From Pacifism to Armament: Unravelling the Paradox of Swedish Arms Trade

‘It is a human right to feel safe’ (Saab, 2020). This is how Sweden’s primary arms manufacturer, Saab AB (hereafter referred to as Saab), has recently articulated its vision and mission. Most security branding studies have primarily concentrated on examining the methods employed by state and non-state entities to cultivate secure and safe perceptions of a location. However, there has been less investigation into how the established brand reputation of inherently safe, secure, and tranquil places is leveraged to promote security-related goods or services. This gap in research is particularly noticeable in the context of the Nordic region. Apart from Iceland, most Nordic nations boast significant security sectors. While initially focused on serving their domestic markets, these industries have gradually expanded their operations over the last three decades. Consequently, certain Nordic nations have emerged as significant suppliers of security technologies and weapon systems internationally. Simultaneously, these countries are widely perceived and labelled as the ‘do-gooders’ in global affairs (de Bengy Puyvallée & Bjørkdahl, 2021). This perception is supported by many characterisations of the Nordics as ‘agents of a world common good’ (Bergman, 2007) and ‘moral superpowers’ (Dahl, 2006). In this article, the focus is directed towards Sweden. Sweden presents an intriguing case study due to several notable factors: until its recent accession to NATO, it had boasted a lengthy tradition of military non-alignment and had been generally perceived as a ‘neutral’ nation. Additionally, Sweden has not engaged in armed conflict with another state since 1814, which is one of the lengthiest periods of uninterrupted peace among all nations worldwide (Bjereld & Möller, 2016). However, since the mid-1990s, Sweden has maintained a substantial arms industry in support of its ‘total defence’ model. Remarkably, despite its size, the country has produced weapon systems for all military branches – air, land, and sea – mainly due to substantial investments in military research and development (Stenlås, 2008). With the reprioritisation of Sweden’s security policy and reductions in defence budgets during the 1990s and 2000s, major arms manufacturers like Saab were compelled to internationalise and focus on exports. This shift positioned the Swedish industry as a significant participant in today’s global arms trade alongside some of the most influential states worldwide (Burja, 2022). While academics have extensively examined Sweden’s foreign and security policies, its defence industry has been neglected within branding literature. Therefore, this article seeks to fill this gap by bringing attention to current research on Nordic branding – specifically its practices and impacts – and shedding light on its link with security. The focus then shifts to analysing how actors within the defence industry, both public and private, utilise symbolic representations to shape a specific interpretation of ‘progressive’ national branding tropes for commercial objectives.

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The New European Defence Industrial Strategy: Can the EU walk the talk?

On March 5, 2024, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented the first European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS, hereafter ‘the Strategy’) that she had announced in the 2023 State of the Union speech (European Commission, 2023; 2024b). The Strategy is an important milestone in the EU’s efforts to establish itself as a prominent security and defence actor. It sets out an ambitious plan to scale up the EU’s defence industry to improve the Union’s overall defence capability. EDIS signals the European Commission’s determination to assume a more prominent role in defence amid efforts for a greater European component in defence to navigate increasingly volatile world politics and the return of conventional warfare to European soil. Nevertheless, EDIS bears unresolved issues, most notably pertaining to the Strategy’s budget. It remains undecided and unclear where the financing necessary to pursue and implement the Strategy’s objectives will come from. The main obstacles here are a lack of political unity and differing member state priorities, as well as a lack of trust between the defence industries and governments. This paper examines the EDIS and assesses the EU’s ability to implement the Strategy’s objectives and address emerging challenges while accounting for differing member state perspectives. For the EU to “walk the talk” and live up to its commitments, there is a need for long-term financial incentives at the EU level and strong support from the Capitals to compensate for a previous deficit in defence spending in the past and make the Union a capable actor in security and defence.

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Understanding Cope Cages: From Origins to Standardisation

Tank warfare remains a favourite among online aficionados due to the enduring cultural fascination with heavy armour. Events from the Russo-Ukrainian War, particularly the recent incident involving the apparent disabling of a Russian T-90M tank by two Ukrainian-operated US-supplied Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) have reignited interest in armoured combat. The ongoing debate surrounding the effectiveness of various tank designs continues to resonate across social media platforms and official channels. However, the emergence of distinct netting structures above tank turrets and other armoured vehicles has garnered significant attention since their increased use in the Russo-Ukrainian War as well as the more recent Israeli-Hamas War (Parker et al., 2022; Axe, 2023). Considered a form of improvised cage armour, these humorously labelled ‘cope cages’ remain relatively prevalent despite increasing scepticism of their utility. This study provides an overview of these improvised armour structures, analysing their origin and current standardisation and assessing their perceived impact.

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Sweden in NATO: Legal Status and Future Challenges

On 7 March 2024, after decades of close partnership, Sweden finally joined NATO. Its accession followed a strict process involving the approval of all Parties of the Alliance. Before this pivotal moment, Sweden’s application to NATO was engaged in an unstable diplomatic negotiation between former Allies. This paper aims to analyse the legal framework and the future setup of NATO after this substantial transformation.

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Ammunition Aid: Kosovo’s Contribution to Ukraine’s Defence

The announcement made by Ejup Maqedonci, Kosovo's Minister of Defence, during the 20th Meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group on 19 March 2024 is a significant development in the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Kosovo's pledge to provide military aid to Ukraine underscores the country’s political alignment with both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) and its willingness to join collective efforts in support of Ukraine's defence. Kosovo has committed to supply two military aid packages, which includes essential resources such as trucks, tactical vehicles, armoured personnel carriers, and mortar artillery shells. This is the first time the country has provided military assistance to Ukraine. Amidst Ukraine's acute shortage of ammunition, a confluence of factors including the political deadlock in the US Congress and production constraints in Europe have accentuated the severity of this situation. This prompts a closer examination whether Kosovo's military aid package, though undoubtedly valuable, sufficiently grapples the enormity of Ukraine’s ammunition crisis.

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