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(Signed Original) Colonel NOËL J.
Head of Finabel
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Promulgation of report Finabel Nr A.23.R

**THE BALANCE OF METHODS OF ACTION, WITHIN THE
CONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS, WHEN FACING AN
INSURGENCY. RECOMMENDATIONS RELEVANT TO FORCE
STRUCTURE AND HQ ORGANISATION.**

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| 1. <u>References</u> : | 2. <u>Other references</u> : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ARMY, UNITED KINGDOM, Army Field Manual, "Counter insurgency operations (Strategic and operational guidelines", 2001, 293 p. - ARMY, SPAIN, DO1-001 Doctrina. Empleo de las Fuerzas Terrestres (2nd Edición). - CDEF, FRANCE, Doctrine d'emploi des forces terrestres en stabilisation, 2006 - CDEF, FRANCE, Gagner la bataille Conduire à la paix, FT01, 2006 - Department of the ARMY, USA, Field Manual-Interim, "Counterinsurgency Operations", Oct 04, 182 p. - EME, PORTUGAL, Regulamento, "O Exército na Guerra Subversiva", 1966. - MADOC, SPAIN, El Conflicto Asimétrico. |
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11. Summary :

After any external intervention Finabel countries forces will provide a supporting relationship to inter-agency nation building activity. While military stability methods of action will be key to maintaining a permissive environment in which other agencies can work, key to achieving this will be the countering of any emergent insurgency quickly and within the construct of inter-agency effort.

After determining the principles to follow in this kind of operation, the study will highlight the key elements Finabel countries forces have to focus in the headquarters and in the structure of the force itself.

12. Abstract : (same classification as the study)

a. Interest / usefulness of the study

All Finabel nations' forces are likely to operate today in theatres where insurgencies are operating. Those are not new threat to our forces but their nature has change and our approach to countering it should be re-examined.

b. Main aspects

Insurgency is an armed political struggle, the goals of which may be diverse but more likely are to imply a political change. It could occur at any time but its appearance is more probable during an asymmetric conflict and when stability operations become the predominant operations within a post-conflict phase.

The causes of insurgencies are multiple from social to economical order, passing through political, religious, racial, etc.

Four types of insurgents could be described: the leadership, the fighters, the cadre and the mass base. Each type acts in a different manner and could be combated in a proper one.

Their methods of action go from psychological actions, influence activities to full combat with some grade of violence as civil disorder, sabotage and terrorism.

c. Main conclusions

To counter these updated threats in a more likely urban environment, Finabel countries forces have to adapt their doctrine taking into account the specificity of the current insurgencies.

All instruments of national power have to be employed in a unified and legal way: Defence working hand in hand with Foreign affairs, Development and all possible agencies in the theatre of operations in a fight for the population, inside and likely outside of the theatre of operations.

The stability operations have to be planned since the very beginning of an intervention and the headquarters must have the capability to execute dual planning and to realise effective liaison with all the actors in the theatre.

d. Main recommendations

CIMIC, as engineer capabilities, reveal in those circumstances its importance, keeping in mind that all actions are to be in favour of the Force. But to act in an adequate manner, Intelligence remains one of the most important parts of the capabilities we need. Human intelligence comes up among all types of intelligence assets. Denying intelligence to the opponent is also a challenge to be raised.

When we have to strike, precision effects have to be reached, as well lethal as less lethal, to minimise collateral damages.

Finally, information remains a centre of gravity, trying to gain the confidence of the local population and to keep the will of our base.

1. INTRODUCTION

A number of Finabel countries have experience in dealing with countering insurgencies over the past sixty years. Much has been written by academics on the subject and doctrine has been developed based on operational experience and enhanced by the benefit of lessons learned. All Finabel nations' forces are likely to operate today in theatres where insurgencies are operating. Some would argue that the nature of insurgency is changing and therefore our approach to countering it should be re-examined.

It is important to realise the developments which now provide the backdrop to operating against insurgents. Understanding the Contemporary Operating Environment is essential when considering counterinsurgency. Available technology has increased the insurgents' ability to plan (internationally while exploiting cyberspace) coordinate and strike internationally. The development of insurgents manipulation of the world's media to magnify the effect of terrorist atrocities provides the military and governments with significant challenges in the information war. The effect of the media on public opinion both within the area of operations and at home has intensified the 'battle for minds' so essential for prosecuting and winning a counter insurgency campaign. People have definitely become the vital ground.

Technology has also had a significant effect on increasing the phenomenon of Globalisation. We now use the term 'Global Insurgency' particularly when describing some radical Islamic organisations. They are able to operate, recruit, draw resources and foster their ideology globally. There is evidence that insurgents groups have formed federations with each other, criminal organisations and rogue states to further their aims. Such threats require individual campaigns to consider threats and counters beyond the territorial confines of those states where forces are operating.

Military doctrine has also developed. The Continuum of Operations model indicates that our forces will be required to conduct offensive, defensive and stability operations concurrently. This method of operating is totally relevant to countering insurgency as while we will conduct precision offensive operations against insurgents, we carry out defensive force protection activities and essentially stability operations vital for winning the support of the civilian populations who otherwise will provide security and resources to the insurgents.

This paper will describe the types of potential insurgency, their strategy and tactics and suggest counter insurgency principles and procedures drawing out key recommendations for HQ structure and those essential elements of operations.

2. INSURGENCY

It is important to have a clear and commonly agreed definition of what an insurgency is. History has shown that there are various types of insurgent who have various methods and operate in differing environments. By having a clear understanding of the motivation, aims and strategies of insurgents it is then possible to consider the methods available to counter them.

2.1. Definition

An Insurgency uses a coordinated set of different actions initially carried out by a core group of people trying to disturb a political and social structure. Their goal is to destroy and replace that structure with other more favourable one to themselves; insurgency actions are carried out in a state with or without external support. The general population may initially be indifferent to, or reject insurgents' purposes.

Insurgency also occurs when a country is occupied by an enemy force and can be considered by the occupying force as a resistance. In this case, their main goal is to liberate their territory; they are usually supported by the rest of the population.

The support of the population is crucial for insurgents to attain their goal. This support is used as an argument to defend their cause as a common one, providing them security and logistic support.

Insurgency is aimed at national authorities, or to occupation authorities. They do not engage security forces in a conventional manner but strike to achieve maximum effect in terms of over reaction and the inappropriate use of force, creating terror and ultimately receiving media coverage. They operate initially in a clandestine manner being shielded by the population who they hope will support the development of the insurgency either voluntarily or by coercion if required. A major problem in countering an insurgency is therefore separating them from the population.

This is the classical approach to insurgency. However, globalisation and the new strategic order have generated a more complex concept of insurgency, which should be considered as a part of asymmetric armed conflicts.

For the purpose of this study, we will define insurgency as :

" A struggle conducted within a state by a group of people potentially supported or helped from the outside against legal or established authorities. "

It is an armed political struggle, the goals of which may be diverse. It is possible that an insurgency can be initiated at any point throughout the spectrum of conflict. However, it's more likely during an asymmetric conflict and when stability operations become the predominant operations within a post-conflict phase.

2.2. Characteristic of an insurgency

While each insurgency is unique, it is helpful to describe some general characteristics or similarities.

2.2.1. Type of insurgency

" Analytical research suggests that there are seven main forms of insurgency which can be used as the basis for further examination "¹.

¹ ARMY, UNITED KINGDOM, Army Field Manual, "Counter insurgency operations (Strategic and operational guidelines)", 2001, 293 p., p. A-1-3

Anarchist

It is the more dangerous form of insurrection because it aims to eliminate all political structures. There are normally no plans to replace any form of government. Nevertheless, it could destabilise a nation very quickly and leave a power vacuum.

Generally it concerns small groups that do not have much impact on the population. While they are not so much influential, they couldn't be underestimated.

Egalitarian

An egalitarian insurgency seeks to impose a new system based on centrally controlled structures and institutions to provide equality in the distribution of all state resources.

Traditionalist

The insurgents seek to displace or overthrow the established system to revert back to national / original values that are rooted in the previous history of the region. Usually, the insurgent group would attempt to establish a system centred on an autocratic rule supported by the army, religious leaders, or the traditional hierarchical system that prevailed in days gone by.

External aid of other groupings of the same type is likely and becomes a very real threat.

Further more the religious bias of an insurgency can affect and influence the views of individuals and these can be used to manipulate more popular support.

Pluralist

The aim is to establish a system in which the values of personal freedom, liberty, moderation and compromise are emphasised.

Many insurgencies may seem to be pluralist in tone, but these invariably mask a more authoritarian intention.

Separatist

The separatists would seek to remove themselves, and the area they live, completely from the control of the remainder of the state. It can be motivated by regional, ethnic, social or religious reasons.

The form of political system that would prevail if they succeed may differ completely from one insurgency to the other.

Reformist

In this case, the insurgents would be fighting for political, economical or social reforms, without altering the overall political status quo.

Preservationist

Here, the insurgents will maintain the political status quo in the nation because of the relative political, social or economic advantages that can be gained from it.

In the past it was quite easy to classify an insurgency, today with the impact of globalisation and advances in information technology, the situation is more complex.

2.2.2. Causes of Insurgency

"The causes of insurgency lie in unfulfilled aspirations and what are perceived as legitimate grievances which may justify rebellion, or in less substantial complaints, which may be manipulated by insurgents who are generally working to a different agenda for their own reasons."²

A series of factors or conditions favourable to an insurgency can be considered :

Of social order

Differences between classes, ethnical groups and religions, the low cultural level, strong social stratification, strong demographic pressure particularly in societies of agrarian economy and existence of minorities could lead to insurgency. As favourable conditions to subversion, we may find breaking of traditional social basis, by influence of other cultures and more progressive ideologies, the high flux of population for urban areas and consequent frustration due to the difficulties of life and lack of jobs and the creation of expectations for better living conditions at short time.

Of political order

We may find as conditioning factors the possible existence of corrupt or incapable governments, absence of competent leaders and managers, lack of concepts of freedom, human rights and democracy, geographical discontinuity, lack of control of rural areas. The problem will become worse if order and law disorders, as well as political strikes and attempts start to occur.

Of economical order

We may find several economical roots as concentration of wealth on a minority, general poverty, insufficient industrialization, currency instability, difficulties of rural population resulting from an unbalanced system or dependence or mortgage on international capital.

Of military order

Factors that may encourage insurgency may include a deficient preparation, lack on equipment, absence of balance and coordination between the Armed Forces and Order Keeping Forces and an intelligence service inoperative.

² ARMY, UNITED KINGDOM, Army Field Manual, "Counter insurgency operations (Strategic and operational guidelines", 2001, 293 p., p. A-1-1

Of psychological order

Important factors may be the absence of a feeling of national union, the support to subversive ideology, the lack of confidence in the government or in the economical-social system. We may add to these factors, nationalism and frustration concerning sense of justice by lack of means of prevention and repression of criminality.

Of religious order

We may point out the proliferation of sects, religions located and affected to certain ethnical groups.

Of racial order

The most important potential cause to point out may be the different development of cultural and economic areas of several racial groups and an unbalanced distribution of wealth concentrated within several ethnic groups. The referred causes and conditions are not, if considered only by themselves, sufficient to start an insurgency. There may be some conditions inherent to the region that may prevent the insurgency or it may happen that even if all conditions to the insurgency are created it will occur. But on the other hand, insurgency may happen even if all conditions in theory do not exist.

2.2.3. Aims

The aims the insurgents pursue may be difficult to identify due to, among other things, the inherent secrecy of an insurgency. Further more, it could change in time because of, for example, a change in leadership or in the political environment. Different insurgencies may exist in a same region but with different aims. They eventually can act together or form a federation but a rivalry between them is not to be excluded.

Nevertheless the most likely aim is to force political change.

However, current insurgents' aims are more complex, and could cause the appearance of various parallel insurgent groups in the same territory, sometimes with different aims. Insurgency within the theatre of operations tries to provoke the insecurity needed to destabilize a political structure, with the aim of getting the local population support. This support comes from fear or from ideological affinity, and it is useful for attaining their political, religious, etc... aims. Occasionally, their aim is not to overthrow the government, but to get some political advantages in the process of stabilization or reconstruction.

2.2.4. Phases

Insurgency may be processed in successive phases, from a simple agitation to violence, from clandestineness to open fight almost with character of conventional operations.

In this evolution we may distinguish five phases, with individual characteristics, but with no well defined boundaries that allow knowing exactly when one ends and another starts.

In what concerns the evolution of an insurgency, the phases to be considered are as follows :

Phase 1 - Preparatory phase

It is a phase of secrecy. The insurgency action is not obvious and, very often, one will only know that it has been initiated after the results are known.

In this phase, insurgency organization initiates its indoctrination of the population, collection of information, making contacts and agitation. These are achieved by infiltrating the society where the insurgency is going to occur.

It is a phase for collecting information destined to the selection of ideas to be diffused as justification for the insurgency and the establishment of a political-administrative organization which later dominate the population of the territory to be subverted.

Phase 2 – Agitation and creation of a subversive environment

This is a phase of clandestineness but no longer of secrecy. The security of insurgent elements is maintained but actions are revealed. In this phase the political-administrative organization is improved and reinforced. Systems of information, organisation and agitation are consolidated and terrorism begins.

Insurgent groups strive to develop a sound information strategy utilising propaganda at all levels and by all means. Such communications target the established authorities and the population of the state in question, as well as international public opinion. An insurgency intends to :

- Increase the agitation of population, raising disorders (strikes, demonstrations, riots);
- Capture the support of elements of the population and create an environment of fear, in order to :
 - * Start creating difficulties to the action of established authorities, trying to provoke a disproportional response and fixing some forces of order.
 - * Progressively obtain a growing support (volunteered and forced) from the population.

Phase 3 – This phase is characterised by the development of terrorism and guerrilla tactics while consolidating the organisation of the insurgency.

In this phase violent actions are intensified. Through the incitement of civil disorder, a repressive reaction by the authorities is hoped for and the functioning of some essential services to collective life is affected. Terrorism reaches the highest level of development when guerrillas, or at least armed groups, start their activity, giving origin to an environment of fear and force counter-insurgency efforts to disperse its forces, loosing freedom of action and being physically and morally weakened and with no credit in population's opinion.

This is the decisive phase, as it is in this phase it is hoped that balance of the population is affected in favour of insurgency. By discrediting the security forces and the established authority in certain areas it may be possible that territorial control can be achieved by the subversive organization.

Phase 4 – Subversive state

This phase is characterized by the creation of bases (areas of the territory where insurgency has superiority over order keeping forces) and by the organization of pseudo-regular forces in these same bases. A rebellion government may be established in one of the controlled areas or abroad, giving rise to the subversive state.

Phase 5 – Final phase

Once the subversive state is consolidated, a group of armed forces is established that may constitute a rebellion army. Supported by the bases created, these forces will try to progressively get the control of the whole territory, the total adhesion of the population and to force the established authority to capitulate.

In the first two phases, the insurgent has great freedom as his preparatory actions might not be recognized by authority or indeed be responded to. The last three phases make part of an insurrectional period which may begin at the same time of violent action characterising the third phase.

Ultimately, time is on the side of the insurgent. Eluding decisive engagement could extend the duration of the conflict. This is also a traditional resource for those adversaries too weak to engage in a decisive combat. Its efficiency is based on the fact that maintaining an army on the battlefield for a long time involves a considerable attrition.

2.3. The insurgent

An insurgent organization could consist of four elements: leadership, fighters, cadre and mass base.³

2.3.1. Leadership

They are the idea people and planners. They may live outside of the insurgency zone, making his apprehension difficult.

2.3.2. Fighters

The fighters do the actual fighting. They exist only to carry out the same functions as the police and armed forces of the state.

Fighters who secure local areas are the local forces. The local forces might use terror initially to intimidate and establish local control and later to enforce the will of the leadership. They can conduct limited conventional actions such as ambushes of government forces and police.

³ Department of the ARMY, USA, Field Manual-Interim, "Counterinsurgency Operations", Oct 04, 182 p., p.1-1

Fighters who link local areas and provide regional security are the regional forces.

Both of these elements normally are tied to specific area of operations (AO). Main forces, in contrast, are the “ heavy ” units of the insurgent movement and may be deployed in any AO. Rather than employing terror (local forces) and guerrilla warfare (the main activity of regional forces), they engage in mobile warfare and positional warfare, both subsumed under the “ conventional warfare ” rubric but in smaller scale because of their limited capacities.

Due to the growing possibility of separate leaders in different regions with various goals, this force-role linkage may not be present. Instead, independent insurgent leaders may carry on military operations, to include terror, independent of other insurgent forces.

2.3.3. Cadre

The cadre contains the political activists and local political leaders of the insurgency. They are referred to as militants since they are actively engaged in struggling to accomplish insurgent goals. The insurgent movement provides guidance and procedures to the cadre, and the cadre use these to assess the grievances in local areas and carry out activities that satisfy those grievances. They then attribute the solutions they have provided to the insurgent movement itself. Deeds are the key to making insurgent slogans meaningful to the population.

Larger societal issues, such as foreign presence, facilitate such action, because these larger issues may be blamed for life’s smaller problems. Insurgents, however, may have no regard for popular dissent or local grievances. The insurgents play by no rules, and they will use fear as a means to intimidate the populace and thereby prevent cooperation with the host nation.

2.3.4. Mass base

The mass base consists of the followers of the insurgent movement that are the population of the state. Mass base members are recruited and indoctrinated by the cadre, who implement instructions and procedures provided by the insurgent leadership. Though they do not actively fight for the insurgency, mass base members provide intelligence and supplies. Mass base members may continue in their normal positions in society, but many will either lead second, clandestine lives for the insurgent movement, or even pursue new, full-time positions within the insurgency. Fighters normally begin as members of the mass base before becoming armed manpower.

2.4. The environment

The environment must not be considered as purely the physical territory where an insurgency may operate. In order to achieve its ends, an insurgency must influence the people and therefore the social dimension is important and in order to fund an insurgency and ultimately replace the administration funding is vital. The insurgent must therefore deal in the social and economic domains and it is within these that an insurgency's centre of gravity might be discovered.

2.4.1. Social

The main characteristic of insurgency is essentially a problem of gaining the support of the mass of a population. The population is where insurgency draws ideological and physical support. No insurgent action will have any probability of success without having first obtained the support, volunteered or forced, conscious or unconscious, of a significant part of the population.

Insurgents try to create a framework of cells inside the population: This framework, with its inherent security, can be considered the main strength of insurgency. Utilising a cellular structure, it tries to control a population through a system of parallel hierarchies.

In organisational terms, such structures have inspired organized crime as it faces similar problems in surviving infiltration by police action. Modern organized crime has developed a decentralized cell-structured organisation with leaders issuing sporadic strategic directives. Independency reduces vulnerability, as security is enhanced. Communications are delivered through intermediaries, which sometimes do not belong to the organization. Occasionally, not even the leadership knows the size of the organization, since independent cells are constantly creating new subordinate cells.

2.4.2. Economic

To fund and conduct their activities, insurgents need resources. They will often obtain material support inside the state to provide the necessary means to live and potentially if required from the outside the means to act in terms of training, weapons and additional funding.

The first supplier, inside the territory, is the population itself. The "donation" can be free or forced. Some "donors" could also be found all over the world through, for example, fundraising by associations.

Organized crime is not only an example to follow but also a source of income. Organized crime has enhanced its expectations with the globalisation phenomenon. Organized crime and asymmetrical enemies are exploiting facilities to move people and money over the world, tax havens, and the easiness to give illegal activities a legal appearance.

Occasionally, the fusion of both groups has provided them with funding in exchange of protection. Drug-trafficking is a profitable funding method for many terrorists, while illegal immigration networks are an excellent procedure for moving and infiltrating militants.

At last providers for the insurgents are the rogue states that can support them not only with funds but also with material that are in short supply.

2.4.3. Physical

Engaging security forces in complex areas where conventional military forces cannot easily operate is the most traditional tactic of insurgent movements. Mountainous, marshy or wooded areas make it difficult for conventional forces to operate. This kind of terrain is advantageous to insurgents who know the ground which facilitates concealment and harassment, while security forces find the logistic support of its forces a major problem.

Before having the capability to establish bases, insurgencies will have to use refuges, installed in a complex or hard to be detected terrain (forests, mountains and urban areas that contribute to the protection of the own force). In the bases and refuges, elements of insurgency try to escape to counter-insurgency actions, achieving safety by means of secrecy, geographical location and politic security (establishing them outside the aimed State). When detected, bases and refuges are abandoned or defended, which is only possible in advanced phases and with the availability of significant military power.

However, some of the aspects of insurgency warfare have changed. Traditional rural organisations utilising the sanctuary of mountains and jungle areas have shifted to the ever increasing urban areas. This is due to the increase of urban population, and to the improvements in the intelligence and attack systems employed by conventional armies, which makes rural insurgency's survival more difficult. Further more, detecting an insurgent among the urban population is finally harder.

As scenarios have changed, procedures have also changed. Terrorism and mobilisation of crowds became essential strategic procedures. Liberated areas have passed from being located in hidden places or even in a bordering country, to be placed in the quarters of the city where the insurgency receives support from the population. Occasionally, as defence in urban areas is quite easy, insurgents accept to maintain a prolonged engagement with regular forces. They also exploit civil casualties - unavoidable in urban area combats – provoked by enemy actions to undermine their actions through information campaigns.

2.5. Methods of action

Actions taken during an insurgency process are aimed at attracting and manipulating population. Other actions are carried out to overthrow the government or, at least, to get some political benefit.

Both types of action are closely linked and even overlapping. Several forms of action and their characteristics are explained below. However, it should be taken into account that these forms of action may vary depending on insurgents' situation and goals.

2.5.1. Psychological Actions

These actions are a systematic process of communicating ideas and feelings, inducing the population to adopt specific attitudes, creating needs and motives, and influencing specific audiences to achieve insurgents' goals. The aims of psychological actions are :

- Attracting population's attention, separating them from established Political Power ;
- Demoralising the State Political and Defence components, paralysing their action, and destroying the legal system ;
- Enhancing insurgents' combat capabilities ;
- Obtaining external or national organisations' support, or at least, inhibiting their action ;
- Influencing the public opinion of those Finabel countries operating in the area.

If their psychological strategy is efficient, military efforts may lose their efficiency, as it occurred in Vietnam. However, for their psychological campaign to work, the effects of insurgent actions must be real and visible, in form of terrorist actions, military operations or mobilization of the population.

2.5.2. Influence activities

Initially, information operations focused on the attack and defence of command and control systems by attacking and defending information and related systems. Over time, it focused more and more on affecting the will, understanding and ultimately behaviour of a target and go well beyond simple attack and defence of information. Actually, insurgents carry out more influence activities than information operations. Nowadays, we can affirm that basically any insurgent strategy is aimed at influencing public opinion in the state and worldwide.

Popular support is gained by launching an idea that transmits the purpose of insurgency. Information agents infiltrated among the population search the causes of their dissatisfaction, as well as racial or political antagonisms. Once determined, it is duly adapted to the purpose in mind and diffused by all possible means with an intensive propaganda.

An insurgency has an advantage in this 'battle for minds' as they defend nothing but promise all. This approach seeks to gain support an insurgency voluntarily but naturally other means may be used for the same goal. In such a case violent actions perpetrated against the population undertaken by agitators, terrorists, armed gangs, guerrilla or pseudo-regular force seek to coerce the population while reducing their confidence in the security forces. While conducting acts of terrorism the insurgent will attempt to magnify the effect by utilising the media – the propaganda of the deed.

2.5.3. Infiltration

The object of this action is to destroy from inside the moral principles on which the established Power is based or to destroy the population supporting them. This action is generally aimed at Armed Forces and Security and Police Corps, as well as at the legal system, the agencies controlling the mass media, syndicates, work organisations, etc...

Furthermore, having its own people in an organization permits the collection of information helping the planning of actions. Insurgents will surely try to infiltrate the key elements of the State.

2.5.4. Population's Political Organisation

The aim is to lead to the establishment and development of a national movement supported by the population.

2.5.5. Civil Disorder

Those actions can be apparently unlinked to the insurgent movement. However, they are provoked in order to achieve the following goals :

- Increasing tension among population ;
- Spreading social unrest ;
- Putting repressive forces to the test ;
- Discrediting the established Power.

2.5.6. Terrorism

Violent acts are used to subjugate the population using fear as a weapon, to neutralize legitimate authorities' influence over the population, and to cause the stoppage and gradual weakening of government responses.

This is one of the most important forms of action, and it is employed to obtain population's ultimate support. Its aim is to create a climate of tension and collective fear among the population –avoiding any engagement– spreading a feeling of dejection, demoralization and helplessness.

The terrorist needs the dissemination of its actions, and a worldwide dissemination has not been possible until the presence of the mass media has generalised among population. Terrorism is a dangerous threat for advanced and stable countries, as Finabel countries. Regarding this point, terrorist goals have developed to obtain a maximum dissemination of their actions. Terrorists are acting at the psychological rather than at the physical level using terror against the population and trying to force a political decision.

2.5.7. Sabotage

Sabotage is deliberately aimed at stopping those activities supporting the legitimate power. Two type of sabotage can be described :

- Active Sabotage : Individual or collective, destructive and risky activities, which may involve the handling of dangerous assets or direct engagement with security forces.
- Passive Sabotage : A form of sabotage developed by individuals neglecting their professional duties.

2.5.8. Political Activities

Political activities are actions carried out by insurgents with the aim to obtain third parties, international organisations, and NGOs' support. This support will be used as an instrument to put pressure on the established Power of the country.

2.5.9. Combat procedures of Guerrilla Warfare

Among others, those forms of action are ambushes, destruction and obstruction, harassment, coup de main, etc... It is quite usual to use snipers and IEDs.

2.5.10. Conventional Combat

This form of action is employed when insurgent forces feel strong enough to reduce asymmetry and execute conventional combat actions.

3. PRINCIPLES FOR FINABEL COUNTRIES

Trying to counter a military weak insurgency through an exclusively military action can be counter-productive, truly decisive military actions will not occur. Insurgency has to be fought through a strategy where all instruments of national power have to be used. The strategy of counter-insurgency will have to be total just like the strategy of insurgency. Considering the indirect character of insurgency, naturally the strategy of counter-insurgency will have to be indirect too, making use of the military and non military means in a coordinated and combined way. This doesn't mean that a direct military action is not necessary. In fact, this action is indispensable to create the security conditions that permit to accomplish the remaining actions, also essential.

Counter-insurgency cannot be limited to a certain State. This fact grants it a character at the same time internal and external.

The long struggle that insurgency tries to develop will eventually give origin to a certain moral waste. A determined long-term will is therefore necessary.

The principles considered for conducting a counter insurgency are as follows :

3.1. Fighting for the population

The armed forces engaged in a theatre of operations could be confronted to different type of actions in the same place: employing the force, sustaining the population or the public services... (Concept of " 3-block warfare " or " continuum of operations "). The multiplicity of actions and tasks is the consequence. A unit has thus to use all possible options it can deploy to solve the problems it is confronted with and not only the lethal ones. Here, it has to fight against terrorists and, at the same time but a street further, it has to contain a crowd or to distribute humanitarian aid.

Furthermore, the today adversary, against who we fight, could be the tomorrow partner we have to associate for the resolution of the conflict. In the village where we are combating now, we will soon have to develop all the necessary means for the local population to live: rebuild the local market, reorganize the school... The versatile population is ready to change her mind on a sign, an image or an act. The " terrain diplomacy " and the military action are conjugated and show the two faces of the same soldier.

The fight against insurgency is a fight for the population and never a fight against the population. Insurgency cannot succeed without the support of the population. Even when the population supports insurgents, they should not become Military Forces' enemy. To prevent this from happening it is essential to launch a hearts and minds campaign to gain popular support.

If the ideology championed by insurgency are well selected and correspond to the truth, they tend to demonstrate that the established authorities and their order keeping forces develop certain attitudes and measures on the population that are contrary to justice, moral, individual freedom and human rights. If the authorities, in order to repress insurgency, arrest, wound or kill the elements of the population that rebel, they are proving that the ideas supplied by insurgency are true and fair.

Considering purely military activities, military forces should not be employed only against the true opponent, that is, to destroy terrorists, armed gangs, guerrilla and pseudo-regular forces, but also to protect the population and institutions. They have also to cooperate in the struggle in other fields, ensuring to the population health care, justice, instruction and other elements that may contribute to welfare and morale and granting the functioning of certain main services.

3.2. Unity of action

We've just seen that counter-insurgency can not be limited to military measures. On the contrary, the military forces represent only a small part of the means to be employed in this struggle. There are other measures of political, social, economical, psychological, cultural, diplomatic, etc order. All of them subordinated to the first principle.

Related to the military actions, another key point is the Unity of Command, especially in a multinational environment or when military and police forces work together.

3.3. Global approach

We couldn't limit our view of the situation to the area of responsibility. It is necessary to develop actions also outside the territory, through diplomacy, psychological action, economic sanctions, etc and also through some special elements that may neutralize certain organisations or individuals, with the purpose of decreasing the activity of insurgency.

The study of the situation must identify the true origins of insurgency and of all those participating. When limiting the study to the territory in question, there is the risk of deducing the capabilities of the opponent as being inferior of the real ones and also of adopting modalities of action which effects may not be sufficient.

In the struggle to be conducted inside a certain territory, political and military measures destined to prevent or at least to disturb the support that the subversive elements may receive from the outside is of main importance.

3.4. Predominance of intelligence

In all phases of an insurgency and even more in the two first phases, intelligence has to be the main effort.

Because of the secrecy and clandestineness of insurgencies, we have to invest in all kind of intelligence assets. The well-spread use of communications means (cell phones, internet ...) forces us to maintain a high level of technology for our EW materiel.

We have to "fight" the information before the insurgent can actually act. Also for intelligence matter, there must exist a unity of effort between all the participants (multinational and interagency).

3.5. Seeking information superiority

We have to achieve information superiority to influence the enemy's perception of the situation and his decisions process, and to protect our own support.

3.6. Situational awareness

It is essential in combating an insurgency that a detailed knowledge of human factor (i.e. races, languages, religions, density, distribution, social organization, habits, and life conditions) be established. The study of these factors will determine the shape of a counter insurgency campaign, shaping the activities which will best achieve support from the population and influence the information strategy.

Each soldier must be aware of all the cultural aspects of the region and the people who live there.

Training institutions must emphasise cultural drivers during all pre-deployment and continuation training. Cultural and situational awareness are vital in prosecuting effective stability operations. In this context it is recognised that the linguistic capabilities of armed forces needs to be enhanced, because our soldiers will regularly be participating in operations where good relations and understanding of the locals are necessary. The training itself should focus on harnessing the language skills and cultural awareness for the most likely deployment.

3.7. Legal framework

All the operations of Finabel forces have to be executed in a legal framework. Not only the national and international laws have to be observed but also the host nation one.

In case of contradiction and for stability operations under chapter VI of the UN Charter, an accord has to be reached before any movement in the theatre of operations.

We have to seek for unified rules of engagement to simplify the task of the local commander and permit him to use all the forces he has to respond to the threat he meets.


4. CONSEQUENCES

Following an intervention when major combat has predominated operations, an organised and trained follow-on force ready to seize the initiative even before the total cessation of hostilities is required. The stability component must become integral to strategic planning from the start: delays during the interregnum between combat and post combat can have disastrous consequences.

The strategic aim of a counter-insurgency campaign is likely to be, following major combat, to establish a regime which contributes to regional stability by providing a state infrastructure which maintains the accepted instruments of power, while providing security to its population without threatening neighbours thus allowing development to occur.

Any requested intervention should always be carefully considered as any operations would be seen as being in support of the existing regime. If the ruling administration is flawed in any way, the battle for the population will be difficult without corrective action being taken by the existing regime, supported by the Finabel involved countries.

Assuming that the political situation is sound then the coordinated counter insurgency campaign should seek to destroy or neutralise the insurgents by operating against the following groupings :



Collection of intelligence is decisive for the success of the counter-insurgency struggle. In fact, lack of contact with the opponent grants great difficulty and complexity to the collection of intelligence. This collection is generally made direct from the population. HUMINT has therefore a very important role. It must be permanent and cover all aspects and area of activity of insurgency.

Equally important are counter-insurgency actions which are destined to deny intelligence to insurgency. They should cover all sectors of interest to insurgency, not being exclusively limited to the military area; to avoid that the leaders of counter-insurgency supply information; to try to prevent the infiltration of adverse elements in the counter-insurgent organization.

Active risk management should achieve an acceptable degree of force protection for the Finabel forces involved in the counter-insurgency operation. Good situational awareness and a constant evaluation of our own vulnerabilities are essential elements in this process. While InfoOps⁴ and CIMIC are aimed to the mass base, all types of offensive actions are executed against as well the leadership as the cadre and fighters. One of the aims of these actions is to break the support the population could give to the insurgency.

To reach the leadership, cadres and fighters that are hidden in the population, it is necessary to utilise non lethal capabilities and precision fires. A more likely urban environment obliges the Force to own special assets capable to operate there.

The leadership could be outside the theatre of operations, impeding the Force to reach him in a legal framework. In this case, international cooperation has to be sought with the nation where the leadership resides. A close cooperation with the foreign affairs and international organisations is necessary.

Some targeting may be time sensitive. Not only the link sensor-to-shooter has to be short to impede any violent act but also the readiness status of the force that permits to react on an insurgent action or to execute pre-emptive operations against a very mobile insurgent.

⁴ InfoOps includes PsyOps.

Therefore the current Finabel forces have to evolve. They have to adapt to the new context of counter-insurgency. The next table gives an overview of the evolution we need :

| | Present capabilities | Future Requirements |
|-------------|---|--|
| The network | Network-centric warfare : sensor to shooter | Interagency, sharing information to achieve unified action |
| Jointness | Service interdependence in combat | Military and interagency jointness to streamline and co-ordinate government action. |
| Information | Conventional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance : sensors, drones, SIGINT, signatures. | HUMINT, social-network analysis, cultural awareness. |
| Precision | Surgical strikes with precision-guided munitions, smart weapons. | Achieve a precise psychological effect through the channelling of non-military and/or military assets as appropriate. |
| Speed | Maximise battlefield speed, preempt and disrupt enemy decision-making cycle. | Control tempo, ability to accelerate and decelerate as appropriate. |
| Technology | Boost lethality “ dominant manoeuvre ”, “ precision engagement ” and “ fulldimension protection ” | Boost human skills (language), non-lethal weapons, biometrics, communications interoperability, counter typical threats (such as snipers, improvised explosive devices). |

4.1. Headquarters

A proper Command and Control capability is the first element to achieve, given the particular features of this kind of conflict. Since the presence of civil components is highly relevant, communications should be robust, in order to get a safe data transmission.

An analytical intelligence cell integrating all the specialists of the different type of intelligence assets present in the AOR should exist in the HQ. The aim of this cell is to give the commander an up to date assessment of the situation and the opportunities he could have. In G-2, the presence of experts in insurgency is especially relevant.

Public information is responsibility of the commander. Usually commanders delegate the authority to develop this responsibility on their Public Information Officers (PIO), that is why there should exist an officer at the Major Staff level of a force to deal with the subversive war phenomenon.

Beside the classical HQ, some cells have to be incremented because of their importance in counter-insurgency. Special assessment organizations (political, cultural, legal, police, religious, etc.) are specially relevant, due to the incidence of “non-military” situations in this kind of conflicts.

Some cultural and language specialists, commanded by a Finabel officer who knows the host nation culture and language, must be integrated.

A Counter-intelligence Cell is in charge of operations security, and of controlling of interpreters and civil personnel engaged by local contract. These personnel should be strictly watched.

In addition to the liaison with other components of the military force, the liaison with the host nation, all the others agencies, IO's and NGO's presents in the AOR must be effective. Some liaison officer functions, as exclusive function, have to be created in the HQ.

Finally, the capability to integrate different actions into the planning process is a necessity. Some have to focus on the combat tasks while others manage the reconstruction.

4.2. Force structure

For the Force structure, we have to focus on the special requirements that exist for counter-insurgency campaign. While manoeuvre units remain the core of a force, ISTAR, EW, INFO OP and CIMIC capabilities have to be more present in the terrain.

4.2.1. Intelligence and electronic warfare (EW)

A main characteristic of the current insurgency is its decentralised operative structure and their simultaneous actions in different scenarios under a centralised strategic direction due to the globalisation phenomenon. For this reason, the today intelligence services in all levels have to act in more aspects and collect information in many scenarios and this decentralisation scatter geographically their efforts more than in the past.

ISTAR capabilities are essential in a context of counter-insurgency. There is the need to establish a hybrid intelligence structure (military and non-military means) with the aim of breaking the subversive elements. This demands an intelligence structure mainly based on human resources (Human Intelligence – HUMINT), as the main source of intelligence. Obviously, other intelligence sources should not be forsaken, in particular the open sources (Open Source Intelligence – OSINT), which is gathered through the available general public means such as TV, radio, internet, newspapers, etc. (means used by insurgency to promote their activities).

The Intelligence Unit will be fitted with signal intelligence assets composed of Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) with unmanned air vehicles (UAV,s).

ELINT and COMINT assets supplied by the Electronic Warfare Unit may also play a relevant role. The Control of Electromagnetic spectrum is especially important to complete the mission. The variety and type of communication systems (civil and military) employed by the insurgent make electronic warfare different. All the necessary means must exist in the EW unit to deal with the communication systems present in the AOR.

Intelligence, security and electronic warfare requirements will be different from those in conventional operations, due to the adversary's specific characteristics. The Force will have an Intelligence Unit able to integrate the information gathered from the different collection resources, turning it into intelligence. An integration and Dissemination Centre will be established for this function.

In what concerns EW capabilities, there should exist EW units with ESM means, but also with ECM. In each echelon where this means are available, there should exist a EW coordination cell (EWCC), which is the element that the commander has to coordinate all the EW resources available to him.

4.2.2. Information operations

INFO OP are another important aspect, since they are crucial in counter-insurgency. These operations should be coordinated at political, diplomatic, and military level before military operation takes place, especially when dealing with military operations developed by Finabel armies under an international order.

All Finabel actions are to be co-ordinated under an overarching information strategy.

Regarding public information operations, it is important that these actions are timely and anticipate to adversary's information. Normally, the enemy tries to deny our information and, they specially try to manipulate the target audience. Occasionally the problem lies on the fact that, different HQs are excessively coordinated, and the need of political approval slows down the process, causing the lost of initiative.

The Mass Media should be taken seriously into account, since any news is broadcasted to a global audience. Proper public information planning for every operation should be developed. Public opinion support may be crucial for certain operations.

Continuous psychological campaigns trying to create a legal and rightful climate should be developed.

Obviously, in the INFO OPS, the capabilities that the force should have are :

PSYOPS

This is a way to carry out one of the INFO OP activities that is to influence the perceptions, attitude and behaviour of groups of individuals selected or Target Audiences. All of this in accordance with the objectives set to the INFO OP and in the scope of the subversive war. In order to be effective, PSYOPS need to have resources in what concerns human resources (translators, experts in various social communication means, etc.), several means of printing, of radio and TV broadcasting as well as other visual, audio and audiovisual means, for their messages and ideas (persuasion line) may be presented through newspapers and magazines, flyers, posters, leaflets, radio and television, communication face-to-face, Internet, FAX, pagers and cell phones. For that reason there should be at the tactical level Tactical PSYOPS Teams (TPT) to disseminate the PSYOPS products, face-to-face communication; PSYOPS Support Elements (PSE) at the various echelons that coordinate the activities of the TPT and have some capability to develop, test and produce PSYOPS products as well as support their command in the PSYOPS planning; and of course a fairly good capability at the national level to produce PSYOPS products, Target Audiences analysis, develop theatre studies, PSYOPS theatre planning, etc.

Public Information

By public information it must be understood all the contents published or disseminated with the primary objective of keeping the public informed and gain their support. Public information mission is to keep informed the nations' public information of the military forces, and the military and the civil population in general, as well as establish conditions that lead to confidence in the military force. It includes information at the tactical and operational level and encompasses :

- External information: it is the information, in all its forms, directed to the media (the international community is important in the support to the effort of subversion and the opposite is also true) ;
- Internal information: it is the information directed to the military forces (moral and motivation maintenance in our troops is highly important in the subversive war scope) ;
- Information to the relatives and military forces people that need some kind of special attention.

4.2.3. CIMIC

One of the main resources for facilitating non-lethal effects is CIMIC action. The relevance of supporting the civil population makes this cooperation a priority.

Civil-Military Cooperation activities can be divided into three groups :

- Civil support to the force. Activities developed to facilitate the maximum cooperation with civil authorities, organisations and civilians in order to support the force and mission. These activities include those allowing Host Nation support.
- Civil-Military Liaison. Activities developed to establish a good relationship between military units and the civil population in the zone –which may affect the development of operations. They are aimed at reinforcing mission’s legitimacy, ensuring efficient communications.
- Supporting Civil Environment. Actions developed to support Civil Authorities/Agencies’ activities, or to provide humanitarian aid needed by the civil population.

The CIMIC unit may include a CIMIC Coordination Centre, Government Support Teams and Tactical Support Teams.

CIMIC activities include several forms of action different from those in conventional conflicts. Among them, the most important activity is military structure’s contribution to the establishment of a local government. This is generally related to the “ nation building ” process. In this process, the international community may establish a temporary administration replacing former government.

During this process, the commander may have a political key role, since he will take on the task of local government in his Area of Action. These responsibilities will depend on the type of government established, on the course of events and the degree of autonomy of the new civil authority.

In these cases, the CIMIC Unit will include a structure supporting civil authorities through a set of liaison teams with the new territorial government (Government Support Teams) in the Area of Responsibility.

4.2.4. Crowd Control

Apart from their capacity for governing a territory, a force should receive a complete training on crowd control. Public order should be an important part of the training received by these units, since they will have to face civilians manipulated by agitators.

Crowd Control will be carried out, if possible by the local police, but Military Police and Combat Units will be able to support this task. Some specific rules of engagement and proper riot equipment (including non-lethal weapons) are required. A reserve should be ready to employ military forces with lethal assets if required.

4.2.5. Fire support/Air Defence

If indirect fire support is used during a counter-insurgency operation, its targeting must be carefully considered and delivery made as precise as possible in order to avoid collateral damage.

Helicopters will be frequently used in fire support missions. They will gain special importance, since they are very appropriate for countering insurgent actions. Rapidity, versatility, and combat power are features that make helicopters a responsive asset in any scenario in this kind of conflict. For this reason, it is important to be provided with an Attack Helicopter Unit.

Conventional air threats in this kind of conflict are not expected. However, the opponent may use light aircrafts, microlight aircrafts and other aircrafts in reconnaissance, transport and even attack missions – employing suicide pilots. Consequently, an Air Defence Unit should have capacity to establish a proper passive and active measure system against this kind of threats.

4.2.6. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)

The acquisition of information is essential in counter-insurgency. We saw that HUMINT has an important role to play. UAVs permit to survey permanently a large area for a relative low cost and then help to better aim the HUMINT effort.

UAVs could also be a mean in the strike against IEDs, detecting significant changes where IEDs could be placed or following suspects. The comparison of images taken at different time is not yet ready for the detection of IEDs but we can expect progress in the following years.

UAVs are directly linked to the targeting process and will assist in the tracking of targets (including time sensitive targets) and the accurate direction of precision guided munitions to avoid unnecessary collateral damage.

Furthermore, "teaming UAVs with manned systems provides enhanced operational fire and manoeuvre and extended intelligence capabilities for the commander. This Manned Unmanned Manned (MUM) team provides force protection, information, and clinical lethality to the manoeuvre force. It can operate at extended ranges and has the tempo and flexibility to rapidly adjust to changing conditions. Previous studies have shown that interconnected systems, rather than individual systems, can achieve better operational effect through greater synergy"⁵.

4.2.7. Engineer

Given the characteristics of this kind of conflict, the force should be provided with considerable Engineer Unit capabilities, as main executors of mobility, counter-mobility and protection combat functions. An Engineer Directorate should assess the Commander on the employment of these assets.

⁵ Finabel KILO, Draft Study K.28.R

A Machine Unit ensuring LOCs maintenance and urban combat support where required is also necessary. An Encamping Unit will be in charge of existing infrastructures operating and management. A critical infrastructure Task Unit will be established to prepare local facilities, as magazines, power stations, pipelines, sanitary fitting networks, etc.,...

An Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit able to neutralize any kind of mines and explosives should be also provided, given the tactics employed by insurgents.

4.2.8. Special operations

Special Operation Units are also needed to develop direct action, special reconnaissance and other missions requiring non-conventional combat procedures.

4.2.9. Security Sector Reform

Security Sector Reform is considered as a key component of Stability Operations. All efforts should be made to utilise indigenous security forces from the outset of operations. Their effective employment may require some capability building (numbers, training) prior to operational deployment. The transfer of operational control must be carefully managed to ensure that indigenous forces have the required capability and public trust. Counter insurgency operations require large numbers and culturally aware efficient indigenous forces will enhance efforts and develop public trust in indigenous forces, thus removing a dependency on Finabel forces.

4.2.10. Force protection

Force protection must be carefully considered and is likely to be the main aim of defensive activity. Because of our own public opinion, losses in Finabel troops can impact on the mission as well on the way to operate itself. Force protection could be extended to all the agencies present in the theatre of operations, including NGO's. Waiting for local trained troops for his protection, the Finabel force could also participate to the protection of the established government.

4.3. Other

From a military point of view, the identification of worthwhile objectives is quite difficult – especially when insurgent activities are limited to terrorist attacks and propaganda actions. In these circumstances, responsibility falls to the police and intelligence services. The problem arises when there is not an efficient local police, because it is corrupt or disintegrated. This situation would force military forces to act as a police service or to deploy specialised military-police units.

Even when insurgency is at an advanced phase, it is usually difficult to decisively defeat the enemy in a short period of time. Conventional operational concepts are not completely applicable in insurgency – as for example the concept of centre of gravity. In insurgency, the centre of gravity is not material, as it occurs with civil support, so attaining those centres involves a long-term effort.

At present, insurgents do not act only in their territories, but also outside the Theatre of Operations. This makes the conflict more complex, since nations have to coordinate to give a political, diplomatic, military, financial and police response. Besides, globalisation has put our centre of gravity – the public opinion – at the reach of insurgents.

Counter-insurgency Military Operations are different from military operations in conventional conflicts. Their goal is to foil the enemy's plan, attacking their will, focusing military operations on decisive objectives. For instance, the systematic destruction of adversary forces involves more problems than advantages. Another problem for HQ's personnel is that offensive, defensive and stabilization operations take place simultaneously. This implies a change in Military Forces' approach, as well as new training and instruction procedures focused on changing military conventional approach and mentality. A complete knowledge –culture, historical events, ethnic groups, religions, government systems, customs, etc. of the territory is essential in the operational planning process. It is very difficult to obtain civilians' support employing only western methods and approaches.

The primary function of the military is not to kill but to guarantee security, initiate reconstruction and work towards the transition of power to a legitimate local government.

One important characteristic of fighting insurgency is the fact that the military actions developed are always the subject of mass media. For this reason, the political level and the higher military levels as result of technological advantages, try to intervene directly in the execution of military actions corresponding to the lower military levels. Really, this risk is very difficult to avoid, but we should define perfectly in each level of Command responsibilities, including the political level.

Another problem is that in many scenarios, forces are multinational. This confers legitimacy on their actions, provides economy of means, and the will of solidarity and political benefit. However, multinationality makes interoperability more difficult, resulting in excessive-sized HQs deployed to conduct operations. This slows down the decision cycle, causing the loss of initiative in operations. This, added to the fact that national ROEs differ, makes operations very complex.

Success depends on obtaining the public opinion support. It is important to differentiate those forces in charge of maintaining public order and delivering crowd control, from those in charge of developing actions in support of the population. Control and public order should be assigned to the existing territorial government, although sometimes it is impossible.

Finally, it must be taken into account that our adversary has a high adaptability to our combat procedures. They exploit this fact to enhance their methods and procedures. Finabel nations must iteratively learn from their actions, the actions of their adversaries and the changes in the environment. An efficient assessment and combat experience (Lessons Learned) analysis system is therefore an essential requirement.

5. CONCLUSION

Today, all Finabel nations' forces are likely to operate in theatres where insurgencies occurred. The current insurgents as part of the modern asymmetrical actors have been inspired on former models for developing their strategy and procedures.

From the revolutionary strategy they have extracted the importance of communication, psychological action, mobilisation of crowds and the employment of time. From the guerrilla warfare they have drawn their tactical procedures adapted to an urban environment. And from organized crime they have extracted its leadership structure and their networked organization, as well as the use of possibilities offered by globalisation. The pursued aim is most likely to force political changes.

To counter these updated threats in a more likely urban environment, Finabel forces have to adapt their doctrine taking into account the specificity of the current insurgencies. The force should act in the interest of their own credibility to persuade the locals about the uselessness of any rebellion. Nonetheless, it has been shown that in this type of scenario, a force fitted with Hi-Tec assets and combat procedures based on them has tactical superiority in certain operations. However, when considering proper area control, it is also necessary to be provided with enough troops allowing to carry it on. Area control is based on understanding and analyzing events on the ground, which implies many troops to be present, as well as daily contact with the population. If area control does not achieve to establish a secure environment allowing rebuilding activities and taking up political and economic activities again—and consequently obtaining civilian support – the Field Campaign can be a complete failure.

All instruments of national power have to be employed in a unified and legal way: Defence working hand in hand with Foreign affairs, Development and all possible agencies in the theatre of operations in a fight for the population, inside and likely outside of the theatre of operations.

We have to remark that the general premise of winning the local population's " hearts and minds " in an insurgency is paramount. Therefore, all friendly activities at the tactical level, as well as any recommendation here included about Force structure and HQs organisation should meet this premise.

This objective is not easy to accomplish, especially when Finabel Countries Forces are to be deployed into scenarios where cultural, religious and social values differ from Western values. It should be always borne in mind that, in principle, the presence of a foreign military force spontaneously causes rejection, which can range from being assumed as a nuisance to being considered as an intolerable presence.

The stability operations have to be planned since the very beginning of an intervention and the headquarters must have the capability to execute dual planning and to realise effective liaison with all the actors in the theatre.

It is essential to have a deep understanding of local society and establishing realistic and pragmatic objectives at the tactical level – as well as at the operational and strategic level. Military actions should be complemented by rebuilding actions and by an effort to reorganize Economy. We should make the population understand that fighting against insurgency benefits the local population. It is crucial to reach agreements with local leaders showing a more tolerant attitude towards foreign military presence. It is also essential that these agreements can be accepted by most of civilians.

CIMIC, as engineer capabilities, reveal in those circumstances its importance, keeping in mind that all actions are to be in favour of the Force. But to act in an adequate manner, Intelligence remains one of the most important parts of the capabilities we need. Human intelligence comes up among all types of intelligence assets. Denying intelligence to the opponent is also a challenge to be raised.

When we have to strike, precision effects have to be reached, as well lethal as less lethal, to minimise collateral damages.

Finally, information remains a centre of gravity, trying to gain the confidence of the local population and to keep the will of our base.

ANNEX 1

COUNTER-INSURGENCY COMBAT. TASK CHECKLIST FOR BRIGADE LEVEL FORMATIONS AND SMALL UNITS

| BRIGADE | SMALL UNITS |
|---|--|
| 1. Establishment of control and security means | 1.1. Establishment of checkpoints. 1.2. Establishment of combat / patrolling bases. 1.3. Establishment of observation points. 1.4. Occupation of sensible points (in general terms). |
| 2. Activation of a patrolling general planning | 2.1 Information patrols. 2.2 Combat patrols. 2.3 Patrols for keeping contact with the population |
| 3. Activation of a transport and logistic movement planning | 3.1. Escorting convoys. 3.2. Journey clearance and monitoring. 3.3. Road and Rail Patrols. 3.4. Immediate reaction to ambushes. 3.5. Mine and obstacle field deliverance. |
| 4. Monitoring border-crossings. Isolation of areas. | 4.1. Establishment of surveillance and observation lines. 4.2. Establishment of reaction groups. 4.3. House searches. 4.4. Maintaining liaison and co-operating with local police. 4.5. Establishment of sieges operations. 4.6. Organization of searches. |
| 5. Constraining and controlling movements in specific areas | 5.1. Support and co-operation with the local police. 5.2. Establishment of a curfew. 5.3. Dissemination of information and orders among the population. |
| 6. Centralized management of public order | 6.1. Support and co-operating with the FCSE. 6.2. Acting as a crowd control force. 6.3. House searches. 6.4. Raids and arrests. 6.5. Development of disarmament and armament control operations. 6.6. Management of prisoner camps. 6.7. Humanitarian actions. |

| BRIGADE | SMALL UNITS |
|---|---|
| 7. Reorganization / resettlement. Control of displaced people and civilians | 7.1. Protecting civilians. 7.2. Taking and controlling a population census. 7.3. Deportations and resettlements. 7.4. Supporting the displaced/refugees. 7.5. Establishment of displaced/refugees camps. |
| 8. Maintenance and securing of civil essential infrastructures and services | 8.1. Securing key points. 8.2. Establishment of CIMIC centres. 8.3. Crucial infrastructures maintenance – or, if appropriate, protecting personnel appointed – Development of CIMIC actions and planning. 8.4. Delivery of humanitarian aid. 8.5. Controlling supplies provided to the population. |
| 9. Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence (CI) planning | 9.1. Recruitment of informers. 9.2. Development and control of local information networks. 9.3. Deployment and sustainment of collecting assets. 9.4. CI and information processing assets. 9.5. Information special missions (Special operations...). 9.6. Conduction of interrogations. |
| 10. Development of PSYOPS actions | 10.1. Dissemination of wall posts and pamphlets. 10.2. Broadcasting. |
| 11. Development of Public Information | 11.1. Addressing the media, broadcasting press releases. 11.2. Answering and attending interviews. 11.3. Answering and attending press conferences. |
| 12. Offensive actions | 12.1. Directing actions or planned attacks (also Special Operations...). 12.2. Restricted raids into urban areas. 12.3. Eliminating / seizing forces. 12.4. Establishment of ambushes. 12.5. Search operations. 12.6. Eliminating civil infrastructures employed by the enemy. 12.7. Selective destruction and seizing of enemy active elements. 12.8. Immediate attacks. 12.9. Force reconnaissance of areas, routes and key points. 12.10. Selective fire attacks. 12.11. Elimination of snipers. |

| BRIGADE | SMALL UNITS |
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| 13. Support, reinforcement or response actions | 13.1. Maintaining link with surrounded forces or civilians. 13.2. Reinforcement of threatened spots / units. 13.3. Search and pursuit operations. 13.4. Responding snipers. 13.5. Responding to IEDs. 13.6. Tackling catastrophes : fires, terrorist attacks, floods, etc. 13.7. Fire support. 13.8. Acting as FO or FAC. |
| 14. Search and Rescue actions | 14.1. Participating in search and rescue operations. |
| 15. Security Operations, defensive operations | 15.1. Defending facilities / positions. 15.2. Protecting and escorting dignitaries. 15.3. Evacuation and relocation of positions. |
| 16. Maintaining and exploiting links | 16.1. Operation and maintenance of local networks. |
| 17. Other | 17.1. Organizing and lighting helicopter landing zones. 17.2. Acting as an airmobile unit. 17.3. Military assistance actions (training of police forces, guerrillas, etc). 17.4. Negotiating with local forces or belligerent factions. 17.5. Effectuate force demonstrations and/or deterrent deployments. 17.6. Maintaining liaison and cooperating with local government. 17.7. Masked actions in special operations. 17.8. Logistic tasks. 17.9. Zone reconnaissance and NBC reports. 17.10. Adopting measures against AAA low- range fire. |

ANNEX 2

COUNTER-INSURGENCY MAIN CHARACTERISTICS

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| PLANNING | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Population is the key element in counter-insurgency. Achieving their support, or at least, their neutrality is essential for an operation to succeed. - In planning, a detailed study on the political, religious, economic, ethnic, linguistic and legal context should be developed. The population psychological aspects and customs should also be studied. - At the strategical and operational level, an effects-based planning is highly relevant for tactical level planning. - Military power must be properly applied (Minimum Force Needed). Irreparable damage or casualties must be avoided. Insurgents need “martyrs” and a disproportionate response can be exploited to promote their cause (tactic based on provocation-repression-appeal against repression). - Operations planning and conduction should be governed by the logic of our force’s action, the insurgents’ reaction – with strategical actions seeking to influence our public opinion and to cause a favourable reaction by decision-makers– and by a counter-reaction of friendly forces seeking to eliminate the insurgents’ reaction effects. |
| COMMAND AND CONTROL | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Command structures should be designed in a way allowing that all elements at each command level operating in the AOR are systematically co-ordinated with civil elements operating in that area. - As a consequence of decentralisation in combat, command and control, in the planning and conduction of operations should be aimed at fulfilling the mission. All subordinates should understand the mission, their Commander’s intent and the Desired End State. - ROEs should govern the employment of force. This are much more detailed, numerous and sensitive to political considerations. - Telecommunication systems should allow command and control of small units operating alone in distant areas as a consequence of an AOR much larger than in conventional combat. - If state security forces (police) are present in the AOR, they are required to be under the same command than Military Forces (Unified Command). |

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| <p>MANOEUVRE</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tactical actions are just a part of the actions needed to achieve the objectives required. It is essential to obtain effects on public information and the population perceptions. - Tactical actions are aimed at controlling the area. The following types can be distinguished : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Protecting the forces, civil actors responsible for solving the conflict, and civilians. It includes escorting convoys and authorities, protecting key points and bases, etc... * Controlling the area to restrict adversary's freedom of action. It includes controlling communication routes, frontiers, patrolling populated areas, etc. It requires the constant presence of units. * Controlling the threat developing actions against the elements constituting it. The aim is to progressively increase control on them. It includes locating targets and obtaining intelligence for identifying the insurgents' motives and purposes. * Keeping the threat under pressure as the situation requires. This implies launching offensives against the threat, eliminating, neutralising or seizing key points, laying siege to certain points, developing direct attack, arresting leaders, disarming the adversary, etc... - Actions are conducted by small units. Operations will be decentralised. Offensive actions will be inter-services and joint. - Special Operation Units will be required for obtaining Intelligence, providing protection to other Intelligence gathering elements, and executing direct attacks against located insurgent groups. - If state Security Forces (police) are fully operational in the AOR, it is important to co-ordinate their actions with Military actions. The police, if possible, will be responsible for maintaining public order and developing offensive operations with a significant impact on public opinion. - When the police require support by Military Forces, the missions assigned should be clearly separate and distinguished. - When the police is not operational in the AOR, task elements with legal authority –as, for example, Military Police– are required. Some of the units should have capacity to develop crowd control actions. - As the AOR is quite large, fast vehicles with enough direct-fire power (helicopters) are required. - Combat actions should always be supported with operations affecting information, civilians and their social environment. |
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| FIRE SUPPORT | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fire support is considered direct support to small units in contact with insurgents. - Non-lethal ammunitions are required. - Precision-guided ammunition is required to reduce collateral damage. - Fire-support lethal effects can also be employed with deterrent purposes. - In deciding whether or not to employ fire support, the effects to be obtained should always be considered, as well as their impact on public opinion. |
| AIR DEFENCE | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Air-defence should provide protection for the force through active and passive measures. - The threat won't be conventional, and UAV and Light plane action with suicide pilots should be considered. |
| INTELLIGENCE | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Intelligence is essential in this kind of conflict. - HUMINT gathering capabilities are essential. A wide range of human Intelligence sources will be present in the AOR. Besides, a large number of different elements (NGO, mass media personnel, civilians, political and religious leaders, etc) could be the aim of these HUMINT sources. - Force personnel should be aware of their being information sources too. - Obtaining information through EW (specially through civil telecommunications) and through open sources (OSINT) is very important in this context. - The ORBAT should include a study on relevant authorities in the AOR (political and religious leaders, NGO, etc.) - The ISTAR system employed should be fast in relation to insurgent actions. The adversary's targets will be fleeting, which means that the ISTAR system will have to generate and provide planning organs with precise, updated Intelligence, and to advise them on the targets to attain in short time. - Counter-Intelligence cells should maintain operations security, and control local civil personnel collaborating with the Military Forces (interpreters, logistic support, externalization, etc). - If local Security Forces (police) are fully operational in the AOR, Intelligence should be shared with them, and mechanisms should be established to protect Intelligence flow. - OPSEC should establish mechanisms for preventing attacks to friendly information systems by hackers. Information processing systems should be protected against intruders who can provide – voluntarily or involuntarily– insurgents with information. |

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| MOBILITY AND COUNTER-MOBILITY | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Initially, it does not seem necessary to enhance the number of counter-mobility capabilities. - On the other hand, mobility capability should be enhanced, specially to face combat in urban areas. |
| PROTECTION | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Protecting personnel is a priority. This is not only to conserve combat capacity, but also because the enemy will try to cause casualties, being aware of the impact that casualties have on Western public opinion. - Units must be provided with a high level of individual and collective protecting measures. However, individual protection does not merely involves providing proper equipment, but also providing training on the different rules, and their compliance. - IED neutralization systems are essential. Personnel must be properly trained in explosives, and receive updated information on their enhancement and evolution, and on every new procedure employed by insurgents. - Counter RAM (rockets, artillery munition and mortars) capability is required. |
| LOGISTIC SUPPORT | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - It should be taken into account that operations in this kind of scenario are long in time. Therefore, a sustained support to maintain action during the whole campaign is required. - Personnel is an important factor, so actions focused on boosting their morale, replacements, leaves, etc. are necessary. Force generation is also relevant: relieving units, rest periods, training periods, etc. are important as well. - Dispersion of bases hinder logistic support tasks. - Supply / evacuation routes have a high probability to suffer attacks from the adversary. - The population should receive basic essentials from friendly forces, at least temporarily until the civil organizations intervene, so supply tasks should be planned. - Medical assistance deployed should cover primary health care, as well as the stabilization of potential casualties, and their evacuation to national territory. - Sanitary facilities can be employed –following proper security measures – as a complement in emergency situations supporting the civil population, or supporting CIMIC actions with the civil population. |

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| <p style="text-align: center;">INFORMATION OPERATIONS (INFO OPS)</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - INFO OPS are highly relevant in this type of scenario, and they should support any military action developed by the Force. - INFO OPS should be co-ordinated from the highest command level and embrace the three levels of conduction as a whole. - Within INFO OPS, psychological operations, CIMIC and public information have an important impact on actions at the tactical level developed to support Force Commander's objectives, and to counter enemy actions and information. - Public information must be timely to prevent adversary systems from obtaining, processing or disseminating information –misinformation– among local and international public opinion. A proper Public Information Plan should be developed focusing on every operation to be developed, and where public opinion is critical. - Enemy propaganda should be countered through an extensive psychological and communication campaign affecting local public opinion in the AOR and international public opinion. - Psychological operations should be based on a detailed analysis of the target audience, and the product obtained from this analysis should be fitted to this audience. Other more general products are not applicable to this scenario. - CIMIC action should be designed to favour the mission of the Forces operating in the AOR. In this type of scenario, projects with strong impact and short duration acquire a crucial relevance. - Within C2 Warfare, actions centered on defending friendly information systems, and on attacking enemy networks and information systems should be included. These systems are a key element for enemy C2, information and propaganda systems. - Intelligence and INFO OPS should closely cooperate. |
| <p style="text-align: center;">MORALE AND LEGALITY</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Every combatant must have high morale and initiative. This will allow him to be highly motivated and have a broad mentality to develop different tasks as combat actions, humanitarian aid or CIMIC actions. - Actions must be within the legal framework. Individual actions disregarding legality have a negative multiplier effect. This would involve the loss of civilian's support. - A flexible and efficient Lessons Learned system (Lessons Learned) should be established. This system would exploit the knowledge acquired in benefit of the whole Force, as a consequence of the insurgents' capacity to adapt to our combat procedures. |