/DA)
- Department of Internal Affairs (D-IA), i.e. governance coach
- Department of Justice (D-J), i.e. judicial coach
- Department of the Prime Minister (D-PM), i.e. StratCom; ‘Grand Narrative’

This basic structure must be substantiated by the requirements evolving from the so-called Level of Ambition for specific missions, strategic goals, level of readiness, scenarios of employability (where, in what activities and type of operations) and ability to rapidly deploy (tactical to strategic).

The pillar of this structure is the infantry, from light to medium, with its specific capabilities. Their structure and organizations must ensure a rapid deployment, an expeditionary status, being continuously prepared to fulfil specific tasks, having in its composition forces that are to sustain defined contingents of different nature and various sizes on operations all over the world from a short-term to prolonged periods. The underlying scenarios are primarily focused in stability and counter insurgency operations, but also maintain the ability to conduct rapid response operations in different intensities.

In addition the major conceptual delineation between the mechanized infantry and the motorized infantry is that the former are employed mounted in and fighting from vehicles, within the framework of heavy battle groups. Mechanised infantry provide direct support to armoured forces using the protection, speed, mobility and fire support that their vehicles provide. The vehicles can be wheeled or tracked, however, they must be able to manoeuvre and fight with armoured forces, and hence will require at least an all-wheel drive capability. Additionally, in order to provide an appropriate degree of fire support, infantry fighting vehicles should be equipped with suitable firepower. Additional machine guns or antitank guided missiles will also likely be mounted directly on the combat vehicle. In other hand motorised infantry are transported in vehicles to their objective, dismount and then conduct operations. The vehicles may be tracked or wheeled (predominantly 4x4), but in response to the increased threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), as seen in current operations, must have a level of force protection at least equivalent to that provided by a mine-resistant protected patrol type vehicle. These vehicles provide increased force protection, mobility and freedom of movement in cases where an IED threat exists. The vehicle is also likely to have limited main armament, heavy machine guns normally. A battalion equipped with such a vehicle will have limitations, particularly in firepower, but possibly also in mobility (off-road) and protection. Although the last delineation is less relevant if we consider that in the foreseen environments the tasks are primarily conducted at platoon and company level under identical conditions, nevertheless, the forces must have a basic and common training independent of the means through which fighting power and the combat functions are applied to achieve the desired effects.

A generic organization is designed on a modular structure with independent operational capability and logistic sustainment to be versatile and capable of performing multifaceted tasks adapted to any environment or level of violence. Various technological, skilled personnel and specialized equipment enhancements in core capabilities suggested in the organization is designed to bridge the performance gaps in the mission areas.

The BG/TF will generally be deployed in one, but being prepared to be dispersed and self sustained in two or more, static operating bases from where it executes mission essential tasks by prophylactic, protracted and robust mobile or proactive static operations in all terrain, weather and any visibility conditions to accomplish the mission, the following is required: Maintaining inherent C2 capability up to section level; direct and indirect fire support capability augmented by mobile platforms up to platoon level; having a credible protected mobility at company level; capability to rapidly mobilize all operational elements with integral transport; state-of-the-art technological enhancements in surveillance, observation, monitoring, tracking and communication means; qualitative, specialized and self sustained logistic support structure; dynamic and responsive potential to carry out outreach and engagement; mission-oriented


structure and systematic capability building; maintaining high state of operational mission readiness including the capability to conduct conventional offensive and defensive operations.

The structure of a BG/TF as a more specific example is depicted in annex A.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The conclusion of the composition of the generic BG/TF flows from the analysis in the chapters before. An assumption has been made of the most likely sort of missions in the most likely environment. The capabilities needed to fulfil that mission is translated to assets. These assets are organised in a structure called Battle group or Task Force. The most likely campaigns will take place under the umbrella of security or peace support operations. Stability activities will be expected to be predominant so in this case we may conclude that have to operate in the Medium Spectrum of conflict. Moreover we must be able to carry out offensive and defensive activities in the high spectrum of conflict. It's a precondition for success, to have the capability to carry out the according activities. The availability of this capacity already has a role as deterrent. It will ensure escalation dominance by its presence and will contribute to keep the spectrum of conflict as low as possible.

The backbone of the BG/TF structure consists of manoeuvre elements. This doesn't deny the importance of others combat functions or specific non-combat capacities, as mentioned. The specific demand for non-combat capacities will also vary more, depending on the specific mission. Including them in a modular arrangement would easily lead to over organisation. As depicted below:



Generic modular arrangement

More details are given in Annex B.

It's recommended to design a force based on manoeuvre companies, light, medium or heavy infantry forces or mixed in order to perform the predicted operations and activities. These forces may be adjustable and suitable with the spectrum of conflict. To maintain escalation dominance in the medium spectrum of violence, main battle tank units and attack helicopters might be an organic part of a generic force.


It's also suggested that these units should be self-sustainable, mobile, sufficiently protected and flexible. This, apart from the question of what specific capabilities are required for a specific task organization to execute a certain mission under the given Intel appreciation of weather, terrain, opponent and other relevant factors of influence. So this arrangement may be augmented with CIMIC, HUMINT, PSYOPS, CBR-N and other enablers.

The BG/TF requirements as a whole are tailored to the mission and are designed to prepare the units for deployment.

ANNEX A: BG/TF structure – example

- Below you find the structure of a BG/TF (as an example) with Combat Service Support Company, Combat Support Company and Manoeuvre Companies which can be light/motorized/mechanized infantry companies with three rifle platoons and one heavy weapons platoon each for light companies, the latter including also some combat service support elements.

In the case of the base structure of the Armoured Infantry (motorized / mechanised) the organization is similar, but in this case, they do not have a support weapons platoon in the regular companies. The idea is that, in the armoured infantry, the dismounted elements always have access to the firepower of their fighting vehicle and do therefore not need additional support weapons. Another aspect to be considered is the need to keep the variety of weapons and equipment manageable with regard to volume, load and training requirements. Specialised teams in the heavy weapons platoon make a contribution to this goal.



- The battalion may consist of a three or more company model each with three or more platoons, one Heavy Weapons Platoon (only for light companies) and one Logistic Support Section, with organic C2, fire power and mobility capabilities. With these platoons, a company (purely or task force organized) is able to undertake continuous and concurrent task-lines optimally to enhance operational reach and visibility in the AOR.

The infantry squads must be integrated with fighting vehicle with enhanced protection against grenade launchers, mines, and IEDs along with higher firepower; thus, it is proposed a 20/30

mm automatic gun and different types of machine guns be mounted as well. It's also required to be competent in employing crowd control techniques; therefore, it should be conveniently trained to carry out those tasks and should be equipped with the appropriate materiel. ~

The increasing engagement in urban warfare, where the civil population is a vulnerable element, demands for ROEs with several constraints and restraints due to the negative effects provoked by civil casualties. Therefore, the BG/TF should be equipped with non-lethal weapons

Recent conflicts have revealed that the employment of units among the population calls for a high degree of decentralization while operating on wide front lines. To that end it is necessary to revise the medical capabilities. It would be advisable to provide the rifle squad with an essential medical aid kit. Likewise, every rifle squad should include a soldier, who must be conveniently trained to give first aid and minor medical treatment.

Based on the mission requirements and envisaged role, companies are responsive, adaptable and flexible and self reliant up to the squad level in all respect. The important elements are:

- The Company HQ

Comprises the Command Post / Company Operations Centre, may have attached PsyOps, CIMIC, HUMINT or other functions as needed. The company CP will be mobile (wheeled or mechanized as per situation). It has the capability to acquire and process tactical information for augmenting situational awareness, conduct independent operations with logistics self sustainment in the AOR and carry out effective outreach and engagement. The enhanced night vision and surveillance capabilities, effective communication systems and a balanced weapon profile of the company, optimizes the performance. The command responsibility will be exercised by the Company Commander. The company second-in-command in addition to assisting the company commander, will also act as focal point / responsible for outreach and engagement, situational awareness, environmental issues, company welfare and knowledge management (data base on best practices and lessons learned (LL)).

- Heavy Weapons Platoon.

The heavy weapons platoon includes one sniper section with reconnaissance, covering and combat support tasks (long and mid range precision rifles are becoming increasingly relevant in these types of environment, also its accessories, such as goniometers or anemometers, which optimize their employment, are needed), one antitank section equipped with guided missiles and one section equipped with automatic grenade launchers. These sections are to complement the platoons capabilities on the one hand and on the other hand enable them to concentrate on

their core tasks especially in those cases where vehicle-mounted weapons are not available or higher precision is required that cannot be delivered by heavy weapons systems.

- Logistic Support Section

Coordinate the operational and logistics support of the company. The Logistics Support Section provides the field kitchen; operation of water plants; provision and stocking of all types of supplies and ordnance stores; management of accommodation, ablutions and laundry; provision, maintenance and repairs of the organic transport and provision of life saving medical cover.

- Platoon

Capable of undertaking robust mobile / on foot / heli-transported operations with organic direct and indirect weapons systems and transport. If mechanized it can act in rapid reaction with protected mobility and firepower, complement motorized / wheeled platoon operations where required, display robust force capability and enhance operational presence and dominance in the company AOR. The infantry platoon is rather flexible as such even without supporting elements. All weapons in the sections may have an effective radius of at least 200 m and deliver precise fire. Under favourable conditions sufficient accuracy shall be provided out to 400 m. Some specifically qualified soldiers in the sections can effectively engage targets out to 600 m with selected weapons and in a favourable environment.

3. Combat Support Company (CSC)

Being specialist in nature, all ranks of the company should be qualified in respective functional specializations. The Combat Support Company is the battalion's combat support slice with Joint Fire Support Teams (JIST) providing close air support elements to provide indirect fire support in the whole spectrum of COE within network-enabled operations. The composition of the Support Company is given below:

- Company HQ

Responsible for providing operational support (with enablers) and logistics cover to the entire Force under self sustainment and coordinates provisioning with higher echelons.

- Mortar Platoon

The platoon is equipped with infantry mortars for providing indirect fire support and illumination cover to the BG/TF. Based on the operational requirements and commanders' appreciation, the mortar platoon may be either centrally kept or deployed in section level at Company Operating Base (COB)(if exists).

- Engineer (up to company)

- The breadth of theaters and areas of operations, the increasing number of threats posed by IED, and the scarce number of engineers available come to suggest an EOR capability should be included in the battalion, though limited. Beside the EOR equipment, two soldiers in every rifle section should be qualified in EOR. This type of training will be cost-effective and will provide an enormous advantage. By doing so, Engineer Units will maintain their responsibilities while providing engineering support to all systems, constitute a combat potential multiplier. It provides and coordinates combat engineering support to all troops with main emphasis on supporting the freedom of manoeuvre. That includes EOD/ IEDD as well as route maintenance and bridging capabilities. In addition, COBs and OPs are to be constructed and operated, e.g. water to be supplied and wastewater to be treated, waste (including hazardous) segregation places set up, electricity (static and generator based, including containment basins) to be provided, maintenance of accommodation and allied infrastructure, emergency mine, IED and UXO clearance to be ensured. Engineers should be prepared to provide engineering assistance to CIMIC/welfare activities as part of outreach and engagement.

If necessary the engineer support must be organized up to company level with an EOD platoon, a construction platoon and at least one engineer and bridging platoon (depending on the amount of infantry companies, threat level and the environmental conditions).

In order to integrate all engineer efforts into the lines of operation an engineer and EOD support cell is to be integrated into the BG/TF HQ.

- Reconnaissance and Surveillance Platoon.
Equipped and trained to provide accurate, timely, and relevant combat information over a large, complex operational environment; this information enables the commander to make rapid, well-informed tactical decisions, gathering information about all threats, both conventional and unconventional, that use asymmetrical tactics, supporting target acquisition for the commander and the effects coordination cell (if it exists) using ground reconnaissance. It may also act with its specially trained reconnaissance sections as a special Quick Reaction Team.
- Antitank Platoon
Provide antitank direct fire against armoured vehicles such as tanks, combat engineering vehicles, infantry combat vehicles and armoured personnel carriers. It can also destroy light skin vehicles, enemy in fortified positions and other specific objectives.
- UAS Section

The increasing intelligence requirements that this type of scenarios demands makes necessary the possession of accurate collection assets to provide precise, updated and timely information. Provide a real-time, responsive, day and night imagery surveillance and reconnaissance capability to support situational awareness (SA), target acquisition, battle damage assessment (BDA), and enhanced battle management capabilities (friendly situation and battlefield visualization). It may be task organized to individual recce (reconnaissance) troops or manoeuvre companies.

- Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) Section

Provide ground surveillance radar to protect the BG/TF against mounted or foot forces. Allow the exercise of command and control in all weather conditions and visibility; guarantee economy of forces due to the ability of surveillance and acquisition targets; increase the efficiency of use of fire support means; act as redundancy with the complement of other ISR means;

4. Combat Service Support [CSS]

This company comprises platoons providing combat service and command support. It is designed to arm, fuel, fix, and move the force. These tasks are generally categorized into logistics support, personnel service support, and health services support.

- Logistics Platoon.

It provides the sustainment and maintenance cover to the battalion and its subordinate units and coordinates provision and stocking of all categories of supplies, general stores, ordnance stores, ammunition and hygiene and sanitation stores. It is also responsible for providing the repair and recovery cover to the battalion (weapon, instruments, signal and engineer equipments, vehicles etc). It also coordinates the maintenance and repairs of all arms and equipment.

- Signal Section.

It is responsible for establishing and maintaining the unit and mission communication and information systems network and will handle the IED mobile jammer and the communications monitor at BG or TF level.

- Transport Platoon

Provides technical assistance, recovery assets and dedicated drivers to support essential services. It also monitors the maintenance and repair of vehicles attached and ensures minimum serviceability standards.

- Medical Platoon

At the BG/TF it is necessary to have an adequate Role 1 or Role 2²⁵ capability.


²⁵ According to AJP - 4.10 (A) Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine, May 2011

In view of recent conflicts, the need was felt to expand the capacity of clinical type Role 2 facilities creating two "sub-roles":

Role 2 Light Manoeuvre (R2LM) conducts triage and advanced resuscitation procedures up to damage control surgery (DCS). It will usually evacuate its post surgical cases to Role 3 (or Role 2E) for stabilization and possible primary surgery (PS) prior to evacuation to Role 4. Role 2 Enhanced (R2E) provides basic secondary care facility built around PS and beds with nursing support. A Role 2E facility is able to stabilize post-surgical cases for evacuation to Role 4 without the need to put them through Role 3 medical treatment facility first.

It provides life saving medical support, ensures medical cover self sufficiency of all elements and coordinates surface and air evacuation of casualties. Within means and capabilities and as the situation dictates it may be required to provide medical assistance to civilian personnel in the AOR as well.

- Based on the mission requirement and operational environments the TF may be configured as a purely Light Infantry Battalion, a Mechanized Infantry Battalion or a Motorized Infantry Battalion. However, in exceptional cases, it can also assume a mixed infantry organization and also embedding a Tank company. The suggested organization for these variants is appended below



The Role 1 medical treatment facility provides first aid, triage, resuscitation and stabilisation. It is an essential element of every national contingent and it must be readily and easily available to all force personnel.

Normally included within the basic Role 1 capabilities are: routine sick call and the management of minor sick and injured personnel for immediate return to duty, as well as casualty collection from the point of wounding and preparation of casualties for evacuation to the rear.

A Role 2 medical facility is an intermediate structure capable of receiving casualties, providing triage and stabilisation for further evacuation, treatment and holding of patients until they can be returned to duty or evacuated.

In addition to Role 1, Role 2 minimum capability includes:

- Re-supply to Role 1; evacuation from Role 1; limited holding capacity; personnel reinforcement to Role 1, patient record maintenance; tracking of evacuated patients; operational stress management.

ANNEX B: Abbreviations and Acronyms

A

- ACC - Air Component Command
- ALO - Air Liaison Officer
- AOO - Area Of Operations
- AOR - Area of Responsibility
- APC - Armour Personnel Carrier
- ATKAVN - Attack Aviation

B

- BDA - Battle Damage Assessment
- BG - Battle Group

C

- C2 - Command and Control
- C4I - Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence
- CAS - Close Air Support
- CBRN - Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
- CCA - Close Combat Attack
- C-IED - Counter Improvised Explosive Device
- CIMIC - Civil and Military Cooperation
- CIS - Communications and Information Systems
- COB - Company Operational Base
- COE - Complex Operational Environment
- C-RAM - Counter Rockets, artillery and Mortars
- CRC - Crowd and Riot Control
- CSC - Combat Support Company
- CTT - Capacities, Tools and Techniques
- CULAD - Cultural Adviser

D

- DCS - Damage Control Surgery
- D-DA - Department of Development Aid
- D-EA - Department of Economic Affairs
- D-FA - Department of Foreign Affairs
- D-IA - Department of Internal Affairs
- D-J - Department of Justice
- D-PM - Department of Prime Minister

E

EOD	- Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EOR	- Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance
EW	- Electronic Warfare
F	
FOE	- Future Operational Environment
FW	- Fixed Wings
G	
GS	- General Support
GSR	- Ground Surveillance Radar
GBAD	- Ground Based Air Defense
H	
HN	- Host Nation
HNS	- Host Nation Support
HQ	- Headquarters
HTT	- Human Terrain Teams
HUMINT	- Human Intelligence
HVT	- High Value Targets
I	
IED	- Improvised Explosive Device
IEDD	- Improvised Explosive Device Disposal
IMINT	- Imagery Intelligence
InfoOps	- Information Operations
IO	- International Organisation
IR	- Information Revolution
ISR	- Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
ISTAR	- Intelligence, surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
J	
JIM	- Joint Inter-Agency Multinational
JIST	- Joint Fires Support Teams
K	
KLE	- Key Leaders Engagement
L	
LEGAD	- Legal Adviser
LL	- Lessons Learned
LLN	- Logistic Lead Nation
LO	- Liaison Officer
LOT	- Liaison Observation Teams

M

- MCC - Maritime Component Command
- Medevac - Medical evacuation
- MILENG - Military Engineering
- MILU - Multinational Integrated Logistic Unit
- MIMU - Multinational Integrated Medical Unit
- MRSI - Multiple Round Simultaneous Impact

N

- NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
- NEO - Non-Combatants Evacuation Operations
- NGO - Non Governmental Organisation
- NSE - National Support Element

O

- OMLT - Observation, Mentoring and Liaison Teams
- OP - Observation Post
- OPSEC - Operations Security
- OSINT - Open Sources Intelligence

P

- PA - Public Affairs
- PAO - Public Affairs Officer
- PI - Public Information
- PME - Peacetime Military Engagement
- POLAD - Political Adviser
- PS - Primary Surgery
- PSO - Peace Support Operations
- PsyOps - Psychological Operations

R

- RCP - Route Clearance Package
- RSN - Role Specialist Nation
- ROE - Rules Of Engagement
- R2E - ROLE 2 Enhanced
- R2LM - ROLE 2 Light Manoeuvre
- RW - Rotary Wings

S

- SA - Situational Awareness
- SAR - Search and Rescue
- SATCOM - Satellite Communication

SIGINT - Signal Intelligence

SOF - Special Operations Force

SSR - Security Sector Reform

StratCom - Strategic Communication

T

TACP - Tactical Air Control Party

TF - Task Force

TPLSS - Third Party Logistic Support Services

U

UAS - Unmanned Aerial System

UGS - Unattended Ground System

UXO - Unexploded Ordnance

W

WIT - Weapons Intelligence Teams