The European Defence Fund – A Slow and Opaque Relay Race to Yesterday’s Needs?

On 9 January 2024, Thierry Breton, Commissioner for the Internal Market and in charge of the European Defence Fund (EDF) and defence industry, announced that he was proposing a new €100 billion defence fund to strengthen the EU’s defence industry (Wax & Kayali, 2024). The statement came in the context of an apparent failure to supply Ukraine with a promised million artillery shells within a year, which he insisted that the Union would nonetheless accomplish, and as the EU’s defence sector becomes increasingly centralised. Most astonishing, however, is that the proposed sum largely surpasses any fund that EU institutions have previously devoted to the defence industry. With the most recent EU capability development tool for defence and security being the EDF, with €8 billion spread over the 2021-2027 period, talks about a newer and larger framework for EU defence funding raise numerous questions regarding framework and administration. While the new interest in defence spending at an EU level is inherently different to the EDF in that it is intended to finance the procurement of equipment rather than just its development, it appears to be an extension of the EDF framework.

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Wagner’s Strategic Control in Africa: Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Legacy

Following the recent death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the former leader of the Wagner Group, uncertainty clouds the future trajectory of this mercenary group and its strategic operations across Africa. Wagner has long been shrouded in ambiguity, often categorized as a Private Military Group (PMC), a Private Security Company (PSC), or simply a band of mercenaries. However, some analysts argue that it extends beyond these definitions, asserting that its influence campaigns are orchestrated on behalf of the Russian government to bolster Russia’s position in strategic competition with the West (Pokalova, 2023).  Over the past decade, the Wagner Group has wielded substantial influence across Africa, utilising defence and security services to obtain access to strategically vital natural resources. Moreover, emerging evidence from Russian documents suggests a deliberate endeavour by the Kremlin to reshape Africa’s mining sector, with the aim of sidelining Western competitors from critical strategic areas. Despite Prigozhin’s demise, the Wagner Group’s continued expansion across various African nations, including the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, and Sudan, underscores its persistent pursuit of objectives with unwavering determination. After setting the context for Wagner's activities under the leadership of Yevgeny Prigozhin, this paper will explore the current situation of the mercenary group's operations in three African countries (CAR, Mali, and Sudan). It will illustrate how the group offers security services in exchange for access to natural resources and how it has gained momentum in these contexts, partly due to the absence of a Western presence.

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EU Mission Aspides to Secure Trade in the Red Sea: An Opportunity for Decisive EU Foreign Policy and Interoperability or Doomed to Failure?

The military conflict that broke out in Gaza in October 2023 spread when, out of self-proclaimed solidarity with the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip (BBC, 2024), the Yemenite Shia Islamist Houthis began attacking civilian merchant ships in the Red Sea at the end of 2023. Due to Yemen's geopolitically significant location at the entrance to the Red Sea, the attacks led to a massive decline in trade through the corridor, which is of crucial importance for Europe. The US responded decisively in December 2023 with the naval mission Operation Prosperity Guardian, however, in contrast, the EU's own response, designated Operation Eunavfor Aspides, was slow to get off the ground. Notwithstanding, now that the EU’s plans have been finalised, this InfoFlash aims to analyse the EU mission with regard to its operational realisation, its creation and mandate, what exactly the EU can achieve through it, and its risks and challenges. Moreover, this InfoFlash will delve into the international consequences of the mission, and how it may shape the perception of the EU on the world stage. In this respect, the mission has the potential to provide a wide array of opportunities to the Union. For instance, the EU could seize the opportunity to demonstrate to the world that it is an internally united global player who is prepared to effectively carry out risky missions in order to fulfil its foreign policy responsibilities by promoting security and stability in the world.

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Geopolitical Tightrope in the South Caucasus: EU’s Strategic Interests Amid Escalation on the Armenia-Azerbaijan Border

Azerbaijan, backed by Russia, has made clear that it will not hesitate to use force to open the Zangezur Corridor (also known as Meghri Corridor) through the Armenian territory to its exclave of Nakhchivan and its ‘brother’ Turkey. The attack occurred from Azerbaijani positions within Armenian territory that had been previously invaded. The fact that the incident occurred within the sovereign state borders of Armenia fuels the growing security concerns of the Armenian population, sceptical about the peaceful coexistence alongside Azerbaijan. On 13 February, the Armenian Ministry of Defence released a statement that four soldiers were killed and one was wounded in an Azerbaijani open fire at a post in the southern region of Armenia’s Syunik. In return, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence claimed that Armenian troops fired on the village of Kokhanabi in Azerbaijan’s Tovuz District on the evening of 12 February, injuring one border guard and prompting the launch of a “retaliatory operation” in revenge.

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Finland in NATO – What’s Next?

Finland’s official entry into NATO on 4 April 2023 marked the culmination of a meticulously orchestrated 11-month accession process, catalysed by the destabilising events surrounding the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While Finland’s accession to NATO may appear straightforward, it was expedited in light of the urgent security imperatives prompted by the invasion. Nevertheless, the transition to NATO membership calls for careful consideration of the multifaceted security dynamics between Finland and the alliance. In this context, this paper endeavours to cast a forward-looking perspective, examining the future trajectory of NATO-Finnish cooperation post-accession. Concretely, it will look at what the next steps are that NATO and Finland could and/or should take after the latter’s accession to the former. Central to this exploration is an assessment of the potential avenues for Finland to further integrate into NATO’s operational framework. Specifically, a detailed analysis will be undertaken to evaluate the feasibility and implications of expanding NATO’s presence within Finnish territory through initiatives such as the enhanced forward presence (eFP). Then, the paper will explore the prospects for enhanced collaboration within the Northern Group, leveraging Finland’s NATO membership to deepen regional defence cooperation. Furthermore, consideration will be given to the merits of Finland joining the Bucharest Nine (B9) group, elucidating the potential benefits and strategic imperatives associated with such a move.

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